

THE MAKING OF THE EUROPEAN HEGEMONIC ORDER: HEGEMONIC
STRUGGLES THROUGH FOOTBALL

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

CAN IRGALI

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

SEPTEMBER 2022

Approval of the thesis:

THE MAKING OF EUROPEAN HEGEMONIC ORDER: HEGEMONIC STRUGGLES THROUGH FOOTBALL

submitted by **CAN IRGALI** in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of **Master of Science in International Relations, the Graduate School of Social Sciences of Middle East Technical University** by,

Prof. Dr. Yaşar KONDAKÇI
Dean
Graduate School of Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Ebru BOYAR
Head of Department
Department of International Relations

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Özgehan ŞENYUVA
Supervisor
Department of International Relations

Examining Committee Members:

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Yüksel Alper ECEVİT (Head of the Examining Committee)
Çukurova University
Department of Political Science and International Relations

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Özgehan ŞENYUVA (Supervisor)
Middle East Technical University
Department of International Relations

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Derya GÖÇER
Middle East Technical University
Department of Area Studies

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last Name: Can IRGALI

Signature:

ABSTRACT

THE MAKING OF EUROPEAN HEGEMONIC ORDER: HEGEMONIC STRUGGLES THROUGH FOOTBALL

IRGALI, Can

M.S., The Department of International Relations

Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Özgehan ŞENYUVA

September 2022, 177 pages

This thesis investigates the hegemonic struggles in European football. This study aims to unfold how the global popularity of sport, specifically football have been utilized by various actors both with in/out the global field of sport to establish a hegemonic order and to expand it. The process of commodification and internationalization have caused football to become a contested field where there is a constant struggle for hegemony between the elite football clubs and the UEFA. This struggle revolves around the UEFA Champions League, the premier European level competitions and the apex of football in the world. The elite football clubs have tried to formulate a breakaway league in which they can group the best teams in Europe so that a much more competitive, more prestigious, and a more revenues can emerge at the expense of a further alienation of the fans, rupture in the existing hierarchical and institutional order in the European football. However, this pursuit driven by purely greed and endless pursuit of glory have crumbled, and the current hegemonic order in the European football is maintained which is designed and progressed, and utilized by the European Union to implement its hegemonic projects through its institutional capacity and power.

Keywords: European Union, hegemonic struggle, UEFA, UEFA Champions League, elite football clubs.

ÖZ

AVRUPA HEGEMONİK DÜZENİNİN YAPIMI: FUTBOL ÜZERİNDEN HEGEMONİK MÜCADELELER

IRGALI, Can

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Özgehan ŞENYUVA

Eylül 2022, 177 sayfa

Bu tez, Avrupa hegemonik düzeninin inşasını, ve bu düzen içerisindeki hegemonik mücadeleleri anlatmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu çalışma, sporun uluslararası popülaritesinin, özellikle futbolun hegemonik bir düzen kurmak ve onu genişletmek için hem küresel spor alanı içindeki hem de dışındaki aktörler tarafından nasıl kullanıldığını ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır. Metalaşma ve uluslararasılaşma süreci, futbol, seçkin futbol kulüpleri ile UEFA arasında sürekli bir hegemonya mücadelesinin yaşandığı çekişmeli bir alan haline gelmesine sebep olmuştur. Bu mücadele, Avrupa'nın en önde gelen ve dünya futbolunun zirvesi olan UEFA Şampiyonlar Ligi etrafında dönmektedir. Seçkin futbol kulüpleri, taraftarların daha da yabancılaşması ve Avrupa futbolunu kurumsal ve hiyerarşik olarak parçalayacak olması pahasına, daha fazla rekabetin, prestijin ve gelirin oluşacağı Avrupa'nın en iyi ve güçlü takımlarının yer alacağı ayrılıkçı bir ligi oluşturmaya çalışmışlardır. Ancak, Avrupa Birliği'nin kurumsal kapasitesi ve gücü ile hegemonik projelerini hayata geçirmek için tasarladığı, geliştirdiği ve kullandığı Avrupa futbolundaki mevcut düzen korunmuştur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Birliği, hegemonik mücadele, UEFA, UEFA Şampiyonlar Ligi, seçkin futbol kulüpleri.

To the unfading memory of my father Mücahit Irgalı

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First of all, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Özgehan Şenyuva for navigating me through the challenges with his kindness, wit, and his kindred spirit. This thesis emboldened by his constructive criticism, heartfelt support, and his genuine belief in me.

I am also grateful to Assoc. Prof. Dr. Derya Göçer and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Yüksel Alper Ecevit for their insights and guidance that contribute to make the thesis more consistent and coherent.

I would like to send my thanks and regards to Asst. Prof. Dr. Selin Akyüz who has a significant influence in my academic life back at Bilkent University, and started my journey here at Middle East Technical University, without her mentorship, my academic life would not be the same.

Most importantly, I am deeply grateful to my family members, namely Ayten Irgalı, my mother, and Onur Irgalı, my brother. They are the ones I turn to when the night is darkest. Their mere presence give me strength, perseverance, and hope for the future.

Secondly, I would like to send my warmest thanks to my aunt Kadiriye Ayten whose belief in me never wavered as long as I can remember, my cousin Hazal Ayten who happily and enthusiastically support me as I progressed through my academic life, and my uncle Murat Coşgun who has always made himself available to me when I am in need of a help.

Thirdly, I am forever grateful to Bengüsu Fal for her unconditional support, endless tolerance, and for her comradery that spanned over 12 years. She facilitated my transition to METU and contributed to this thesis in any way she can despite the distance.

Furthermore, I would like to thank İlayda Döne for her invaluable and irreplaceable friendship. She has been an indispensable in every aspect and every

period of my life through joy and sorrow. I wish that we will remain by each other's side until the end, my beloved sister.

Lastly, I would sincerely like to thank my dearest friend Göze Kocalmıř for she has been a source of joy, laughter, and love. She has always found a way to motivate me mostly through her contagious excitement and passion.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM.....	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZ.....	v
DEDICATION.....	vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	ix
LIST OF TABLES.....	xi
LIST OF FIGURES	xii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	xiii
CHAPTERS	
1. INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 A Definition of Sport	7
1.2 A Brief History of Football	9
1.3 The Champions League: A Hegemonic Concern	11
1.4 Conclusion.....	13
2. SPORT AND POLITICS: AN OVERVIEW	15
2.1 The Historical Accounts of Football and Authoritarianism	17
2.1.1 A Vehicle for Consensus and Consent: <i>Il Calcio</i>	17
2.1.2 Spanish Football: A Contested Field for Culture and Identity.....	22
2.2 The Geopolitics of Regional Aspirations: Hosting Mega Sport-Events.....	27
2.2.1 Mega-Sport Events	28
2.2.2 The Rise of South Korea’s Hallyu: The Augmentation of Soft Power.....	31

2.2.3	Qatari Experience of FIFA World Cup 2022: Soft Disempowerment	35
2.3.	Sport as an Engine for Development: the United Nations	39
2.4.	Conclusion	45
3.	THE INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN OF THE EUROPEAN FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE	48
3.1	FIFA and the World Cup	49
3.2	UEFA's Hegemonic Position and Hegemonic Projects in the European Football	55
3.3	Football Clubs and Hegemonic Struggles in European Football	66
4.	THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OVER FOOTBALL IN EUROPE	73
4.1	The Emergence of the UEFA Champions League	73
4.2	Hegemonic Struggles over the Champions League	77
4.3	European Super League Project	83
5.	THE EUROPEAN UNION AND SPORT	93
5.1	European Union and the European Hegemonic Projects	94
5.2	The Construction of European Identity through Football	98
5.3	ECJ's Bosman Ruling	103
5.4	Broadcasting in Europe	107
6.	CONCLUSION	119
	REFERENCES:	126
APPENDICES		
	APPENDIX A: TURKISH SUMMARY/TÜRKÇE ÖZET	145
	APPENDIX B: THESIS PERMISSION FORM/ TEZ İZİN FORMU	161

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1:Documentary Sources	7
Table 2:East Asian counties and their Mega Sport Events hosting records.....	33
Table 3:The list of most valuable European football clubs.....	69

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Generated Revenues and Expenses of FIFA in World Cups	53
Figure 2. The wage spending of the elite football clubs between 2018 and 2020	65
Figure 3. Elite football clubs in the transfer market from post-FFP to 2021 summer, 65	
Figure 4: Distribution and Solidarity Payments in relations to UEFA total revenues	80
Figure 5: Revenues generated by the UEFA Champions League	81

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CAF	Confederation of African Football
CONCACAF	The North American Confederation
CONI	Italian Olympic Committee
CONMEBOL	South American Football Confederation
DGCP	Directorate General for Competition Policy
EC	European Commission
ECA	European Club Association
ECF	European Club Forum
ECJ	European Court of Justice
EEIG	European Economic Interest Group
EU	European Union
FFP	Financial Fair Play
FIFA <i>Association</i>	<i>Fédération Internationale de Football</i>
FORCE	Football Organization Redesign for the next Century in Europe
FIFPro	<i>The Fédération Internationale des Associations de Footballeurs Professionnels</i>
FSE	Football Supporters Europe
IOC	International Olympic Committee
MDG	Millennium Development Goals

MSE	Mega Sport Events
NGO	Non-governmental Organizations
OCF	Oceania Football Confederation
UCL	UEFA Champions League
UEFA	Union of European Football Associations
UN	United Nations
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
SDP	Sport for Development and Peace
TEAM	Television Event and Media Marketing

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Sport in general, and football in particular Sport in general, and football in particular are elements belonging to the cultural terrain which builds on and shapes the experiences of the individual activities and become a force in the construction of and contestation for hegemony¹. The global field of football comprise of a number of social forces infused with different powers and capabilities operate under commodification which has cultivated to the football, especially to European football. The role of ideas, institutions, and culture are significant both in the construction of a hegemony and the establishment of a hegemonic order, and in discerning the already establish hegemonic order and hegemonic blocs as they draw a general framework for the formulation of dominant ethos, and the emergence of social forces². The dominant ideas govern the European football have been favored by the hierarchical institutions in the global field of football, and have been internalized as a cultural practice by the social forces who are in a cycle of struggle and compromise which are significant in the making of European hegemonic order. This thesis aims to unfold how the hegemonic struggles of the social forces in European football make the European hegemonic order which requires to determine the continuities and ruptures of the social forces' hegemonic projects in an era defined predominantly by the commodification process. The following sections of the introduction unpack the stages in the neo-gramscian construction of hegemony to draw a theoretical framework for the thesis, identify the social forces' struggle in European football by focusing on their hegemonic interests and hegemonic projects.

¹ Andrews, D. & Silk. M. (2012). *Sport and Neoliberalism: Politics, Consumption, and Culture*. Temple University Press. P.5.

² Ramesh, S. (2021). "Neo-Gramscian interpretations on ideas, institutions, and hegemony", *Berlin Journal of Critical Theory*, 5:2, p.102.

Social forces engendered by the social relations of production that is “not confined to the production of physical goods used or consumed but covers the production and reproduction of knowledge and of the social relations, morals and institutions that are prerequisites to the production of physical goods”³. The domination of the social forces in a given order is established by “engineering political institutions, economic systems, and governance frameworks that sustain the regime of commodification and capital accumulation”⁴. The preservation the commodification regime and capital accumulation dictates domination and subjugation over other social forces which can be achieved through the political, economic, and social system founded on the exploitative capabilities of capital⁵. The social forces contending with one another aim to establish a historic bloc composed of an economic, political, and historical elements⁶. The historic bloc refers to “social forces who share particular interests come together to form a distinctly dominant class to establish a dominant social order informed by ideas or ideology, institutions, and culture”⁷. However, the social forces that form a historic bloc aim to become a hegemonic bloc through controlling and organizing the production of goods/commodities, incorporating the interests of other social forces into their own, and having a total control over the culture⁸. The construction of a hegemony happens when a leading social forces in an order compound the diverse aspirations and general interests of various social forces which can be achieved through a formulation and implementation of hegemonic projects which function as a comprehensive concept of control⁹. Therefore, hegemony is “an expression of broadly based consent, manifested in the acceptance of ideas and supported by material resources and institutions which is established by the social

³ Morton, D. A. (2003). “Social Forces in the Struggle over Hegemony: Neo-Gramscian Perspectives in International Political Economy”, *Rethinking Marxism*, 15:2, p.155.

⁴ Morton, D. A. (2003). P.112.

⁵ Ramesh (2021). *Op.cit.* p.103.

⁶ *Ibid.* P.104.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ Morton (2003). *Op.cit.* p.159.

forces occupying a leading role in a certain order”¹⁰. The power configurations in a hegemonic order involve “an ebb and flow of influences, illustrative of the reflexive and generative capacity of social forces to confirm, adapt, negotiate, and at times remake their institutions and cultures.”¹¹

Football in Europe contains a number of social forces, most notably football clubs and the UEFA, these social forces possess different powers and responsibilities such as producing the football matches and regulating football competitions in different levels which dictate a constant reproduction and reassessment of the power dynamics between them. The leading role in the field of football is claimed by the richest and most successful football clubs who consider themselves as the engine for progress and expansion of European football, especially after the commodification process. The hegemonic projects of these elite football clubs driven by their pursuit of capital, success, and glory through re-structuring the Champions League to attain more money so that they continue to dominate the domestic and European level competitions and exploit other football clubs to maintain their powerful position at the expense of the common interest of the European football pyramid. These football clubs have opted to act in a way that only served their hegemonic interests, especially against the UEFA who is the sovereign organizer of European level competitions and the main regulator and distributor of the broadcasting revenues and prize money generated by the most prestigious event in European football, the Champions League. UEFA, despite the fact that it is the hierarchical superior of the every stakeholder in European football, has not been able to manage to formulate hegemonic projects to incorporate different positions and interests of the other social forces. Furthermore, the hegemonic projects implemented by the UEFA to preserve both the historic hegemonic position of itself and the greater interests of the European football pyramid led only the empowerment of the elite football clubs. The power dynamics in the hegemonic struggles for the making of European hegemonic order have changed as football entered into the European Union’s agenda, and since then there has been a systemic restraint on the

¹⁰ Bieler, A. & Morton, D. A. (2004). “A critical theory route to hegemony, World order and historical change: neo-Gramscian perspectives in International Relations”, *Class & Capital*, 28(1), p.87

¹¹ Sugden, J. And Tomlinson, A. (2002). *Theory and method for a critical sociology of sport*. New York: Routledge. P.8.

actors in the European football pyramid brought by the institutional venues of the EU, it can actively shape the future of the European football pyramid by implementing its hegemonic projects such as the gradual expansion and increase in areas of competence, facilitation of competition, empowerment of supranational institutions, and guaranteeing the freedom of movement of goods, services, capital, and labor. Even though hegemony necessitates a counter-hegemony that aims to build a unity across different social forces disadvantaged and exploited by the existing hegemonic order and the historic bloc, in football there is not a social force whose vision for the future fundamentally differs from the rest of the actors. Every stakeholder in European football, pyramid have been formulating hegemonic projects to preserve, strengthen, and expand their hegemonic interests, thus serving the not only the making but also the continuation of the existing European hegemonic order in European football.

The rest of the introduction will explain the significance of sport and the origins of the sporting activity to pinpoint the current state of sport, more specifically the current state of football in Europe. Then, there will be a discussion on the diffusion and evolution of football to a historical stage where commodification and internationalization become permanent in European football. Last section of the introduction will briefly mention the pyramid structure of football to deliberate on the European football governance, and talk about the historical evolution of the Champions League as the center of hegemonic struggles.

In Chapter 2, the main focus will be on the multidimensional relationship between sport and politics with a specific focus on how sport is utilized by various actors to pursue their respective goals and interests in national, regional, and international levels. The section 2.1 of the Chapter 2 will serve to uncover the nature of the hegemonic struggles and the co-constitutive purpose and dimension of the hegemonic projects formulated and implemented by the hegemonic bloc and counter hegemonic bloc in respective national context which will be the Italy under Mussolini and Spain under Franco. In addition to the hegemonic struggles fought in the national context, there will be an investigation on how nation-states utilize Mega-Sport events as a source of soft power to pursue their regional aspirations. The section 2.2 will explain South Korean and Qatari experiences with hosting MSEs to show the utilization of sport does not guarantee success and can result in failure which in this case it is either

augmentation of soft power or soft disempowerment. The final section 2.3 will discuss the United Nations' interest in sport in general, and football in particular. United Nations aims to utilize sport to foster peace and development by tapping into its cultural potential and popularity across the world. It operates under broad mandate to address the needs and interests of the disadvantaged, however in spite the institutional capacity and will, fails to deliver on its promises.

In Chapter 3, there will be a discussion on how the process of commodification has transformed the interests, consolidated or undermined the hegemonic positions, and shaped the hegemonic projects of the actors in football pyramid. The sections constituting the Chapter 3 will talk about the FIFA's historical development and its hegemonic project, and will explain the emergence of UEFA and its' historical development, and its hegemonic project for the European football pyramid, and will explain the origin and evolution of the football clubs vis-à-vis commodification which empowers some of the football clubs to become richest and most powerful football clubs in Europe, and lastly set the stage for the hegemonic struggles between the UEFA and the richest and powerful football clubs(elite football clubs).

In Chapter 4, an emerging battlefield for the hegemonic struggles transpire between the elite football clubs and the UEFA in European football will be introduced as the UEFA Champions League. This chapter investigates the formulation of the UCL as a result of a hegemonic struggle between UEFA and the elite football clubs, and focus on the hegemonic struggles after the establishment of the UCL by discussing the formulation and implementation of the hegemonic projects of both UEFA and the elite football clubs which ultimately lead to another contestation in their hegemonic struggle.

In Chapter 5, the main focus will be on the European Union as the only actor who is not reside directly in the football pyramid but has the power to transform not only the football itself but also the positions, interests, and projects of the actors who are in a hegemonic struggle. However, the transformative force of the EU is not limited to other actors only, EU engages to sport in general, and football in particular to pursue its hegemonic interests. This chapter unfolds the hegemonic projects of the European Union and their implementation.

The answers to these questions require a qualitative method. The research for the thesis was conducted by a mixture of primary and secondary sources which include academic literature, press releases, statements, reports, and official documents disclosed by the relevant actors. The primary sources helped me to pinpoint the interests and projects of the actors involved in the struggle transpire in the European football. The documents prepared and disclosed by the actors such as UEFA, football clubs, and the relevant institutions of the European Union comprehensively outlines their priorities and strategies, and their policies both for the current struggles and the future challenges they might take place in the European football. Furthermore, the primary sources provide me a roadmap to follow so that I can analyze their interests, projects of the actors in a neo-gramscian context that I have learned through the secondary sources. The secondary sources not only enable me to draw a theoretical framework for the thesis but also provided a rich literature on sport's and football's significance, football's diffusion, how commodification process fundamentally change not only the fabric of this global game but also the interests of the actors that directly/indirectly involved in European football, the point of contestations in the actors' hegemonic struggles. In addition to the establishment of the actors' interests and projects who are directly participate and engage with European football, secondary sources also lead me to trace the historical evolution of sport in European Union's agenda, to designate European Union's interests and projects for the European football. This thesis, having took advantage on the rich literature on sport, aims to contribute to the literature on European football by unpacking the current state of European football with a specific focus on how the hegemonic struggles and projects of various actors, namely of the elite football clubs and the UEFA, and the European Union. The hegemonic struggles of the actors make and re-make of the European hegemonic order in football characterized with contestation and negotiation for the power to control and shape the future of European football. The thesis aspire to prove the existing European hegemonic order made by the hegemonic struggles of the aforementioned actors have been sustained through series of clashes of the actors' hegemonic projects which have only breed conflict and systemic exploitation to attain more and more capital.

Table 1: Documentary Sources

Primary Sources	Secondary Sources
Official documents and press releases of the European Commission	Scholarly journals and books
European Council conclusions	Doctoral dissertations
European Court of Justice judgements	Conference Papers
Press releases of football organizations	Reports of research institutes
Websites of G-14 and European Super League	
Official and working documents of UEFA	
Newspaper articles of media institutions	

1.1 A Definition of Sport

Sport is a multi-dimensional and multi-purposeful activity that captures time, place, and emotion as it can be performed by people in an amateur spirit, played professionally as an athlete or can be experienced and enjoyed either as a spectator or as a fan, and it can be utilized for political and social purposes. Sport has been a central social practice throughout history as it represents “human drama at its finest, providing a stimulus and an acceptable arena for the expression of the full range of human emotions”¹²; it is built on the limits of a human capacity¹³; it tells a story of heroes and villains; it attracts large and passionately devoted audiences¹⁴; it is “cheap to produce,

¹² Jackson, SJ. (2013). “The contested terrain of sport diplomacy in a globalizing World” .*International Area Studies Review*, 16(3), p 275.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

relative to other types of media programming¹⁵; it is associated with positive images of health and nationhood¹⁶”. Further, Nelson Mandela points out the social significance and power of the sport by stating:

Sport has the power to change the world. It has the power to inspire, it has the power to unite people in a way that little else does. It speaks to the youth in a language they understand. Sport can create hope, where once there is only despair, and laughs in the face of all types of discrimination.¹⁷

The definition of sporting activity is bound to historical and cultural variations, denoting leisure pursuits such as hunting and shooting to recreational activities among friends¹⁸. The current nature and state of sporting activity require a more comprehensive and systematic definition. Giulianotti defines sporting activity as follows: “it must be structured by rules and codes of conduct, by spatial and temporal frameworks, it must be goal-oriented and competitive so that the winners and losers are identifiable, it must be ludic to germinate excitement.¹⁹” These benchmarks not only enable people to explain and comprehend how the sporting activity is conducted but also remains mostly the same for every level of sporting activity. A sporting activity can take place in various settings with various purposes. Garcia classifies sporting activities as sport for all, amateur sport, semi-professional sport, and professional sport²⁰. Then Garcia explains these activities as follows: the sport for all is a physical activity that is conducted in people’s leisure time to benefit health, personal and social development, and integration; the amateur sport follows the same logic as the sport for all but also it builds upon the characteristics of being competitive and organized; the semi-professional sport requires a degree of dedication from the athletes as they make a living out of it but also needs some sort of subsidy to survive;

¹⁵Jackson, S. (2012). “Reflections on Communication and Sport: On Advertising and Promotional Culture”, *Communication & Sport*, 1-2, p.101.

¹⁶ Jackson (2012). *Op.cit.* P.101

¹⁷<https://www.globalgoals.org/news/sport-for-development-and-peace/#:~:text=In%202000%2C%20at%20the%20inaugural,in%20a%20language%20they%20understand.>

¹⁸ Giulianotti, R. (2015). *Sport. A Critical Sociology*. Polity Press. P.15.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* p. 16.

²⁰ Garcia, B. (2008). *The European Union and the Governance of Football. A Game of Levels and Agendas*.p.25.

what separates a professional sport from the rest is the degree of commodification which transforms the sporting activity into a business, and economic activity²¹. Professional sport is organized as a fusion of sport, industry, and entertainment with large media coverage and public attention²².

1.2 A Brief History of Football

Football emerges as the most popular sporting activity throughout the world because it is a relatively easy game to play, the rules are simple and straightforward, and it only needs some kind of a ball, a flat surface, and some sort of indication for two goals²³. The common belief that the origins of football date back to the British where there was different “folk” and “mob” football games played as early as the fourteenth century²⁴, the game of football has been played in various forms spanning time and place²⁵. These include Egyptian relics and paintings pointing to people playing football²⁶, a ball-kicking game named *tsu-chu*²⁷ played between the second and third centuries in China, a Japanese game of *kemari*²⁸ that dates back to the twelve century, and a Florentine game of *calcio*²⁹ which has been played since at least sixteenth century across northern Italy. The discrepancies in the formats and the rules have amplified the efforts to establish a common format for the game, and by the call from Ebenezer Cobb Morley different representatives from clubs in London gathered to form an association with the object of establishing a definite code of rules for the

²¹ Garcia (2008). *Op.cit.* p.25

²² *Ibid.*

²³ Kuhn, G. (2011). *Soccer vs. the State: Tackling Football and Radical Politics*. Oakland: PM Press., p.51.

²⁴ Murray, B. (1994). *Football, a History of the World Game*. Aldershot: Scholar Press. P.24.

²⁵ Goldblatt, D. (2006). *The Ball is Round: A Global History of Football*, London: Viking, pp.1-8.

²⁶ *Ibid.* P.1.

²⁷ Giulianotti, R. and Robertson, R. (2009). *Globalization and Football*. London: Sage Publications. P.5.

²⁸ Goldblatt (2006). *Op.cit.* p.4.

²⁹ *Ibid.* P.14.

regulation of the game.³⁰ The introduction of a league structure, and a degree of professionalization have enabled football to spread to the world³¹. Football's diffusion and popularization throughout the world happened mostly by the British influence who infuse football into the popular cultures of Europe and South America, and in European colonies in Africa, Asia, and North America through using informal social ways such as businesses and industrial routes³². British maritime and industrial workers in the 1870s and 1880s played football matches in numerous ports across the North Sea, Mediterranean, Black Sea, South American coastline³³, and in Asian outposts³⁴ which contributed to the development of football in the local settings. Football's popularity expanded and deepened in places where there has been rapid urbanization and industrialization such as Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Montevideo, all of which have hosted large populations of European migrants³⁵.

Giulianotti argues that the evolution of football follows three stages in history, namely, traditional, modern, and post-modern³⁶. The traditional period marked the establishment of the game's rules, the international diffusion of the game, and the formation of national associations to administer the sport³⁷. The modern era of football is divided into three periods. Early modernity covers the time from the 1920s to the Second World War. During that time the Olympic Games and the World Cup have been the epitome of sport. Football became the major national sport in Europe and Latin America where players emerge as national heroes and earn meaningful wages,

³⁰ Henderson, R.W. (2001). *Ball, Bat and Bishop: The origin of Ball Games*, Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press. p. 80.

³¹ *Ibid.* P.80.

³² Giulianotti & Robertson (2009). *Op.cit* p.22.

³³ MacClancy, J. (1996). "Nationalism at Play: The Basques of Vizcaya and Athletic Bilbao", in J. MacClancy *Sport, Identity and Ethnicity*, Oxford: Berg. P.192.

³⁴Edelman, R. (1993). *Serious Fun: A History of Spectator Sports in the USSR*, New York: Oxford University Press. P.29.

³⁵ Giulianotti and Robertson (2009). *Op.cit* p.23.

³⁶ Giulianotti, R. (1999). *Football: A Sociology of the Global Game*. Polity Press. Pp.23-39.

³⁷ *Ibid.* p.24.

but lacked long-term security³⁸. The intermediate modernity of football lasted from the post-war period to the early 1960s which witnessed the emergence of continental confederations as a tier in the governance of the game.³⁹ Late modernity ran from the early 1960s to the late 1980s. A new consumer and youth culture has augmented the game's popularity, opening a new window for football to increase its income⁴⁰. Football's post-modern era began in the late 1980s and it has been evolving ever since. The process of commodification entails further professionalization and internationalization, accelerating the change in the structure and ownership models, the legal unbundling of football clubs from member associations and the entry of both domestic and foreign private investors into the game.⁴¹ The commodification of football have initiated a process of global migration of players, the proliferation of both merchandising and continental and global competitions, followed with an influx of various and high volumes of capital originated from satellite and pay-per-view television networks, telecommunication companies, transnational corporations⁴².

1.3 The Champions League: A Hegemonic Concern

Football in Europe is organized as a pyramid where each level takes on responsibilities with different geographical scope. The international federation (FIFA) sits at the apex, followed by European football's governing body (UEFA) and national FAs; clubs, and players positioned at the base of the pyramid.⁴³ FIFA is the supreme authority in the football, organized to "improve the game of football constantly and promote it globally, to organize international competitions; to draw up regulations and provisions and to ensure their enforcement, and to control every type of Association Football by taking appropriate measures to prevent impediments to the Statues."⁴⁴The

³⁸ *Ibid.* pp.25-29.

³⁹ *Ibid.* pp.30-33.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* pp.34-37.

⁴¹ Giulianotti, R.(2002). "Supporters, Followers, Fans, and Flaneurs: A Taxonomy of Spectator Identities in Football". *Journal of Sport & Social Issues* 26(1) p.29.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ Garcia. B. (2008). *The European Union and the Governance of Football: A Game of Levels and Agendas*. Doctoral Thesis. Loughborough University. P.30.

⁴⁴ Garcia (2008). *Op.cit.* P.33

next step in the pyramid is UEFA which controls the football in Europe. UEFA is a politically and religiously neutral society entered in the register of companies under the terms of Article 60 et seq. of the Swiss Civil Code whose headquarters shall be in Switzerland⁴⁵. Membership to UEFA is “open to national football associations situated in the continent of Europe, based in a country which is recognized by the United Nations as an independent state, and which are responsible for the organization and implementation of football-related matters in the territory of their country”.⁴⁶ The governance of European football follows a logic that “no single actor has the capacity to control a diverse field of actions and interactions”⁴⁷ so that the relationship between the actors sustained and developed based on diverse and conflictual nature ranging from co-operation to competition. UEFA’s founding principles dictate that it must govern and rule the European football and all its components in a way that protect and sustain the social and cultural elements of the game against the hyper-commodification.

Football’s popularity and supremacy over the other sport in Europe have no rivals, European professional male football is dominating the continent as Europe hosts the biggest and most successful leagues, clubs, and players. The Champions League (originally European Champion Clubs’ Cup) was pioneered by *L’equipe*, the prominent sport magazine, inviting the champions of each domestic league in Europe⁴⁸. This idea has been materialized by the UEFA which has been searching to solidify its position in the European football pyramid.⁴⁹ A pan-European tournament that brings the most successful teams in Europe to compete has remarkably increased the popularity of football throughout Europe, but despite the steady growth and increased popularity of football have failed to satisfy the European powerhouses as they claim that the tournament structure favors smaller clubs rather than themselves

⁴⁵ UEFA (2007) *UEFA Statutes: Edition June 2007*. Nyon (Switzerland): UEFA.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ Hindley, D.(2002).“An examination of the utility of the concept of governance in relation to the sports of swimming, football and cricket”, (unpublished thesis), Institute of Sport and Leisure Policy, Loughborough University. P.245.

⁴⁸ King, A. (2003). *The European Ritual: Football in the New Europe*. Ashgate Publishing. P.39.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

which jeopardize their economic and sporting success⁵⁰. Even though what makes football unique and beautiful is the uncertainty of outcome, the European powerhouses have been dictating a new path where they exploit the opportunities offered by the commodification of football.

The commodification of football has amplified and diversified the source of revenues generated by the domestic and European level competitions, and while the former cannot be subject to extensive reforms to increase the revenues, the latter on the hand can present various opportunities. The Champions League, the top European level competition, has become the focal point of hegemonic contestation, a battleground where a diverse group of actors has clashed to enact their hegemonic projects. UEFA, as the sovereign organizer of the European level competitions, has aimed to maintain its hegemonic status in the European football pyramid, however, the policies it implements have only led to the empowerment of the elite football clubs, the richest and historically most successful clubs who made regular appearances in the Champions League. The elite football clubs, as the provider of the lion's share in terms of quality, talent, and excitement in European football, have pressured the actors, namely the UEFA and the other football clubs to cave into their desires for the future of European football which only strengthened themselves and cast a shadow of cynical greed for the pursuit of glory that caused financial instability and a need for a greater source of revenue. The announcement of the European Super League Project in 2020, has been the latest attempt at constructing a new hegemonic order by the elite football clubs, which would replace the existing order that has already favored them to a certain level of dominance and control over the other actors in the European football pyramid. The failure of the European Super League has proven that the European football pyramid can only function under a hegemonic order where the hegemonic positions and interests of different hegemonic blocs can be maintained by ideas and material resources rather than the sheer will and threats of coercion of elite football clubs.

1.4 Conclusion

Sport has been a consistent social practice throughout history as it can fulfill various functions at once such as telling a story, producing winners and losers, and

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

evoking a wide range of emotions in people. The evolution of sport in general, and football in particular from an amateur leisure activity to a professional, highly competitive, entertainment industry in which diverse and increased volumes of capital have swiftly penetrated the game fundamentally shifted the interest of various actors in the football pyramid. Despite the relatively autonomous nature of the hierarchically organized governance model, actors within the pyramid have quickly adapted to the new hegemonic order and began to devise policies that would maintain and eventually would strengthen their hegemonic position against a new wave of emerging actors. A challenge to the UEFA's hegemonic position has emerged, and the actions taken by the UEFA have further empowered the challengers, namely the football clubs who sought more capital to attain success and glory. Although this struggle has become a recurring incident within the European football pyramid, the conversion of football into an industry has resulted in the EU's involvement which then begins to formulate and implement policies to preserve its interests and materialize its hegemonic projects in the European football pyramid.

CHAPTER 2

SPORT AND POLITICS: AN OVERVIEW

This chapter aims to unfold the comprehensive relationship between sport and politics by investigating how actors, namely nation states and international organizations, engage in sport to pursue their goals. These actors operate through the three realms of politics, namely national, regional, and international levels. First of all, football is utilized by the totalitarian regimes of Spain and Italy as legitimization and a constitutive tool to consolidate their power and control over the population and to formulate a new and dominant identity. Although they had to operate in different settings, both of them had gone through a struggle against different social forces to enact their hegemonic projects. In the pursuit of constructing a hegemonic order through football, actors must operate in a contested field where a clash of hegemonic projects is inevitable, what both of the actors have aimed to devise is the centralization of sport so that complete control over the dissents can be achieved, however, despite the commonality in methods of top-down policies while Spain sought for the domination of other social forces, Italy sought for consent for the materialization of their hegemonic projects. This contestation that exists in national settings, has also observable at the European level as well where a single social force cannot dictate its will and hegemonic projects to others, hence a formation of a hegemonic, and more so a historic bloc that incorporates the interests, ideas, and power of other social forces is a necessity to enact hegemonic projects and construct a hegemonic order.

Second of all, the utilitarian goals of the nation-states are not limited to the national context, states try to utilize sport by hosting mega-sport events (Summer Olympics and World Cup) which can enhance their reputation and augment their soft

power.⁵¹ Some states initiate a process of re-formulation on their nation-branding to dilute the negative impressions from the past like the China⁵² tried to accomplish in the 2008 Summer Olympics, or to re-identify itself as vibrant, rich and sophisticated power like Brazil⁵³ tried while hosting the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympics. Although there are various examples of how states utilize MSEs, the main focus will be on the South Korean and Qatari experiences, as nations that have regional aspirations to achieve through the instrumentalization of sport. South Korea hosted the 1988 Summer Olympics, 2002 World Cup, and 2018 Winter Olympics, and Qatar is set to host the 2022 World Cup, what these nations' experiences prove for this research is to show that engagement with sport is challenging and elusive as there is a good chance of failure as well as success. The determination between success and failure boils down to the long-term image, benefits, and impact of the mega-sport events for the sport.

Lastly, thus far the discussion focused on nation states' interest in sport that operate in a national context to fulfill their domestic and regional aspirations. The utilization of sport reached a much wider scope and range when the United Nations have begun to concentrate its resources, will, and power to reconstruct sport⁵⁴ as a comprehensive and sustainable force to tackle gender inequality, and poverty and to foster development that remained pervasive in the disadvantages communities in the

⁵¹ Brannagan, M.P. and Rookwood, J. (2016). "Sports mega-events, soft power and soft disempowerment: international supporters' perspectives on Qatar's acquisition of the 2022 FIFA World Cup finals", *International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics*, 8(2),p. 174.

⁵² Ding, S. (2012). "Is Human Rights the Achilles' heel of Chinese Soft Power? A new Perspective on Its Appeal". *Asian Perspective*,36 ,pp.641-665.

⁵³ Mitra, A. (2015). "An Ethical Analysis of the 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil". *Law&Bus Review*.21(3) p.15.

⁵⁴ The international community recognized sport as a fundamental rights as early as 1959 in the Declaration on the Rights of the Child, and then in 1978, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization International Charter of Physical Education and Sport described sport and physical education as a fundamental right for all. In 1990, the right of the child to rest and leisure, to engage in play and recreational activities appropriate to the age of child was recognized in the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The Convention on the Elimination of ALL Forms of Discrimination against Women affirms that "on the basis of equality of men and women", women must be ensured opportunities to participate actively in sports and physical education.

world.⁵⁵ UN's perception of the sport as a natural partnership that prioritizes participation and inclusion because sport brings individuals and communities together, highlighting commonalities and bridging cultural and ethnic divides⁵⁶. Furthermore, sport provides a forum to learn skills such as discipline, confidence, and leadership as well as values and principles like tolerance, cooperation, and respect which are also championed by the UN.⁵⁷ However, despite the comprehensive approach and interests in sport, policies formulated and implemented by the United Nations have gone through challenges to address and solve the problems of the target groups. The UN, in spite of the will and institutional capacity to operate in field of sport, can fail to devise policies to answer the needs and interests of the people which is not unique to UN but also can be observable in a European context.

2.1. The Historical Accounts of Football and Authoritarianism

2.1.1 A Vehicle for Consensus and Consent: *Il Calcio*

The diffusion of football into various parts of the world, and the gradual and steady increase of its popularity across the populations have transcended its impact on the pitch. Football has been used to fulfill many functions throughout the 20th century ranging from a legitimization tool for totalitarian regimes to fostering collectivity and solidarity. They have engaged in football to consolidate their rule through showing supremacy, controlling societal actors, gaining an international reputation, boosting morale, and trying to unify their population. Totalitarian regimes aim to benefit from the quasi-religious nature of sport as it can provide cohesion and solidarity, can foster integration and discipline, and invoke an emotional euphoria among the masses. The function of sport in controlling, directing, and shaping the attitudes and preferences of the masses has an integral role in maintaining the hegemony of the ruling class. The formulation and implementation of policies to uphold a certain social order, construct and favor the desired identity, to eliminate the different forms of opposition have been at the center of the purpose of utilizing sport. Although totalitarian regimes implement

⁵⁵ Kidd. B. (2008). A new social movement: Sport for development and peace., *Sport in Society*, 11(4), p.370

⁵⁶ Hartmann, D. & Kwauk C. (2011). "Sport and Development: An Overview, Critique, and Reconstruction", *Journal of Sport and Social Issues*, 35:3, p.285.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

their policies in a top-down fashion, Italy under Mussolini has chosen to manufacture consent for its hegemonic projects, Spain under Franco opted for a total domination to maintain its hegemonic status.

Football has been associated with military propaganda, political symbols, and regulations, and has created an environment for the display of identity for hegemonic forces⁵⁸. Political actors have capitalized on football both for social mobilization and political propaganda, especially those from the far right of the political spectrum like Italy under Mussolini. Sport in general, and football in particular as a combination of sport clubs, competitive physical activity, and a form of entertainment introduced to Italy by the Fascist regime after WW1⁵⁹. The war revealed the physical weaknesses and health issues of Italian men, hence the Fascist regime acted to restore the poor physical conditions and health of the Italian people through sporting activities⁶⁰. The consolidation and centralization of power in sport required Fascist regime to “seize control of young people’s physical activities from rival organizations; take over the recreational sport associations for industrial workers and turn them into mass organizations; and secure the leadership of gymnastic and sport societies affiliated to the national sport federations”.⁶¹ Catholic Church and the Socialist organizations have been the two primary targets of the Fascist takeover in sport as they were social forces in pre-Fascist Italy to exploit the popularity of sport for the recruitment of the masses and contribution of the physical and personal development of their members⁶². Prior to Fascism’s growing interest in sport, Socialist organizations’ influence over sport has slowly begun to fade as a result of a lack of resources and a failure to compete with the Catholic Church which has already a hand in the field of sport to foster morality, improve discipline and health⁶³. Furthermore, Catholic Church formed the Catholic Sport Associations -*Federazione delle Associazioni Sportive Cattoliche*-(FASCI)

⁵⁸ Carr, J., Millar, S., Parnell, D., Power, M. and Widdop, P.(2020). “Football and politics: the politics of football”, *Managing Sport and Leisure*,25, 1-2, p.1.

⁵⁹ Dogliani, P. (2000). “Sport and Fascism”, *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*,5:3, p 326.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* P.327.

⁶¹ Dogliani(2000), *Op.cit.* p.328.

⁶² Martin, S. (2004). *Football and Fascism: The National Game under Mussolini*. Oxford Press. P.17.

⁶³ *Ibid.* p.17.

which has over ten thousand members by the time of 1910.⁶⁴ Even though, the FASCI have not been able to manage to establish a monopoly over Catholic sporting activities, it has the organizational capability and numbers to oppose the Fascist centralization attempts over the sport. Therefore, the delay caused by FASCI to the total control over the sport in the hands of the Fascist regime has led them to seek an agreement of coexistence with the Church which prevented brutal repression of the Catholic associations⁶⁵.

This accord has enabled the Fascist regime to establish⁶⁶ organizations and re-organize⁶⁷ the existing ones to erode the influence of the Catholic Church in terms of recruiting and educating the masses through sport so that the masses remained in the sphere of influence of the Catholic Church can be reached to manufacture consent required for the construction and maintenance of the hegemonic order sought by the Fascist regime. The increasing control and influence over the sport enabled Mussolini to exploit the mass appeal of sport in general, and football in particular with the construction of large and glorified stadiums that can function as the regime's propaganda tool⁶⁸. Mussolini's goal was to initiate a process of nation-building devoted entirely to the promotion and reinforcement of a distinct national identity⁶⁹. The construction of this identity should aim to foster an "organic, patriotic, nationalist identity, to produce footballers and teams capable of representing the new political order and society, and to start a process of national and racial regeneration".⁷⁰ The construction of a distinct national identity by indoctrinating and the masses through sport was thought to be a necessity for the regime to gain legitimacy and ensure internal

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ *Opera Nazionale Dopolavora*(After Work) and *Opera Nazionale Balilla*(Fascist Youth Corps)

⁶⁷ *Ente Nazionale per l'Educazione*(National Organization for Physical Education), and *Milizia Volontaria Sicurezza Nazionale*(National Voluntary Security Militia).

⁶⁸ Kassimeris, C. (2011). "Fascism, separatism and the ultras: discrimination in Italian football", *Soccer & Society*, 12:5, p.677.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.* P.688.

⁷⁰ Martin (2004). *Op.cit.*p.3.

consensus⁷¹. The Fascist forces explored venues to penetrate into the hearts, minds, and bodies of the masses, hence intense cooperation and coordination between the Fascist forces at the national level and the *Enti Sportivi Provinciali Fascisti* (local sport organizations) at the local level began to develop, resulting in the transfer of responsibilities of the latter into the party apparatus due to the poor propaganda⁷². The Fascist forces informed the party apparatus in the nation to concentrate their work on financing the poorest, most popular, and most useful sporting activities and to engage in active propaganda work to disseminate the regime's ideals⁷³. Furthermore, the future of Italian sport was secured under the patronage of the party since "sport is no longer considered a free activity but a political interest, inside a particular sport a hierarchy develops, associations of governors and servants emerge: sport takes on the moral nature that characterizes the regime"⁷⁴.

The next step for the Fascist centralization of the sport is the Italianization and institutionalization of football as *calcio* per the demands and realities of the new political era⁷⁵. Italian football is stranger to crises both before and during the Fascist era, the underlying problems can be listed as the lack of fiscal responsibility, the power and influence gap between the big and small clubs, the quality of the game, and the inadequacy of the refereeing performances that affect the results of the matches⁷⁶. The problems that pile up created a suitable environment for the regime to tighten its grip over football. The regime believed that if left unchecked "football would be fatally condemned to degenerate into the trick of a money grabber, worthy of repressive police measures and the contempt of the citizens"⁷⁷. The Fascist regime enacted its hegemonic project when the Viareggio Charter, depict as the *Calcio's* constitution

⁷¹ Benoit, M. (2008). "The politicization of football: the European game and the approach to the Second World War", *Soccer & Society*, 9:4, p.540.

⁷² Martin. (2004). *Op.cit.* 43.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ Kassimeris(2011). *Op.cit* p.678.

⁷⁶ Martin. (2004). *Op.cit* p.58.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.* P.58.

prepared by the Italian Olympic Committee (CONI) implemented in 1926⁷⁸. This charter “envisioned a new federal statute for football, established the hierarchical system of offices, reformed the institutions of the governance of football, regulated the professional status of players and set new rules for foreign players, and established the single national league”⁷⁹. The legal power and authority the regime acquired through the Viareggio Charter, regime apparatus re-assigned clubs to different divisions to ease the conflict that arose between the clubs, classified players as amateur and non-amateur, and national and non-national players, favoring dominantly the former, organized new taxation procedures, established a new hierarchical order of the governing bodies to eliminate the questions of authority disputes, and introduced two new national cups, namely the *Coppa d’Ora*(Gold Cup) and the *Coppa Italia*(Italian Cup), thus completing Italianization and institutionalization of football⁸⁰.

The purpose of investigating Italy under Mussolini’s Fascist regime and their attempt to create a distinct identity for the unification of the nation by manufacturing consent is to show that the materialization of a hegemonic project and its sustainability even in a national context is not feasible, especially when the hegemonic bloc in question sought to undermine and eradicate the power and influence of other social forces in play. Italy under Mussolini as a totalitarian regime entered a struggle with the Catholic Church to replace the hegemonic position of the Church in sport so that the Fascist forces can gradually penetrate every branch of sport, particularly in football whose popularity both nationally and globally is on the rise to imposed its ideas and will to the masses. The takeover of the existing governance structures into the party apparatus resulted in the complete overhaul of the hierarchical governance model of Italian football, leading to the ban of foreign players, Italianization of the terms and names in football, restricting the transfer of players between regions (restriction of freedom of movement). The Fascist forces sought to attain total control over the sport in general, and football in particular which they have achieved for a considerable time, but their ideas have faded and their projects have been overridden from the Italian

⁷⁸ Foot, J. (2007). *Calcio: A History of Italian Football*. Harper Collins Publishing. London: UK. P.135.

⁷⁹ Sbeti, N. & Serapiglia. (2020). “Was football fascist? The 1934 World Cup in the postwar memory”, *Soccer & Society*, 21:8, p.891.

⁸⁰ Martin (2004). *Op.cit* p.60.

football. Every hegemonic bloc produces a challenger as a result of the hegemonic order it had created, the contestation between the rival hegemonic forces shapes each other's hegemonic projects.

2.1.2 Spanish Football: A Contested Field for Culture and Identity

Spain has been introduced with football through the British economic expansion in which the British workers were heavily involved in the game in Huelva, from there football spread to Bilbao and San Sebastian and then the rest of the Spain.⁸¹ The collaboration between the Spaniards and the British workers led to the establishment of prominent football clubs such as Athletic de Bilbao in 1898, FC Barcelona in 1899, Real Madrid in 1902, and Atletico de Madrid in 1903⁸². Football in Spain lacked a unitary structure in terms of organizational and competitive context, it has been played on a regional basis even though the consolidation of the Spanish Championship⁸³ later known as the King's Cup provides a degree of national context to the football⁸⁴. The transition from a regional basis to national has been steady and gradual shaped by the process of professionalization which centered on the commodification of football, and the increasing number of spectators and members of clubs. The changes in the organizational and competitive structure to provide football a national context take place in 1927 and 1928⁸⁵. Football answered the needs of the people, especially those who are in search of a new type and form of entertainment generated by industrialization and division of labor. However, football and football clubs have become a center for political activity as it does not only reveal the underlying social values in a society but also serve as a mode of expression⁸⁶. Football

⁸¹ Goig, L., R. (2008). "Identity, nation-state and football in Spain. The evolution of nationalist feelings in Spanish Football", *Soccer & Society*, 9(1), p.57.

⁸² Goig. (2008). *Op.cit.* p.57.

⁸³ In 1903 the First Spanish Championship played, fostered by Madrid manager who tried to organize the Tournament as an annual competition, which would aim to bring together the different regional champions in Madrid.

⁸⁴ Goig (2008). *Op.cit.* p.57.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.* p.58

⁸⁶ Shobe, H. (2008). "Place, identity and football: Catalonia, Catalanisme and Football Club Barcelona, 1899-1975", *National Identities*, 10(3), p.329.

“captures the notion of an imagined community as it is easier to imagine and conform to an identity when eleven players are representing that identity on and off the pitch”⁸⁷. Football does not “serve only to project a place to people who would otherwise never hear its name mentioned; it also provides a potent medium for collective identification with a place”⁸⁸. Football clubs act as a medium for the expression of national, regional or, local identity since they can facilitate connections to places such as regions, cities, towns, or neighborhoods⁸⁹. Furthermore, football “is an embodied practice in which meanings are generated, and whose representation and interpretation are open to negotiation and contest”.⁹⁰

The new Spanish regime under Franco acknowledged the significance of football in Spanish society and tried to exploit it to indoctrinate ultra-nationalist features such as obedience, submission, and military discipline⁹¹. The regime wanted to utilize football to ease the domestic instability and restlessness, and to promote Spanish nationalism to eliminate or contain regional, cultural, and linguistic variations among different ethnic groups in the nation⁹². The first order of business was the militarization of the society through football, hence the military officials began to exercise authority over the Spanish football governing body, and football players were encouraged to give fascist salutes before the kick-off, to sign the fascist anthem *Cara al Sol* and to cheer “*Arriba Espana, Viva Franco*”⁹³. Furthermore, in 1941, a *Delagacion Nacional de Prensa y Propaganda* (Home Office Department for Press and Propaganda) imposed the Hispanicization of all football clubs, resulting in renaming Futbol Club Barcelona to Club de Futbol de Barcelona, Athletic de Bilbao

⁸⁷ Duke, V., Crolley, L. (1996). *Football, nationality and the state*. London: Longman. P.4.

⁸⁸ Bale, J. (2001). *Sport, space and the city*. Caldwell, NJ. Blackburn Press. P.56.

⁸⁹ Shobe, (2008). *Op.cit* p.331.

⁹⁰ MacClancy, J. (1996). *Sport, identity and ethnicity*. Oxford: Berg. P.4.

⁹¹ Quiroga, A. (2020). “Football and nation. F.C. Barcelona and Athletic de Bilbao during the Franco dictatorship (1937-1977).”, *Journal of Iberian and Latin American Studies*, 26:1, p.66.

⁹² Kassimeris, C. (2012). “Franco, the popular game and ethnocentric conduct in modern Spanish football”, *Soccer and Society*, 13(4). P.562

⁹³ *Ibid*. P.559

to Atletico Bilbao, Sporting Gijon to Deportivo Gijon⁹⁴. In light of the provisions adopted by the regime, some football clubs have opted to accommodate and/or consolidate their political positions. Athletic de Bilbao has continued to accept only Basque players, Real Sociedad has maintained to enroll non-Spanish players in their squad, and Barcelona Football Club positioned itself against the regime as the major opponent in the construction of Spanish identity and in becoming a beacon for the regional segregation, and Espanyol chose to side with the regime by promoting a Spanish identity while located in Catalonia⁹⁵. The Basque country and Catalonia have promoted their distinct regional identity and began to be recognized as historical nationalities that in conflict with Franco's regime. The unity of the nation has been the number one agenda of the Franco regime, and the way to achieve unity is to formulate and implement anti-communist and anti-separatist policies, although there has not been a credible threat or a struggle derived from the former, however, the regime adopted forceful measures and initiated a relentless campaign to eradicate the latter⁹⁶. Despite the "repressive approach of the regime and the degree of centralization that characterized the Spanish government only succeeded in reinforcing those separate identities, thus reviving the regionalism in Spanish politics and society⁹⁷."

The process of creating and promoting cultural and symbolic regionalism to contest Franco's design for Spain was embodied in the football clubs. The power dynamics constructed by the Spanish regime left little room for freedom to express regional identities and carried out a suppressive agenda that have undermined the identity of FC Barcelona. The policies targeting FC Barcelona are not unique to the Franco regime, the Spanish government led by General Miguel Primo de Rivera, have also followed suppressive policies, including the abolishment of the Catalan governing authority, shutting down the political and cultural institutions, banning the Catalan

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵ Tunon, J. & Brey, E. (2012). "Sports and Politics in Spain" Football and Nationalist Attitudes within the Basque Country and Catalonia", *European Journal for Sport and Society*, 9(1), p.8.

⁹⁶ Kassimeris. (2012). *Op.cit.* p.558.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.* P.558

flag.⁹⁸ The “persecution of the most fundamental symbols of Catalan identity”⁹⁹ have only empowered the Catalanist movement and the significance of collective symbols. The FC Barcelona acted as an extension of Catalonia, attracting a high number of new members to the club, and providing a platform for the expression of Catalanism under the threat of repression and suspension. Franco’s regime followed a similar path where centralization of every element of Spanish society and politics, and a campaign to unpack and discredit every cultural symbol and institutional capacity of any regional ambition and regional identity have been the main pillar of their policy so that a single Spanish identity and culture can be forged. The regime forbade the public and written use of the Catalan language in all forms, abolished the Catalan autonomous government, eliminated university courses and educational material that included Catalan culture, and banned the exhibition of Catalan flags, monuments, and music¹⁰⁰. The measures taken by the regime are an “attempted systematic cultural genocide of the Catalan nation”¹⁰¹ since the regime does not want to “suffocate Catalanism but to eradicate Catalan culture and any sign of a separate Catalan identity at its very roots”¹⁰². The repression of the Catalan identity and culture has only amplified the Catalan nationalism and Catalan national identity embodied in the FC Barcelona.¹⁰³

The centralization of the football under Franco’s regime has begun to loosen its grip over the footballing world. Football began to enjoy a degree of autonomy and served as a catalyst for the regional identities to prosper despite the long process of suppression¹⁰⁴. Although the regime wanted to eradicate different regional identities, it really produced and ignited further tension between the centralized Spanish identity

⁹⁸ Shobe, H. (2008).” Place, identity and football: Catalonia, Catalanisme and Football Club Barcelona, 1899-1975”, *National Identities*, 10(3), p.336.

⁹⁹ Balcells, A. (1996). *Catalan nationalism: Past and present*, trans. J.Hall. New York: St. Martin’s Press. P.83

¹⁰⁰ Conversi, D. (1997). *The Basques, the Catalans and Spain: Alternative routes to nationalist mobilization*. Reno, NV: University of Nevada Press. P.36.

¹⁰¹ Llobera, J. R. (1989). “Catalan national identity: The dialectics of past and present. In E. Tonkin, M. McDonald & M. Champman. (Eds), *History and ethnicity*, pp.247-261, New York: Routledge. P.252.

¹⁰² Conversi. (1997).*Op.cit* p.113.

¹⁰³ Shobe. (2008). *Op.cit.* p.338.

¹⁰⁴ Goig. (2008). *Op.cit.*p.60.

and the regional identities, namely the Basque and Catalan, hence regime resorted to football to de-escalate and contain the regional tensions¹⁰⁵. The organizational structure, power configurations, and the identity-based hegemonic structure designed by Franco's regime have undergone a deep and comprehensive transformation with the arrival of democracy¹⁰⁶. The centralization of power and authority, and control and suppression have marked the rule of Franco, all of which must be substituted with the expression and maintenance of regional identities, cultures, and institutions so that there can be national unity in the restored democracy¹⁰⁷. The 1978 Spanish constitution was inspired to accommodate regionalist pressures centered on integration, unity, and compromise, which resulted in a negotiated consensus between centralists and regionalists. It combines the notion of "one and indivisible" state with a very tolerant recognition of the different regions and nationalities that are situated within the Spanish state.¹⁰⁸ The contestation and conflict that arise from the regional, cultural and linguistic variations between the separate ethnic groups, although carefully calculated, produced, and utilized by the totalitarian governments, have reflected upon football as where the oppressed find a safe-haven to protect, uphold, and consolidate their identity and culture. Despite the military regime's systematic and comprehensive suppression to subordinate any regional identity to forge a single Spanish identity, those who resist constitutionally secured their cultural and linguistic practices both on and off the pitch.

Spain under Franco just like Italy under Mussolini sought total control over the football to enact its hegemonic project of forging a single Spanish identity and culture by suppressing different regional and linguistic identities for a unified Spain. The Fascist regime in Spain opted to utilize football to display a single national identity infused with ultra-nationalist features such as obedience, submission, and discipline. Even though football opens to outside intervention, it also creates a space for resistance, especially for a projection of identity as players on the pitch and the football

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ Goig. (2008). *Op.cit.*p.60.

¹⁰⁷ Kassimeris (2012).*Op.cit* p. 558.

¹⁰⁸ Schrijver, F. (2006). *Regionalism after Regionalization: Spain, France and the United Kingdom.* Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.p.86.

clubs can serve as a medium for identity expression. The Spanish experience crafted by Franco to impose a dominant identity through football to suppress regional and linguistic identities caused further instability and unrest which pushed the regime to pursue a de-escalation as they gradually lost power and control.

2.2. The Geopolitics of Regional Aspirations: Hosting Mega Sport-Events

The utilitarian goals of the nation-states through the instrumentalization of sport are not limited to national context in terms of engaging in a struggle with the social forces in that particular context to either consolidation of power such as in Italy under Mussolini or to suppress any form of regional, and linguistic identities for the nation unity in Spain under Franco. The usefulness of sport in pursuing nation-wide objectives can also apply to pursuing regional foreign policy objectives in which sport can be utilized as a soft power resource. Soft power is the ability to co-opt rather than coerce, and it involves shaping the preferences of others through attraction and appeal¹⁰⁹. Soft power is “more than just persuasion or the ability to move people by argument, it is also the ability to attract, and attraction often leads to acquiescence”¹¹⁰. Joseph Nye states that “the soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)”¹¹¹. Sport as an instrument for the augmentation of soft power, can constitute a platform for dialogue, trust-building, peace-building, and image-building¹¹². Some nation-states utilize sport’s role to build an image and showcase that image to the world through hosting mega-sports events to augment their soft power for the pursuit of their foreign policy objectives. The focus of this section is to explain what constitutes an MSEs, why they are significant for states’ regional aspirations, and how MSEs can augment states’ soft power by examining the South Korean and Qatari experiences with hosting MSEs.

¹⁰⁹ Nye, S., J. (2005). *The Means to Success in World Politics*. New York: Public Affairs. P.5.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.* P.6

¹¹¹ Nye (2005). *Op.cit.* p.11

¹¹² Nygard, H.M., & Gates, S. (2013). “Soft power at home and abroad: sport diplomacy, politics and peace-building”, *International Area Studies Review*, 16:3, pp.238-240.

2.2.1 Mega-Sport Events

The mega-sport events are generally conceptualized as discontinuous, out of the ordinary, international, and big in composition¹¹³, however, this definition does not fully capture the essence of the mega-sport events. It is best understood as “large-scale cultural, commercial and sporting events, which have a dramatic character, mass popular appeal and international significance”¹¹⁴. Mega-sport events, namely the World Cup and Summer Olympics, offer a spectacle in an environment where there is a constant cycle of competition for capital and people. The monopolistic position coupled with the competition of the nations, guarantees an international significance which is magnified through the exclusive broadcasting rights, merchandizing, and an alliance between sport-media and business.¹¹⁵ Mega-sport events are not monolithic in nature and composition since the Olympics and the World Cup differ from the rest of the organizations such as Euros and Winter Olympics, and Commonwealth Games and Pan American Games¹¹⁶. The debates and objections surrounding the Mega-sport events are diverse and comprehensive. These generally revolve around the use of economic resources and urban transformation while the former centers on a debate between consumption-based development and social redistribution of resources, the latter is about urban regeneration which leads to both gentrification of specific areas being regenerated and others being ignored and the displacement and replacement of poorer and less powerful communities¹¹⁷. Hosting mega-sport events is a huge undertaking that requires a degree of consensus among all the stakeholders and population on how to use their resources, and how to create and maintain a legacy afterward. Even though most states want to host the mega-sport events due to various reasons, several of them have withdrawn their names from the bidding process such as Rome for 2020 Summer Olympics and Stockholm for 2022 Winter Olympics due to

¹¹³ Roberts, K. (2004). *The Leisure Industries* London: Palgrave. P.108.

¹¹⁴ Roche, M. (2000). *Mega-events and modernity* London: Routledge p.1.

¹¹⁵ Horne, J. And Manzerteirer, W. (2006). “An introduction to the sociology of sports mega-events.” *Sociological Review*, 54(s2). Pp.1-24.

¹¹⁶ Horne, J. (2017). “Sports mega-events-three sites of contemporary political contestation”, *Sport in Society*, 20:3, pp.328-340.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.* P.331.

lack of political support, and Graubünden for 2022 Winter Olympics, Krakow for 2022 Winter Olympics, and Munich for 2022 Winter Olympics and Vienna for 2028 for the Summer Olympics due to public referendums¹¹⁸. The debates and questions about hosting mega-sport events are not limited to lack of political and popular support, economic burdens it might bring to the citizens, and the security concerns but also extends to the legacy, politics of rights, and labor.

The concept of legacy is generally considered unique to hosting the Olympics, it also applies to other mega-sport events as well. The literature on legacy framework deals with questions about what should be considered as legacy, who are affected by the changes, how the legacy will finally affect the quality of life in a host city or country, and when a legacy starts to create value.¹¹⁹ The legacy covers not only economic effects or the infrastructural changes but also social, environmental, and political changes.¹²⁰ The concept of legacy is best defined as “irrespective of the time of production and space, legacy is all planned and unplanned, positive and negative, tangible and intangible structures created for and by a sporting event that remain longer than the event itself”¹²¹. The negative sides of hosting mega-sport events are often ignored and generally denied which is a common tendency when an undesirable situation arises. Hosting mega-sport events brings a degree of reputational risks as the host states find themselves in a position where high levels of attention and critical scrutiny from international media, other states, and sporting and other international organizations. China failed to capitalize on the opportunities provided by the Summer Olympics in Beijing in 2008 as the nation has gone through serious scrutiny by the international media and a considerable degree of protests due to the occupation of Tibet, the ill-treatment of minorities, and poor records on human rights and

¹¹⁸ Preuss, H. (2015). “A framework for identifying the legacies of a mega-sport events”, *Leisure Studies*, 34:6, p.643

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.* p.645.

¹²⁰ Preuss, H. (2007). “The conceptualization and measurement of mega sport event legacies”. *Journal of Sport and Tourism*, 12, p.211.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*

democracy¹²². China has aimed to utilize the Olympics with the purpose of illustrating its power and supremacy while simultaneously erasing its tarnished image and reputation in the international arena. Therefore, any form of protest is framed in as an act of unjustified violence against the innocent people of China and the state itself which leads to the need for restoration of order stability¹²³. The forced evictions of citizens without due process or compensation for building the necessary infrastructure the games needed, the abuse and exploitation of migrant workers, the silencing of civil society and rights activists, threats, intimidation, and arrest of journalists have also been apparent and resorted as a common practice in the mega-sport events¹²⁴.

Sport diplomacy offers a new venue in which actors can engage in politics in the realm of both domestic and international affairs. States initiate a process of mobilization of capital and human resources before hosting mega-sport events take place as they want to capitalize on the undivided attention of the world. They project a new, carefully crafted image of their country to increase their international prestige or improve a tarnished image, to achieve their regional and international foreign policy objectives. Hosting MSEs provide a host country an opportunity to showcase the desired image based on its culture and history, projecting a kind of uniqueness that captures the minds and hearts of the people. Sport operates on another level where there is an exchange in the form of culture, knowledge, language, art, and music. The accumulation of attractiveness derived from these elements can facilitate the augmentation of soft power which emulates from the values and ideologies, credible and prominent institutions and policies, and an attractive culture¹²⁵. Soft power is the ability to achieve goals through attraction rather than coercion and is not simply the ability to persuade but to entice and attract, leading to acquiescence¹²⁶. Mega-sport

¹²² Brannagan, M. P. And Giulianotti, R. (2015). "Soft power and soft disempowerment: Qatar, global sport and football's 2022 World Cup finals", *Leisure Studies*, 34(6), p.706.

¹²³ Horne, J. And Whannel, G. (2010). "The caged torch procession: celebrities, protesters and the 2008 Olympic torch rally in London, Paris and San Francisco." *Sport in Society* 13(5), p.10.

¹²⁴ Worden, M. (2015). "Raising the Bar: Mega-sporting Events and Human Rights." Human Rights Watch World Report 2015.

¹²⁵ Keohane, R. And Nye, J. (1998). "Power and interdependence in the information age", *Foreign Affairs*, 77(5),p.86.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

events create an atmosphere that enables host cities/nations to utilize such a platform to reshape attitudes in both the domestic and international arena, transcend provincialism and historical insecurities, to pursue regional and global policy objectives¹²⁷.

The effects of the MSEs tend to outlive the duration of the event itself, it echoes through time and space as a result of a process of branding and crafting a legacy. The upcoming sections talk about the pursuit of soft power through hosting MSEs which enable host nations to introduce a series of elements from their history, culture, music, and art so that they can reach the hearts and minds of an international audience. The cases are South Korea and Qatar which hosted the 1988 Summer Olympics, 2002 World Cup, and 2018 Winter Olympics, and will host the 2022 World Cup respectively. The former represents a success story in creating a legacy through branding and introducing a cultural element to the world, while the latter represents a failure prior to the event itself due to the surmounting criticism regarding allegations of corruption, ill-treatment and exploitation of workers, and poor records of human rights and democracy. What these examples would prove that even though utilization of sport is a common practice employed by various nation-states, there is no guarantee of success. The process of preparation and the actual event are open to many possibilities which would fundamentally tarnish the international reputation of a country and hinder the possibility of staging an MSE for a foreseeable future, while on the other hand it can open the door for a series of other tournaments because sport has a lingering impact over international audiences.

2.2.2 The Rise of South Korea's *Hallyu*: The Augmentation of Soft Power

South Korean has a considerable experience in utilizing sport which dates back to the 1950s, a time which the government used sport as a propaganda tool to promote national unity and to legitimize the authoritarian government.¹²⁸ Although, for a long period of time the utilization of sport has limited to national context, the interests of the successive governments in sport have expanded South Korea's repertoire of sport

¹²⁷ Grix, J. Et al (2017). "State strategies for leveraging sports mega-events: unpacking the concept of legacy". *International Journal of Sport Policy and politics*, 9(2). P.205.

¹²⁸ Kang, Y. & Houlihan, B. (2021). "Sport as a diplomatic resource: the case of South Korea", *International Journal of Sport Policy*, 13:1 p.51.

for the pursuit and augmentation of soft power¹²⁹.The maximization of elite sport success, achieving prominence in international sport organizations, and hosting mega-sport events have become the hallmark of South Korea's strategy, and have started a transition from national aspirations to regional aspirations. Even though all these strategies are significant in South Korea's efforts to utilize sport, hosting mega-sport events remains at center of these strategies¹³⁰.

East Asia has become the hub of hosting MSE. The region hosted three Olympic Games in a row, namely PyeongChang(2018, Winter), Tokyo(2022, Summer), and Beijing(2022, Winter), adding to previous records of hosting Olympics and World Cup, in Beijing(2008, Summer) and Seoul(1988, Summer), Japan and Korea(2002) respectively. Hosting 1988 Summer Olympics in Seoul was the first step of plan formulated by the Ministry of Sport to showcase South Korea to the spotlight¹³¹. 1988 Seoul Olympics was significant in terms of the high number of participants, safety, cost-efficient management, and especially reconciliation between Western and Eastern Blocks following the boycotts of 1980 and 1984 Olympics¹³². South Korea's objectives at that time, were "to demonstrate Korea's economic growth and national power, improve Korea's status in the international sporting community, promote friendship with foreign countries through sport, create favorable conditions for establishing diplomatic relations with both Communists and non-aligned nations, and consolidate national consensus through mega-sport events"¹³³. Second Secretary in the Cultural Cooperation Division of MOFA stated that:

The South Korean government is committed to enhancing the national brand image and the promotion of international friendship through sport. MOFA puts a big emphasis on sport diplomacy in hosting sport mega-events, which have an influence on the economy and which promote the national brand image. In this respect, hosting the 1988 Seoul Olympics played the most significant role in promoting the Republic of Korea to the world¹³⁴.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*

¹³⁰ Kang & Houlihan (2021). *Op.cit.* P.57.

¹³¹ Gil-Nam, H. & Mangan, A.J. (2002). "Ideology, Politics, Power: Korean Sport- Transformation, 1945-92", *The International Journal of History of Sport*, 19:2-3, p.233.

¹³² Kang & Houlihan (2021). *Op.cit.* p.52.

¹³³ *Ibid.*

¹³⁴ *Ibid.* P.134.

Table 2: East Asian countries and their Mega Sport Events hosting records. *Japan and South Korea bid to host the 2002 World Cup together.

Source: Grix, J. Jeong, B.J, and Kim, H. (2021).” Understanding South Korea’s Use of Sports Mega-Events for Domestic, Regional and International Soft Power. Societies, 11,

East Asian countries and their Mega Sport Events hosting records			
	Winter Olympics	Summer Olympics	World Cup
China	Beijing 2022	Beijing 2008	
Japan		Tokyo 2022	2002*
South Korea	PyeongChang 2018	Seoul 1988	2002*

The 1988 Seoul Olympics paved the way for South Korea to attain other hosting opportunities, and helped Taekwondo to become South Korea’s successful international cultural export which has already been introduced to the world by the Korean diaspora in the aftermath of the Korean War¹³⁵. Furthermore, Taekwondo became an official Olympic sport after an official demonstration sport for 1988 Seoul Olympics thanks to the South Korea’s strategy and growing influence as illustrated by the Secretary General of International Sport Diplomacy Institute which stated that “Kim Un-yong¹³⁶ played a determinant role in the decision that IOC adopted Taekwondo as an Olympic sport. Through the 1988 Seoul Olympics and Taekwondo, he has opened a new era of internationalization of Korean sport to let the world know South Korean sport and culture”¹³⁷.

This door opened through the 1988 Seoul Olympics encouraged South Korea to continue to allocate considerable time, energy, and resources to win the hosting rights of the mega-sport events which can facilitate what they designed and inspired in the Seoul Olympics. South Korea started a branding process as Dynamic Korea which then became a national slogan, and uttered a great significance to the 2002 Korea-Japan World Cup as a golden opportunity to enhance the national brand by building on the cultural legacy of 1988 Seoul¹³⁸. The 2002 World Cup conceived as a significant

¹³⁵ Moenig, U., and Kim, Y.I. (2021). “The Early Globalization Process of Taekwondo, from the 1950s to 1971. *International Journal of Sport*,37, pp.1-20.

¹³⁶ IOC committee member from 1986 to 2005, president of Global Associations of International Sports Federations and World Taekwondo, and vice-president of the IOC.

¹³⁷ Kang & Houlihan (2021). *Op.cit.* p.55.

¹³⁸ Kang & Houlihan (2021). *Op.cit* P.54.

opportunity to mend the inter-state relations between South Korea and Japan as it was the first time in history that the World Cup had been co-hosted and the first time that it has been held outside of Europe and America¹³⁹. The 2002 World Cup, despite of the “fierce historic rivalry between South Korea and Japan led to a degree of reconciliation and the signing of a joint message that focused on expanding non-sporting areas including politics, economic and culture”¹⁴⁰. Hosting the 2002 World Cup served the regional aspirations of South Korea as it provided a new ground for relations to prosper and enabled Korea to re-emerge as a new contender of regional power with global reach¹⁴¹ through its cultural exports, namely *Hallyu* resources which consisted of Korean popular cultural content including television, dramas, movies, pop songs, and their associated celebrities¹⁴². The 2002 World Cup secured the constant rise and expansion of Korean wave into China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and other East and Southeast Asian countries, and then to the world.¹⁴³

South Korea have tapped into the potential of sport as early as the 1950s in which where government opted to utilize sport as a tool of propaganda to ensure national unity and to legitimize their authoritarian practices. The institutionalization of sport into a state strategy to fulfill various goals other than those limited in national context led to a concentration of efforts and resources to bid to host MSEs. The first opportunity to host an MSE happened in 1988 Seoul where Summer Olympics showcased South Korea’s traditions and culture that thought to lead to the augmentation of soft power. The legacy of the 1988 Olympics was the internationalization and acknowledgment of Taekwondo as an Olympic sport proved that South Korea has the cultural resources to influence the hearts and minds of the people throughout the world. The legacy forged in the Seoul Olympics enriched as South Korea co-hosted the 2002 World Cup with a specific focus on friendship and solidarity. 2002 World Cup introduced another cultural resource of South Korea,

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.* P.55

¹⁴¹ Grix, J., Jeong, B.J, and Kim, H. (2021). *Op.cit.* p.10.

¹⁴² Shim, D. (2006). “Hybridity and the rise of Korean popular culture in Asia”. *Media, Culture, and Society*, 28(1),pp.25-44.

¹⁴³ Shim (2006). *Op.cit.* p.38.

Hallyu, which is a combination of songs, dramas, series, and celebrities. *Hallyu*, has already a strong supporters and enthusiastic people in South Korea, expanded into East Asia, and then to the world, and became the second cultural resource of South Korea to make an impact through hosting an MSE. South Korea, as a result of a plan and strategy implemented after the independence, utilized sport first as a tool to address the needs of the government in a national context which laid the groundwork for the institutionalization of sport in general, and hosting MSEs in particular for the augmentation of soft power in pursuit of regional aspirations.

2.2.3 Qatari Experience of FIFA World Cup 2022: Soft Disempowerment

States allocate a considerable amount of time and resources to host mega-sport events, they formulate and implement policies starting from the bidding process. Although states' policies and priorities vary from one another, their dedication and desire to utilize the MSEs to further their goals for the augmentation of soft power remains the same. Despite the promising nature of the MSEs in terms of offering a platform to shine for the host nation, there is always a possibility of coming short in the augmentation of soft power. Soft disempowerment refers to the "loss of attractiveness or influence"¹⁴⁴ resulting from offending or alienating others. Brazil hosted both the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics and has been at the center of the discussions and scrutiny regarding the states' efforts in creating a legacy that would not go beyond a symbolic transformation¹⁴⁵. Brazil has tried to erase the suspicions regarding the security and order in the country, showcase its economic success, and advertise vibrant, exciting, and safe places in the country while failing to improve the quality of life of its own citizens, and negatively impacting the poor and marginalized populations¹⁴⁶. The Qatari bid for the 2022 membership follows the path of Brazil before even hosting the event. Qatar has plenty of experience in its engagement with the sport as it hosted a plethora of international sporting events, namely, the 2006

¹⁴⁴ Brannagan, M. P. And Giulianotti, R. (2015). "Soft power and soft disempowerment: Qatar, global sport and football's 2022 World Cup finals", *Leisure Studies*, 34(6), p.706.

¹⁴⁵ Grix, J., Brannagan, M., P. & Houlihan, B.(2015). "Interrogating States' Soft Power Strategies: A Case Study of Sports Mega-Events in Brazil and the UK", *Globaly Society*, 29:3 pp.474-477.

¹⁴⁶ Broudehoux, A.M. (2015). "Mega-events, Urban Image Construction, and the Politics of Exclusion" in *Mega-events and Globalization: Capital and Spectacle in a Changing World Order*. Edited by R. Gruneau and J. Horne. London: Routledge. P.125.

Asian Games, the 2011 Asian Cup football tournament, the 2015 Handball World Cup, the Qatar Open Tennis Tournament and the Qatar Open Golf Masters¹⁴⁷. Qatar wanted to utilize MSEs to showcase its commitment to the ideals of modernity, to align itself to the universal ideas of peace and security by detaching itself from the rest of the Middle East where there is no shortage of socio-political unrest, to facilitate health and well-being among the Qatari people.¹⁴⁸

FIFA, the world football governing organization, granted the host position to Qatar for the 2022 World Cup which enable Qatar to cultivate the sporting vision already embraced and tested in the regional competitions. Hosting the 2022 World Cup enhanced Qatari engagement with the sport to foster health and well-being in the country, display progress and modernization to the global audiences, and uphold peace and security as the main foreign policy goals in the region¹⁴⁹. First of all, Qatar has concerning levels of obesity both among its adult populace and amongst its male youth population which has been rooted in the extravagant levels of fast-food consumption and considerable low levels of physical activity¹⁵⁰. Qatari authorities believe that a continuous involvement in sport organizations, especially consecutive hosting rights can inspire people to be involved in physical activity which would lead to tackling health disorders such as obesity and diabetes¹⁵¹. Second of all, Qatar wanted to utilize MSE to confront the negative images and long-held stereotypes that tended to portray Arab people as irrational, unreasonable, lazy, and lacking a sense of responsibility¹⁵². The preparation for the 2022 World Cup is significant in terms of highlighting Qatar's capability, responsibility and professionalism so that the Qataris have invested in-state-of-the-art technology that will show its high level of development and modern

¹⁴⁷ Brannagan and Giulianotti (2015). *Op.cit.* p.707.

¹⁴⁸ Brannagan, M.P. and Rookwood, J. (2016). "Sports mega-events, soft power and soft disempowerment: international supporters' perspectives on Qatar's acquisition of the 2022 FIFA World Cup finals", *International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics*, 8(2),p.174.

¹⁴⁹ Grix, J.(2014). *Leveraging Legacies from Sports Mega-events Concepts and Cases*. Palgrave: Macmillan.p. 155.

¹⁵⁰ International Association for the Study of Obesity (2012). *Global Obesity Regional Top 5*.

¹⁵¹ Grix, J.(2014). *Op.cit.* p.158.

¹⁵² Amara, M. (2005). "2006 Qatar Asian Games: A Modernization Project from Above?" *Sport in Society, Culture, Commerce, Media, Politics*, 8(3),p.506.

culture¹⁵³. The bidding process acknowledges the shortcomings in the number and quality of the stadiums, hence Qatar has been meticulous in the designing and implementation of the stadiums since the sporting architecture can be the symbol of change for Qatar “capturing the modernism and national ambitions”¹⁵⁴. Furthermore, the suitability of Qatar’s climate for elite competition has been a recurring pivotal issue as the temperatures can reach up to 50C¹⁵⁵, however, Qatar ensured that the stadiums will be equipped with technology to reduce or eliminate the negative impact of climate¹⁵⁶. The issues regarding the stadiums do not end with how they accommodate hot temperatures, it extends to the operationalization as MSEs generally generate “white elephant” facilities which is a term to cover “poorly used facilities associated with idiosyncratic Olympic sport, or hotels and transportation infrastructure built to accommodate a one-time peak demand of just three weeks”¹⁵⁷ became obsolete in the aftermath of the games. Qatar committed to constructing modular stadiums so that they can be disassembled and given away to the developing African nations as a sign of cooperation and solidarity¹⁵⁸. Finally, Qatar’s engagement in sport for the augmentation of its soft power is a necessity derived from the lack of hard power. Qatar’s foreign policy is centered on exercising soft power through international and regional cooperation supported by the values of peace and integrity¹⁵⁹. Qatar’s goal to develop its role as a mediator and reliable peace broker in Middle East conflicts, and its commitment to reduce the prospect of using hard power in international conflicts have served the country to enhance its soft power¹⁶⁰. Hosting an MSE would

¹⁵³ Brannagan and Giulianotti (2015). *Op.cit.* p.709.

¹⁵⁴ Mangan, J.A. (2011). “The new Asia: Global transformation, regional ascendancy, and meta-phorical modernity.” *The International Journal of the History of Sport*, 28, p.2232.

¹⁵⁵ Brannagan and Giulianotti (2015). *Op.cit.* p.709.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁷ Rose, A.K. and Spiegel, M.M.(2011). “The Olympic effect”, *The Economic Journal*, 121, p.656.

¹⁵⁸ FIFA. (2010). 2022 FIFA World Cup Bid evaluation report: Qatar. Zurich: Fédération Internationale de Football Association.General Secretariat for Development and Planning.

¹⁵⁹ Sajedi, A.(2009). “Geopolitics of the Persian Gulf security: Iran and the United States”, *Islamabad Policy Research Institute Journal*, 9, pp.77-89.

¹⁶⁰ Kamrava, M.(2009). “Mediation and Qatari foreign policy”. *The Middle East Journal*, 65, pp.539-555.

consolidate Qatari efforts to re-shape the general image of their country by enabling them to frame the Gulf region as peaceful and prosperous.

The Qatari strategy to utilize hosting sporting events so that they can formulate and implement a series of comprehensive and extensive policies that would serve not only to deal with the domestic issues but also lead to the augmentation of soft power has suffered greatly since the FIFA's grant of hosting. The reputational risks that arise from the high level of attention and detailed scrutiny can breed soft disempowerment. There are undercover reports that surfaced pointing out corruption and bribery allegations regarding the Qatari bid for the 2022 World Cup¹⁶¹. The reports suggest that Qatar had paid \$1 million to African FIFA Committee members in exchange for their votes in favor of Qatari bid, the allegations gained more prominence when FIFA executive committee member from Qatar was given a life ban from football after allegedly responsible for the transaction¹⁶². The public perception of the Qatari's involvement in sport has been critical and unsupportive since the Qatari acquisition of European football club Paris Saint-Germain because they completely ignored the FFP rules in place to safeguard the competition at both domestic and European level. This unfavorable perception has led to the emergence of a general consensus especially favored by the UEFA's 54 member countries, to play the tournament in the middle of the season calendar would disrupt and hinder the continuation of both domestic leagues and the Champions League¹⁶³. However, what really hampers the augmentation of soft power is the human rights conditions in Qatar where there has already been pressure from not only the civil rights organizations but also from the organizer of the World Cup itself. A report prepared by the Guardian revealed the appalling conditions South Asian expatriates endure on a daily basis, "documenting examples of exploitation, abuse; lack of pay and access to food and free drinking water; confiscation of passports, equating to the forms of modern-day slavery"¹⁶⁴. This report tells the story of a country that exhibit a lack of integrity, foul play, discrimination, unfriendliness,

¹⁶¹ Brannagan and Giulianotti (2015). *Op.cit.* p.714.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁴ Patisson, P. (2013). Revealed: Qatar's World Cup Slaves. The Guardian. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/25/revealed-qatars-world-cup-slaves>.

exploitation, and a dearth of accountability which resulted in questioning its ability to host the 2022 World Cup, and its readiness to fully join the international community.¹⁶⁵

Qatar presents a unique case for the loss of influence and prestige because these happened prior to the start of the 2022 World Cup. Qatar, even though formulated and implement policies and strategies to utilize sport for national, regional, and international aspirations has been the focus of worldwide discontent and criticism directed from the international community, participatory national teams and even the players due to the allegations of corruption documented in the bidding process, deplorable conditions workers have endured in the construction of the stadiums, and the long existing human rights violations occurring in the nation. This is a legacy that nobody would want to be associated with as both participatory national teams¹⁶⁶ and players¹⁶⁷ have seriously considered boycotting the World Cup, a tournament of glory and prestige, and a dream for both national teams and players. Qatar has a broad experience in hosting regional tournaments, and has a broad mandate to pursue its regional, and international aspirations through hosting MSEs. The Qatari pursuit for the augmentation of soft power to compensate the its lack of hard power, is halted prior to the 2022 World Cup because of the bribery allegations to acquire the hosting position of the 2022 World Cup, poor records of human rights, and deplorable conditions of workers. The Qatari aims to utilize sport as a way to augment soft power led to the soft disempowerment, a loss of attraction.

2.3. Sport as an Engine for Development: the United Nations

There are various international organizations that formulate and implement development programs through sport, however, United Nations stands out because of the institutional and administrative capacity to utilize sport. Even though sport-based development is a broad concept there are three main approaches which are traditional development, humanitarian assistance through sport fund-raising, and sport for

¹⁶⁵ Brannagan, M. P. And Giulianotti, R. (2015). *Op.cit* p.715.

¹⁶⁶ <https://www.euronews.com/2021/03/28/football-netherlands-joins-germany-norway-in-qatar-world-cup-protest>

¹⁶⁷ <https://www.bbc.com/sport/football/59338116>.

development and peace¹⁶⁸. The international organizations, most notably the UN, have utilized sport for “conflict resolution and inter-cultural understanding; building physical, social and community infrastructure; raising awareness, particularly through education; empowerment; direct impact on physical and psychological health and general welfare; economic development and poverty alleviation¹⁶⁹. Sport has come UN’s agenda in the late 1990s, and was quickly embraced both by the organization itself and the top officials within the organization. Former UN Deputy Secretary, Louise Frechette, stated at the World Sport Forum¹⁷⁰:

The power of sport is far more than symbolic. You are engines of economic growth. You are a force for gender equality. You can bring youth and other in from the margins, strengthening the social fabric. You can promote communication and help heal the division between peoples, communities and entire nations. You can set an example of fair play. Last but not least, you can advocate a strong and effective United Nations.

Former Special Adviser on Sport for Development and Peace, Adolf Ogi, explains the significance of sport for the United Nations by stating:

Sport teaches life skills. Sport remains the best school of life. With sport, young people learn: to manage victory; to overcome defeat; to become team players and to be reliable and gain the other team members’ confidence; respect for opponents and the rules; that for good results regular training is need; to know their limits and themselves better. The positive lessons and values of sport are essential for life¹⁷¹.

Former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, stated¹⁷²:

Sport is a universal language. At its best it can bring people together, no matter what their origin, background, religious beliefs or economic status. And when young people participate in sport or have access to physical educations, they can experience real exhilaration even as they learn the ideals of teamwork and tolerance. That is why the United Nations is turning more and more to the world of sport for help in our work for peace and our efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals¹⁷³.

¹⁶⁸ Kidd, B. (2008). “A new social movement: Sport for development and peace. *Sport in Society* 114(4): pp.370-380

¹⁶⁹ Coalter, F. (2010). “The politics of sport for development: Limited focus programmes and broad gauge problems?” *International Review for the Sociology of Sport*, 45(3), p.298.

¹⁷⁰ <https://www.peace-sport.org/opinion/sport-a-substitute-or-a-motivation-for-war/>.

¹⁷¹ Giulianotti, R. (2004). “Human rights, Globalization and Sentimental Education: The Case of Sport”, *Sport in Society*, 7.3, p.355.

¹⁷² <https://press.un.org/en/2004/sgsm9579.doc.htm>

¹⁷³ The MDGs were established at the High-level Plenary Meeting of the fifty-fifth session of the General Assembly with a target of achieving them by 2015. The MDGs were: 1) Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; 2) Achieve universal primary education; 3) Promote gender equality and empower women; 4) Reduce child mortality; 5) Improve maternal health; 6) Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; 7) Ensure environmental sustainability; 8) Develop a global partnership for development.

In July 2002, the Secretary-General convened a United Nations Inter-Agency Task Force on Sport for Development and Peace to formulate a more systematic and coherent use of sport in the process of pursuing MDGs¹⁷⁴. The Inter-Agency Task Force reach out to other agencies¹⁷⁵ that share the idea to resort to the sport as a means of development, and who have the experience and knowledge of using sport in their work so that they can formulate strategies, set priorities, and implement policies with their combined resources. The Inter-Agency Task Force prepared a report named “Sport for Development and Peace: Towards Achieving the Millennium Development Goals” which outlines a series of concrete steps to increase the awareness for sport both within and across the agencies and in the world so that the efforts of the utilization of sport can reach its full potential¹⁷⁶. The report calls on the United Nations Agencies to both coordinate their efforts and consolidate the role of sport through developing a strategic approach within the United Nations to foster Sport for Development and Peace partnerships; accommodating the mainstream sport into the work of the United Nations; incorporating sport in United Nations coordination mechanism to better integrate sport into United Nations strategic planning instruments; and looking ways to use sport for communication and social mobilization purposes.¹⁷⁷

The United Nations have designated International Years to draw attention to certain issues in order to foster international cooperation and encourage action. The year 2005 was marked by the United Nations as the year of sport and physical education so that the significance adhered to sport for development and peace initiatives would translate into better knowledge-sharing among various key stakeholders, to increase general awareness as well as to create proper conditions for the implementation of new, and to strengthen the existing sport-based development

¹⁷⁴Beutler, I. (2008). “Sport serving development and peace: Achieving the goals of the United Nations through sport”, *Sport in Society*, 11(4),p.360.

¹⁷⁵ These are ILO, UNESCO, the World Health Organization, the United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Volunteers, the United Nations Environment Programme, and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNICEF, the United Nations on Drugs and Crime, and the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS.

¹⁷⁶ Buetler. (2008). *Op.cit.* p.360.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.* p.361.

programs and projects.¹⁷⁸ The international year of sport and physical education have accelerated the phase of the United Nation in implementing its sport for development and peace projects. This new phase sets new set of priorities which aims to encourage governments to promote the role of sport for all; to ensure sport and physical education are mainstreamed into development programs; to promote sport and physical education based opportunities for solidarity and cooperation in order to promote a culture of peace and social and gender equality and to advocate dialogue and harmony; to promote the recognition of the contribution and physical education can bring towards economic and social development and encouraging the building and restoration of sport infrastructures; to encourage sport and physical education to be used on the basis of local needs as a means to foster education, health, peace, social and cultural development; to facilitate cooperation, coherence and partnership between all stakeholders including sport organizations, athletes, multilateral organizations and the United Nations system.¹⁷⁹ The United Nations continue to engage with all stakeholder with the aim of urging them to undertake different responsibilities and to coordinate their efforts for sport for development and peace programs. The United Nations at the Second Magglingen Conference on Sport and Development called on these various stakeholders to take action on the basis of their proposal. The United Nations proposes that sport organizations and bilateral development agencies to integrate and implement sustainable development principles into their policies, programs and projects; urges athletes to act as role models and actively use their influence and experience to advocate for development and peace.¹⁸⁰ Furthermore, it suggests that both multilateral organizations and the UN system assume a leading role in policy dialogue on strategic and global levels; raise awareness of international actors and other partners; strengthen and expand their networks and enhance coordination; and carry out and evaluate projects and programs¹⁸¹.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁰ Buetler. (2008). *Op.cit* p.361.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*

The UN's incorporation of sport for advancing its development and peace projects and programs while at the same time utilizing sport to achieve its Millennium development goals has expanded and accelerated the efforts of sport for development and peace in various parts of the world. For example, in AIDS-torn east Africa, a coalition of African and first-world agencies called the Kicking Aids Out network uses sport to teach personal health and sexual responsibility to vulnerable youth, in the former Yugoslavia, UNICEF has created "Open Fun Football Schools" to teach children and youth about the perils of landmines, and an NGO called Peace Players Internationals to teach basketball to encourage communication and cooperation between children and youth from different ethnic or religious backgrounds in Israel, Northern Ireland, and South Africa.¹⁸² The International Commission for the Red Cross has employed sport athletes to publicize its anti-personnel mines campaign, and have tried to help victims of genocide in Rwanda with the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and other international sport federations¹⁸³. *Red Deporte y Cooperacion* was established in 1999 and located in Madrid and in the United States, with the aim of "educating values and promoting physical, intellectual and psychomotor skills and development amongst underprivileged youth through organized sport activities¹⁸⁴". In Colombia, the *Futbol por la Paz* project was established through local sport associations to rehabilitate and reintegrate drug-addicted young people¹⁸⁵. Despite the fact that there have been efforts in various parts of the world to use sport for development and peace, there are a series of shortcomings that can be identified with the formulation and implementation of projects and programs. The UN championed efforts for SDP projects grounded on a general set of principles with loose goals and lacked the focus on sustainability, monitoring, and evaluation of work, and fell short on facilitating international coordination and knowledge transfer¹⁸⁶. Furthermore, there has been a discrepancy and rupture between

¹⁸² Kidd. (2008). *Op.cit.* P.370.

¹⁸³ Giulianotti, R. (2004). "Human Rights, Globalization and Sentimental Education: The Case of Sport", *Sport in Society*, 7:3, p.355.

¹⁸⁴ Giulianotti (2004). *Op.cit* p.356.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁶ Giulianotti (2004). *Op.cit* p.356.

the organization implementing the projects and the target groups. The disconnection among the providers and users arises due to poor dialogue between them, lack or little understanding of the local conditions, and poor engagements with the locals that have halted the initiatives or hindered them greatly¹⁸⁷. Lastly, the top-down and one-size fits all approach in SDP projects have seen as an extension of imperial, neo-colonial, and neo-liberal form of domination and exploitation that has been persistent in the evolution and diffusion of sport¹⁸⁸. Sport has been used by the dominant class as a socially beneficial and culturally normative character builder as the participants in sport are fed up with symbols, emotions, and dominant meanings of sport-based development through socialization, education, and intervention¹⁸⁹. Sport for development and peace programs designed in a certain way to uphold power relations, hierarchical order, to maintain cultural hegemony, and the continuation of the institutionalized poverty and privilege¹⁹⁰.

Sport entered into the UN's agenda in the early 1990s, and since then its significance has been acknowledged by the top officials of the UN even so that they have opted to mobilize their institutional capacity and resources to utilize sport. Among the routes that they could have chosen, namely traditional development, and humanitarian assistance through sport fund-raising, they choose to focus on sport for development and peace. They began to act under a broad mandate which required all the UN Agencies to coordinate their efforts, resources, and knowledge to formulate and implement sport for development and peace projects in various parts of the world ranging from organizing a campaign to fight AIDS in Africa to help rehabilitate people who have drug addiction in Colombia. Despite the dedication and desire to benefit from the sport's constitutive and transformative power SDP projects served to maintain the existing power relations and hierarchical order by failing to meet the needs of the target groups. The UN's utilization of sport proves that top-down measures do not necessarily lead to a desired outcome as the needs and the interests of

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*p.357.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁹ Darnell, S.C. (2010). "Sport, race, and bio-politics: Encounter with difference in "sport for development and peace" *Journal of Sport and Social Issues*, 34, pp. 396-417.

¹⁹⁰ Hartmann and Kwauk. (2011). *Op.cit.* p.297.

the target groups require a careful and elaborative solution rather than one-size fits all approach which may lead to the empowerment and continuation of the existing hierarchical power structures.

2.4. Conclusion

The multi-dimensional and multi-purposeful nature of sport has been utilized by various actors who have pursued their interest in different levels of politics, namely, national, regional, and international. Firstly, the authoritarian regimes have developed a closer relationship with sport so that they tap its nation-wide popularity of sport to consolidate their power, enact their policies of suppression to uphold their political priorities. Sport has served as a legitimization tool for authoritarian regimes, especially for the Fascist regime of Italy and Franco's Spain, both of whom have formulated and implemented different policies to further their agenda. These authoritarian regimes have centralized football for the continuation of their hegemonic order, the Fascist regime Italy utilized sport in general and football in particular to diminish the influence and power of the other societal forces which stand in the way of regime and the masses, Spain under Franco has sought to promote ultra-nationalists practices and ideas to ensure obedience and submission for the elimination of linguistic, cultural and regional identities. Despite the centralization of control over football, regime's ideas and efforts have perished, and after the football have recovered from the totalitarian grip, it enjoyed a relative autonomy to ensure the existence of different identities. Secondly, the nation-states utilitarian goals are not limited with the national context, some nation-states opted to use sport in general, and Mega-Sport events in particular as a resource of soft power to pursue their regional aspirations. Mega-Sport events offer a unique opportunity for states to showcase a brand image infused with history, tradition, and culture to capture the hearts and minds of the people. South Korea and Qatar are the selections to show the success and failure to utilize sport as a resource of soft power, the former, being the host of 1988 Summer Olympics and 2002 World Cup, created a carefully designed legacy that outlives the events itself to pursue its regional aspirations which was to re-emerge as a significant regional actor, while the latter failed to create legacy to amend the existing tarnished reputation surrounding country, and became the center of criticism due to allegations of bribery, poor human rights records, and exploitation of the workers. The utilization of sport does not necessarily

lead to the augmentation of soft power and soft disempowerment, what determines the result is the legacy nation-states create or lack thereof through hosting MSEs. Finally, the United Nations has incorporated sport into their agenda at the beginning of the millennia to foster its efforts of development and peace, hence an extensive and systemic campaigns have started that targeted different communities throughout the world. This undertaking which born out of the sport's power and significance throughout the communities of the world have led international organizations, particularly the UN to constitute divisions within the to coordinate the instrumentalization of the sport across the world by cooperating and engaging with the local authorities and other relative agencies. UN's idea and plan of action with regards to sport, however, has led to a top-down one-size fit approach does not dismantle the hierarchical power relations and cultural hegemonic order that stands in the way of encompassing development and genuine peace.

This chapter is built on the utilitarian nature of sport and how it has been employed by various actors to pursue their national, regional, and international goals. The hegemonic struggles that Italy under Franco has gone through also transpires in European football pyramid where a constant hegemonic struggle between UEFA and elite football clubs have continue since commodification penetrated to change the fabric of European football. European football stages a struggle between various hegemonic positions and projects, and the materialization and continuation of those projects will depend on the incorporation of diverse interests and positions. In addition to the authoritarian regimes utilization of sport, Spain under Franco sets an example to the identity construction process in which suppression of expression a certain identity in favor of another is prove to be not efficient. The identity construction remains at the top of the European Union's hegemonic projects in football where they want to utilize the daily exposure to European football infused with European symbols and rituals to create a European identity that is not in conflict with national and regional identities. On the other hand, the pursuit for the augmentation of soft power through hosting MSEs necessitates a creation of legacy which should tend to outlive the event itself, is similar to the creation of brand identity for the UEFA Champions League. The both UEFA and Team have carefully designed a brand identity infused with heritage and prestige, it foster a legitimacy for the tournament and facilitate the development of the

tournament. Finally, the result of the UN's policies that fail to dismantle the hierarchical power relations and cultural hegemonic order is also a struggle that UEFA endures as in spite of the coercive and comprehensive measures UEFA cannot prevail against the cycle of greed which fuels the hegemonic struggle against itself.

CHAPTER 3

THE INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN OF THE EUROPEAN FOOTBALL GOVERNANCE

This chapter designs to unpack the institutional governance of football which requires the examination of the historical development of FIFA, UEFA, and football clubs with a specific focus on how the process of commodification affected their hegemonic positions, means and capabilities, and their hegemonic projects for football's future. First section will investigate the FIFA's early years as the hierarchical leader of the football pyramid, then will discuss how a new era defined by commodification changed FIFA's approach to football and consolidated its hegemonic position, and finally will elaborate on the significance of World Cup as the apex of football in global and FIFA's hegemonic projects revolve around World Cup which engender hegemonic struggles in football. Second section will talk about newly established UEFA and its search for legitimacy and purpose, how a new era of commodification kicked off a hegemonic struggle for UEFA's hegemonic position in European football pyramid and forced UEFA to develop hegemonic projects to counter and balance the hegemonic challenge against itself. Third section will explain the evolution of football clubs in accordance with the football's transformation bring forth by the commodification process which ultimately caused a change in ownership structures and models in European football. Furthermore, how a change in the ownership structures and the emergence of wide array of commercial resources have empowered some football clubs conceptualized as elite football clubs will stage further hegemonic struggles in European football centered primarily on Champions League. This chapter aims to prove the prevalent existence of hegemonic struggles in football pyramid regardless of the power and authority of the actors in question. These hegemonic struggles originate from the football's transformation constituted by commodification which necessitates an endless search of capital attained only by the

constant expansion of football. The hegemonic struggles introduced in this chapter, specifically the hegemonic struggles in European football serve to set the stage for the hegemonic struggles waged over the Champions League.

3.1 FIFA and the World Cup

Football's diffusion and popularization necessitates a global standardization which led to the emergence of pyramidal world system¹⁹¹. FIFA (Federation Internationale de Football Association) sits at the apex, followed by the continental governing bodies such as UEFA, then national associations, regional and local associations, football clubs, and fans at the base¹⁹². FIFA who secured the global standardization in football, is an international organization founded by European members, namely from France, Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland in 1904¹⁹³. FIFA's authority was constantly challenged by England and South American countries which caused an impairment in FIFA's legitimacy in a world where there is no shortage of political and geopolitical crises¹⁹⁴. FIFA had to operate in an environment where contested and incompatible sporting cultures, and political and cultural differences which undermine the decision-making process in the FIFA as the members share an equal status despite the difference in their sporting success, political systems, and economic power¹⁹⁵. FIFA continued to suffer from the lack of legitimacy and worldwide status and considered as a "minor player in the organization of the games, beyond awarding the hosting rights it had neither staff nor money nor authority to decisively shape the tournament"¹⁹⁶. This environment which enabled European founders in FIFA to exert their influence in the decision-making process continued until the wave of decolonization. The emergence of new nation-

¹⁹¹ Giulianotti & Robertson (2009). *Op.cit* p.27.

¹⁹² Giulianotti & Robertson (2009). *Op.cit* p.27.

¹⁹³ Pouliopoulos, T. & Georgiadis, K.(2021)."FIFA and UEFA, a critical review of the two organizations through the lens of institutional theory and MacIntyre's philosophical schema", *Soccer & Society*, 22(7), p.781.

¹⁹⁴ Pouliopoulos, & Georgiadis, (2021). *Op.cit*. p.783.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid*. P.782.

¹⁹⁶ Bar-On, T. &Escobedo, L. (2019)."FIFA seen from a postcolonial perspective", *Soccer & Society*, 20(1), p.48

states as a result of the decolonization process has accelerated the expansion of FIFA as non-European countries turn to the organization for greater respect and representation which transform FIFA membership into a sign of legitimacy, and solidified FIFA's political power and status as an international stakeholder¹⁹⁷. The new memberships to the FIFA have raised the European countries' concern as they believed that FIFA no longer prioritized the European interests which required a European collective voice to protect its hegemonic positions at the top of the football pyramid.¹⁹⁸ The weakening position of the European interests in the FIFA have led the Europeans to feel a sense of betrayal which would stir up Europeans to formulate an organization of their own, namely the UEFA to repel the threats against the European dominance, and to preserve their hegemonic positions in football.¹⁹⁹

FIFA as the hierarchical leader of the football pyramid entered a new era as the European dominance faded and new members from Africa, Asia, and Caribbean joined to the fold²⁰⁰. The organization has acknowledged these regions political, economic, and cultural potential in terms of changing the power dynamics in FIFA's decision making process, expanding the services and organizations provided by FIFA to these regions as new markets to be conquered, and further diffuse football into new societies and cultures²⁰¹. This new era witnessed a new figure in the post of presidency which Joao Havelanga, a former double Olympian and an independent businessman, took the helms of FIFA in 1974 by obtaining the support of the new members through pledging to increase the number of participants to the World Cup, and adhere to provide assistance to build and develop sporting infrastructure in these countries²⁰². Furthermore, Havelange assured both the new members and those who were frustrated of the European hegemonic interests and power that dictate the decisions of FIFA

¹⁹⁷ Pouliopoulos, & Georgiadis, (2021). *Op.cit.* p.783.

¹⁹⁸ Sugden, J. & Tomlinson, A. (1997). "Global power struggles in world football: FIFA and UEFA, 1954-74, and their legacy", *The International Journal of the History of Sport*, 14:2, p.4.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁰ Bar-on & Escobedo (2019). *Op.cit.* p.49.

²⁰¹ Sugden & Tomlinson (1997). *Op.cit.* p.4.

²⁰² *Ibid.* P.10

would change in favor of the majority²⁰³. Despite the promises and vision that led Havelange to become the president, FIFA continued to organize, regulate, and govern football in a Western and European-centric manner that prioritizes opportunistic nationalism and hyper-capitalist logic”²⁰⁴.

FIFA under the leadership of Havelange utilized football’s popularity to negotiate new deals with transnational corporations such as Adidas and Coca-Cola, thus ushering a new era in football where commercialization and commodification become the centerpiece of the game²⁰⁵. This era foresaw a shift “from public to private, from mission to market, from the civil society to commerce”, Havelange sought to establish a network which includes new markets, attracts global sponsors, and reshapes and transforms the male World Cup into a lucrative and highly prestigious global event²⁰⁶. Joseph Blatter, successor to the Havelange, “managed to expand FIFA’s power and status by closing lucrative deals with sponsors and broadcasters, developing infrastructure and women’s football around the world, introducing new games (futsal, beach soccer), and expanding the World Cup to new markets”²⁰⁷ both through hosting opportunities and the increasing number of the participants. World Cups as mega-sport events provide “lively cultural arenas for the reproduction and interplay of national-societal particularities”²⁰⁸, and become a site where “different national supporters converge and commingle”²⁰⁹ to display their particular dresses, songs, dances, and patterns of social behavior that are unique to their culture. The excitement and tension of the World Cups is built up with the beginning of the qualification tournaments that takes place in every continent which stage a fierce rivalry between nations and evoke feelings of joy, sadness, and proudness. Regardless of the qualification to the World

²⁰³ Pouliopoulos, & Georgiadis(2021).*Op.cit.* p.781.

²⁰⁴ Bar-on & Escobedo(2019).*Op.cit.*p.43.

²⁰⁵ Pouliopoulos, & Georgiadis(2021).*Op.cit.* p.782.

²⁰⁶ Tomlinson, A.(2014).” The supreme leader sails on: leadership ethics and governance in FIFA”, *Soccer & Society*, 17(9), p.1159.

²⁰⁷ Pouliopoulos, & Georgiadis(2021).*Op.cit.* p.782.

²⁰⁸ Giulianotti & Robertson (2009). *Op.cit* p.26.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

Cup, everyone attached to football is locked in to experience the greatness of football happened once in every 4 years. The World Cup's commercial potential and cultural significance is epitome of hyper-commodification which requires a constant injection of and search for capital fueled by greed that also requires a constant expansion of football, and desirably a more frequent World Cup.

The World Cup in the era of hyper-commodification becomes the main profit-making product of FIFA who took measures back in the 2006 to fully exploit the commercial potential of the World Cup after recording a net loss in the 2002 World Cup co-hosted by Japan and South Korea²¹⁰. Therefore, a new piece of regulations approved by the Congress²¹¹ for the 2006 World Cup which state:

Marketing rights mean all rights of exploitation (in whatever form) of all types of advertising, including electronic and virtual promotion, marketing, merchandising (including but not limited to publications, musical compositions, coins, stamps, DVDs, videos, commercial hospitality, apparel and electronic games of any nature), licensing, franchising, sponsorship, hospitality, publications, and any other rights and/or associated commercial opportunities relating to or in connection with the 2006 FIFA World Cup, including advertising, franchising, displaying, sampling and selling rights of any nature at the event stadiums and other official sites. The marketing rights also include the exclusive right to use and sub-license the use of the marks²¹².

This provision approved for the 2006 World Cup, applied for all other World Cups to come, and finalized FIFA's revenue sources which until 2006 consists of television broadcasting rights, marketing rights, licensing rights, hospitality rights and ticket sales, and other revenue and income generated by the sale of video rights, the FIFA World Football Museum, FIFA Quality Program, penalties and appeals, and rental income²¹³. Even though FIFA has a diverse revenue streams, the revenues generated by the FIFA predominantly comes from the World Cup organizations. According to the FIFA financial reports, 2006 World Cup in Germany generated 912 million CHF

²¹⁰Generated revenue is 963 million CHF while net expenses is 966 million CHF. See <https://digitalhub.fifa.com/m/10e86ad2eaf02dab/original/qkdqvrhkrnqfswpmjct-pdf.pdf>

²¹¹ The Congress is FIFA's supreme and legislative body responsible for electing the president of FIFA, for deciding the host of both men and women World Cups, approving the budgetary standings of the FIFA. See <https://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/congress>

²¹² Eick, V.(2010). "A neoliberal sports event? FIFA from the *Estadio Nacional* to the fan mile", *City*, 14:3, p.285.

²¹³<https://publications.fifa.com/en/annual-report-2020/2020-financials-and-2022-budget/2022-budget/>.

for 609 million CHF for expenses²¹⁴, 2010 World Cup in South Africa generated 1.219 million \$ for 1.089 million \$ expenses²¹⁵, 2014 World Cup in Brazil generated 2.096 million \$ for 1.995 million \$ expenses²¹⁶, 2018 World Cup in Russia generated 4.641 million \$ for 2.891 million \$ expenses²¹⁷, and 2022 World Cup in Qatar projected to generate 4.666 million \$ for 1.696 \$ expenses²¹⁸.




Figure 1. Generated Revenues and Expenses of FIFA in World Cups

*Both the revenues and expenses are reported in CHF.

**Projected revenues and expenses as the 2022 World Cup yet to take place.

The commercial results of the successive World Cups shows a steady growth in generated revenues for a relatively lower expenditures which encourages FIFA to act with an insatiable hunger towards greater revenues. FIFA, being the supreme authority of football pyramid believe that it can force hegemonic policies to the rest of

²¹⁴ <https://digitalhub.fifa.com/m/114402613edaae50/original/zq7qokz0hgq1g7jlosqk-pdf.pdf>

²¹⁵ <https://digitalhub.fifa.com/m/605abd94a1bc476f/original/miuql8kpghitm7kdzha2-pdf.pdf>

²¹⁶ <https://digitalhub.fifa.com/m/6d29dfb0f8a0e4ad/original/e4e5lkxrbqvgscxgjnpx-pdf.pdf>

²¹⁷ <https://digitalhub.fifa.com/m/337fab75839abc76/original/xzshsoe2ayttyquuxhq0-pdf.pdf>

²¹⁸ <https://publications.fifa.com/en/annual-report-2020/2020-financials-and-2022-budget/2022-budget/>

football pyramid despite the possible resistance that may have come from the continental organizations, national organizations, football clubs, and fans who are the backbone of football. FIFA's hegemonic project is to re-structure the World Cup to biennial organizations in which FIFA can at least double the revenues generated by the World Cup²¹⁹. This idea although have yet to materialize or even take its final form, have been discussed in the football world, and have been encouraged and even promoted by footballing celebrities, legends, and former players, regardless of the systemic damage it might bring on the football pyramid, domestic leagues, European level competitions, players, and fans. The biennial World Cup would require a complete re-organization of the football calendar which already have little resting periods for players to recover from the injuries and to catch a break from high intensity trainings and matches, and for fans who need affordable and reachable football rather than an uninterrupted football calendar full of domestic, European, worldwide competitions. FIFA have tried to formulate a hegemonic bloc to pursue this hegemonic project, take advantage of the promise of cash and easier participation that can be generated and become possible by the biennial World Cup to incorporate member nations from the Asian Confederation, the North American Confederation (CONCACAF), Oceania Football Confederation (OFC), and Confederation of African Football (CAF). The rest of the continental confederations, namely UEFA and the South American Football Confederation (CONMEBOL), have staunchly opposed the idea of biennial World Cup emphasizing that it would be a betrayal to the 100 years of world football tradition²²⁰. FIFA chose to not to move forward with the biennial World Cup because of the failure to incorporate different social forces' interests and the emergence of counter-hegemonic bloc who firmly oppose the biennial World Cup. However, despite the failure, not only the biennial World Cup did not disappear from FIFA's agenda, FIFA continues to act for the formulation of new set of tournaments

²¹⁹<https://www.goal.com/en-us/news/will-the-world-cup-be-every-2-years-biennial-tournament/blt1fb876373f30a27d>

²²⁰<https://www.skysports.com/football/news/12098/12446370/fifa-world-cup-conmebol-countries-would-not-take-part-in-biennial-format-of-competition#:~:text=A%20CONMEBOL%20statement%20said%3A%20%22There,the%20change%20promoted%20by%20FIFA.&text=%22In%20view%20of%20this%2C%20the,Cup%20organised%20every%20two%20years.>

such as the introduction of annual boys and girls competition, and the expansion of the existing tournament, namely the Club World Cup²²¹, and seeking further support for the re-emergence and materialization of the biennial World Cup to have control over more capital which then to be distributed among member nations, and used to consolidate its hegemonic position in the football pyramid.

3.2 UEFA's Hegemonic Position and Hegemonic Projects in the European Football

UEFA, born out of a diminishing power and influence of the European nations in FIFA, is registered and operating under the Swiss Civil Code which indicates that associations that have a political, religious, scientific, artistic, charitable, social or any other industrial object, acquire the status of a person as soon as they show by their constitution and their intention to have a corporate existence.²²² UEFA's membership is open to national football associations located in the continent of Europe, with the exception of Monaco (a UN member state) and Vatican City (a UN observer state)²²³. Additionally, some of the UEFA members are not sovereign states but part of a larger sovereign state recognized by the international law such as England, Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales (constituent countries of the United Kingdom), Gibraltar (British Overseas Territory), the Faroe Islands (constituent country within the Kingdom of Denmark), and Kosovo (state with limited recognition)²²⁴. UEFA is responsible for "promoting football in a spirit of unity, solidarity, peace, understanding, fair play, safeguarding the values of European football, maintaining good relations with all stakeholder involved in European football, and supporting its member associations for the overall well-being of the European game"²²⁵. UEFA operates in an environment where there is a diverse and conflictual interests for the future of European football pyramid, hence UEFA must deal with football clubs whose prioritizes and interests for

²²¹ <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/04/sports/soccer/biennial-world-cup-fifa.html>

²²² UEFA (2007). UEFA Statutes: Edition June 2007. Nyon(Switzerland): UEFA.

²²³ *Ibid.*

²²⁴ <https://www.centreonconstitutionalchange.ac.uk/news-and-opinion/sovereignty-and-non-state-territories-international-football>

²²⁵ <https://www.uefa.com/insideuefa/about-uefa/what-uefa-does/>

the game vary from one another, and with European Union whose institutional framework can have a transformative impact for every stakeholder in European football. UEFA, unlike FIFA, is in charge of two prime product generating capital for the European football pyramid, the European Championship, a competition brings the nations in Europe to determine the continental champion, and the UEFA Champions League, although both of them have significant commercial potential, cultural and political significant steeped in tradition and history, the focus of the paper is limited to the UEFA Champions League which is the restructured version of the European Champions Clubs' Cup that ran through 1955 to 1992.

The European Champions Clubs' Cup born out of an invitation sent by the prestigious French sport magazine, *L'equipe*, to the football clubs for the development of a European club competition in December 1954. The European Champions Clubs' Cup designed to bring together the champions of each domestic league in Europe, intrigued by this invitation 18 clubs met on 2 April 1955 to discuss the format and viability of the competition which resulted in the necessity of a higher authority to administer and organize this European club competition, and to mediate the interest of competing clubs²²⁶. UEFA, being established a year ago mainly because of the diminishing power and influence in FIFA, did not have clear role and purpose and vision for the future of European football, accepted the offer to organize and regulate the organization which quickly became a premier club competition in Europe, and in world football²²⁷. FIFA who at the time monitoring ambitions to formulate a European club competition, approved the projects based on "participating clubs had to receive permission from their national associations, the tournament had to be organized by UEFA"²²⁸. The format of the European Champions Clubs' guarantees a smaller number of matches due to the knock-out based elimination system which hinders to exploit the full potential of the organization. The participating clubs from the beginning envisioned a quasi-league competition which would increase their revenues, another meeting took place in March 1967 in which the clubs who participate the

²²⁶ King, A. (2003). *The European Ritual: Football in the New Europe*. Taylor & Francis Publishing. P.37.

²²⁷ King (2003). *Op.cit.*38.

²²⁸ *Ibid.* p.39

tournament sought the approval of FIFA and UEFA to transform the European Champions Clubs' into a European Super League²²⁹. This proposal even though it was refused, resurfaced a decade later in November 1977 which would guarantee more clubs, more matches, and more money²³⁰. The football clubs whose proposal rejected on two times were economically and politically powerful enough to materialize their interests, however, as the commodification changed the fabric of the game by introducing new opportunities to inject further capital from diverse revenue streams such as broadcasting, merchandising, and sponsorship deals, elite football clubs who were the Champions and contenders of domestic leagues, and those who made regular appearances to European club competition, came together to pressure UEFA to transform the format of the European Champions Clubs' to a new one called the UEFA Champions League in 1991-92 season which would foresee a greater commercial potential to be exploited by both elite football clubs for their pursuit for success and by UEFA to distributed to protect the wider interests of the European football pyramid.

UEFA, having firmly established its power and authority in European football after taking the responsibility of organizing the European club competition, had to operate in an evolving footballing world where it had to protect the interests of European football pyramid, mediate with the demands of the elite football clubs, and adjust to the decisions and regulations taken by the European Union whose increasing involvement to football have a transformative impact over the power dynamics among the actors and fabric of the game itself. UEFA, after the transformation in European football triggered by commodification, encountered another transformative force in European football, the European Union who originally did not have a direct competence to operate a sport policy, became highly interested sport which become a priority in EU's agenda. European Union entered in European football, knowing full well of the transformation football went through and being aware of the challenges football faces which documented in the Helsinki Report and the Nice Declaration. The Helsinki Report on Sport, and acknowledged the rise in the popularity of sport, the internationalization of sport, and the development of the economic dimension of the

²²⁹ *Ibid.* p. 137

²³⁰ *Ibid.* p.138

sport²³¹. The economic dimension of sport and the need solidarity highlighted in the Nice Declaration which stated “the ownership or economic control by one financial operator of several sporting clubs taking part in the same competition may jeopardize fair competition”²³², and “as the sale of television broadcasting rights is one of the greatest sources of income, the sharing of part of the corresponding revenue among the appropriate levels may be beneficial in order to preserve the principle of solidarity in sport”²³³. However, despite recognizing the commercial potential and the dangers it might bring and the need for solidarity, European Union has implemented policies to enable the commercial potential to become a threat for European football’s solidarity and integrity. The deregulation and privatization of broadcasting of the European football market and the European Court of Justice’s Bosman ruling that ensured the freedom of movement of football players, which widened the disproportionate distribution of broadcasting revenues that further empower elite football clubs over other stakeholders, and further injection of capital coming from private media organizations that led to irresponsible spending and greed, and hindered the affordability of football which also negatively impacted the hegemonic projects of EU itself. Former UEFA Ceo Gerd Agner stated that:

The Bosman ruling of 1995 has meant that a small number of clubs have become excessively powerful, both financial and from a political and sporting point of view. At the same time, political structures have begun to break down, a process which is evident in many different ways. Creating an international lobby on behalf of a number of major clubs from within the EU is a huge challenge for UEFA and its member associations- a challenge which must be met if the existing principles that govern football are to continue in the future.²³⁴

After ECJ’s Bosman Ruling, football in Europe finds itself under constant threat from economic circles. Club budgets have exploded, players’ salaries have reached astronomical heights, transfer fees have been replaced by contract buy- out clauses, and a desire for more and more money has led to initiatives such as the quoting of clubs on the stock market. At the same time, plans for new competitions surface again and again, with the sole objective of procuring a greater abundance financial resources. For the game’s authorities retaining control of this tumultuous world is an arduous task.²³⁵

²³¹ <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:1999:0644:FIN:EN:PDF>

²³² <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/incorporating-the-specific-characteristics-of-sport-and-its-social-functions-into-the-implementation-of-common-policies.html>

²³³ <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/incorporating-the-specific-characteristics-of-sport-and-its-social-functions-into-the-implementation-of-common-policies.html>

²³⁴ UEFA(2003). CEO Annual Report 2003: XXVIII Ordinary UEFA Annual Congress, Limassol, Cyprus. Nyon, UEFA. P.7.

²³⁵ UEFA (1999). Report of the General Secretary, 1998-1999. Nyon, UEFA. P.12

Furthermore, Furthermore, the White paper penned by European Commission reiterated the increasing social and economic role and power of the sport to the European Union's strategic objectives of solidarity and prosperity²³⁶. The White Paper gives details about the societal role of sport, its economic dimension and its organization in Europe with a specific focus placed on the European Sport Model and the specificity of sport. The Commission considers that:

Certain values and traditions of European sport should be promoted. In view of the diversity and complexities of European sport structures it considers, however, that it is unrealistic to try to define a unified model of organization of sport in Europe. Moreover, economic and social developments that are common to the majority of the Member States (increasing commercialization, challenges to public spending, increasing numbers of participants and stagnation in the number of voluntary workers) have resulted in new challenges for the organization of sport in Europe. The emergence of new stakeholders (participants outside the organized disciplines, professional sport, clubs etc.) is posing new questions as regards to governance, democracy and representation of interests within the sport movement.²³⁷

UEFA, amid the transformation and threat surfaced in European football, forced to adopt measures and policies that would preserve its hegemonic position in European football, and protect the integrity of European football pyramid. UEFA have formulated a project named F.O.R.C.E that aims to create a framework for UEFA to determine and tackle the problems in the European football pyramid by re-structuring UEFA's the hegemonic position and hegemonic interests of UEFA vis-à-vis with the football world, European football governance, off-field issues and key stakeholders.²³⁸ UEFA's core mission is to "promote, protect and develop European football at every level of the game, to promote the principles of unity and solidarity, and to deal with all questions relating to European football"²³⁹. UEFA, having positioned itself at the very center of the European football as the guardian of its legacy and memory, aims to fully exploit the commercial potential of the European club competitions so that it can use the revenues generated by these competitions to re-invest and re-distribute in the

²³⁶ <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52007DC0391>

²³⁷ <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52007DC0391>

²³⁸ UEFA (2005). UEFA Vision Paper. Nyon: UEFA.

²³⁹ *Ibid.* p.7.

European football pyramid to ensure solidarity and unity²⁴⁰. This re-investment and re-distribution necessitates central marketing and selling of core rights on all levels would be in charge of UEFA who is better equipped than any actor in European football pyramid to understand the different needs, views, interests of different stakeholders²⁴¹. The unique position of the UEFA as the sovereign organizer of European club competition grants UEFA the power to keep the football family together to stand for the promotion and relegation system and to maintain a degree of competitive balance, both of which are intrinsic part of the European football's history and tradition, and are integral for the development of football. The vision and philosophy of UEFA for European football's future adhere the hegemonic position of UEFA to address the needs and interests of different actors which are fundamentally economic in nature, hence UEFA reaffirms its commitment to ensure financial solidarity in all levels of European football, implement policies and mechanism to provide fiscal responsibility and prevent irresponsible spending fueled by greed for success and glory which not only detrimental to the club that go to spending frenzy but also to the European football pyramid as well since this understanding and common practice put a systemic pressure on football clubs which force them into a cycle of searching for more capital to spend money.

UEFA, having reaffirm its hegemonic position in European football pyramid as the only actor that has the power, institutional capacity and will, to mediate the interest on all levels of football, implemented a hegemonic policy to address the threat posed by elite football clubs not only to the UEFA's hegemonic position in European football but also to the wider European football pyramid. The unchecked and uncontrolled spiral of spending through injection of high volumes of capital disrupted the competitive balance in both domestic and European club competitions, and spilled over to the other football clubs who internalized the spending practices of the richest which create a cycle in pursuit of additional capital to be spend either for glory and success or for survival. UEFA aims to tackle systemic spending frenzy which favors the richest and most powerful clubs over those who do not have the sufficient resources

²⁴⁰ UEFA (2005). UEFA Vision Paper. Nyon: UEFA. P.7.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.* p.10.

and those who spend borrowed money. The spending practices of the football clubs regardless of unsustainable financial situations that they are in, continued which forced UEFA to take action to bring restraint and fiscal responsibility to ensure solidarity on all levels of European football, and to preserve what has remained of the competitive balance. UEFA, as its hegemonic project implemented the Financial Fair Play to encourage clubs to better manage their spending strategies to achieve a sustainable balance between income, spending and investments.

Financial Fair Play is a comprehensive hegemonic project that aims to “improve the economic and financial capability of the clubs; to introduce more discipline and rationality in club football finances; to encourage clubs to operate on the basis of their own revenues; to encourage responsible spending for the long-term benefit of football; to protect the long-term viability and sustainability of European club football”.²⁴² FFP engages with the loss-making clubs, and offers them a package deal for a 3 year basis to reach a break-even in football operations. FFP has coercive mechanisms such as transfer and wage restrictions, preventing new capital injection to make-up for the losses to force clubs comply with the agreed upon goals²⁴³. The major components of financial fair play is as follows: it outlines the relevant and non-relevant expenses²⁴⁴ and income so that the clubs can plan and report their fiscal responsibilities for qualification to the European competitions. In case of failure to fulfill the goals set by the FFP regulations, clubs in question can face expulsion from European level competitions. Financial fair play is designed to counteract the increasing indebtedness and chronic loss-making spiral of the European football clubs. The financial problems in European football rooted in the rising players’ expenses, mostly in wages and growing reliance on private or public benefactors to succeed in domestic and European

²⁴² <https://www.uefa.com/insideuefa/protecting-the-game/financial-fair-play/>

²⁴³ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁴ Relevant expenses include: Cost of sales; Employee benefits expenses; Other operating expenses; Amortisation or costs of player registration; Finance costs and dividends. Non-relevant expenses include: Youth development activities; Women’s football activities; Infrastructure costs; Community development activities; Non-monetary items; Finance costs. Relevant income includes: Revenues generated from gate receipts, broadcasting rights, sponsorships and advertising, commercial activities, UEFA solidarity and prize money, other operating income. Profit or income of disposal of player registration. Excess proceeds on disposal of tangible fixed assets and financial income. Non-relevant income includes: Income from non-football operations, non-monetary items, and related party transactions above fair value.

competitions²⁴⁵. UEFA's goal in formulating FFP is to establish financial discipline and rationality in the management of football clubs, and to bring more clubs to compete in the domestic and European level competitions.²⁴⁶ FFP seen as an instrument to level the playing field between a handful of rich and powerful football clubs that can easily tap new investors, secure funds from banks, or even exploit taxpayers' money and the rest of the remaining football clubs.²⁴⁷

The architecture of the European football composed of a system of promotion and regulation where success is rewarded with additional prize money and a place in European club competitions, hence clubs to attain success tend to overinvest and overpay which is not sustainable and put clubs into a cycle of debt, economic hardship. The overinvestment fueled by greed for success and glory pushes many clubs across Europe into a de-facto insolvency which led to soft budget constraints, suboptimal, and insufficient resource allocation.²⁴⁸ The imposition of restraints through FFP regulations can cause a rise in the average level of sporting and financial management quality in the domestic leagues.²⁴⁹ Furthermore, FFP regulations "harden club budget constraints, reduce the capacity for investment, lower the likelihood of debt financial distress and help mitigate the moral hazard inherent with being too prominent to fail"²⁵⁰. The new framework for European football introduced by the FFP based on to provide fiscal responsibility and to limit clubs, especially the elite clubs' spending frenzy for success, aims to restore the tarnished competitive balance. FFP's goal is to end the exploitative practices of elite football clubs so that smaller and weaker teams can challenge them in domestic and European level competitions. Aleksander Ceferin, the current President of UEFA, stated that "the uncertainty of outcome and competitive

²⁴⁵ Schubert, M., Könecke, T. & Pitthan, H.(2016). "The guardians of European football: European Financial Fair Play and the career of social problems", *European Journal for Sport and Society*, 13(4), p.297.

²⁴⁶ Birkhauser, S., Kaserer, C., & Urban, D. (2019). "Did UEFA's financial fair play harm competition in European football leagues?", *Review of Managerial Science*, 13(1), p.114.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁸ Franck, E. (2014). "Financial Fair Play in European Club Football- What is it all about?" UZH Business Working Paper Series. University of Zurich.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

balance are the magic of football, and called for European and national legislators to help football in creating measures to ensure a fairer and better regulated game based on solidarity”²⁵¹. Furthermore, Ceferin hinted a new wave of comprehensive and extensive measurements as an evolution of the FFP can be introduced such as “salary caps, luxury tax, squad limits, reforms of the transfer system, the creation of a clearing house to control money flows, restrictions on the commissions paid to players’ agents, the introduction of a solidarity tax on transfers, loan limits, prohibition on cross-ownership of clubs”²⁵².

UEFA have implemented a hegemonic project called Financial Fair Play to address the chronic loss-making and overinvestment in European football which first opted by elite football clubs to dominate their respective domestic leagues and to furthest in European club competitions. These practices spilled over to rest of the football clubs spend to break the domination of elite football clubs’ in their leagues, and to get rid of the relegation zone which falter their financial resilience and put them in an endless cycle of debt. The regulations introduced by FFP to tackle the systemic pressure of spending frenzy exist in European football and to consolidate UEFA’s hegemonic position, through preventing unlimited injection of capital to dominate and exploit other football clubs in pursuit of success and glory. However, FFP regulations fail to deliver on its promises as the elite football clubs continue to dominate the domestic and European competitions by acquiring further capital either through an injection of capital from private benefactor in different forms such as loans, sponsorship deals, and donations, or through selling a portion of their revenues such as their broadcasting rights, merchandising, and media rights which put a high pressure on clubs financial resilience for short-term benefits.

FFP, in spite of the comprehensive and coercive measures to bring checks and balances to European football have failed. UEFA’s hegemonic project only solidified elite football clubs’ position in domestic and European competitions. FFP supposed to limit the spending frenzy of elite football clubs which grant them unfair and

²⁵¹<https://www.uefa.com/insideuefa/about-uefa/news/023d-0f8e574139c6-afb62841fa98-1000--keeping-competitive-balance-aleksander-ceferin/>

²⁵²<https://www.uefa.com/insideuefa/about-uefa/news/023d-0f8e574139c6-afb62841fa98-1000--keeping-competitive-balance-aleksander-ceferin/>

unattainable advantage over others, however, post-FFP period witness an even higher spending by elite football clubs who have much easier access to capital because of the revenues generated by making a regular appearance in European competitions, dominating their respective domestic leagues, procuring the best talents in European football, all of which also attract a wide fan-base that turn further capital. The European powerhouses, namely, Manchester City, FC Barcelona, Chelsea, Manchester United, Juventus, Paris St-Germain, Real Madrid, Liverpool, Atletico Madrid, Internazionale, Arsenal, Tottenham Hotspur, Milan, Bayern Munich, and Borussia Dortmund have spent 1.699 billion £, 1.630 billion £, 1.614 billion £, 1.545 billion £, 1.542 billion £, 1.445 billion £, 1.163 billion £, 1.128 billion £, 1.101 billion £, 1.058 billion £, 1.029 billion £, 1.013 billion £, 884 million £, 815 million £, 806 million £ respectively only in the transfer market²⁵³; while have earned 715 million £, 980 million £, 1.201 billion £, 470 million £, 981 million £, 504 million £, 984 million £, 781 million £, 995 million £, 673 million £, 446 million £, 677 million £, 452 million £, 452 million £, 892 million £ respectively with the sales of their players²⁵⁴. The spending in the transfer market does not cover all the operational activities of the football clubs such as wage bill to the players occupies a considerable space of the clubs' budgets. The latest reports by the UEFA have shown these European powerhouses are the top wage spenders, FC Barcelona, Real Madrid, Paris St-Germain, Manchester United, Bayern Munich, Manchester City, Liverpool, Chelsea, Arsenal, Juventus, Atletico Madrid, Borussia Dortmund, Tottenham, Inter, and Milan have allocated 529 million £, 431 million £, 337 million £, 334 million £, 315 million £, 314 million £, 298 million £, 275 million £, 271 million £, 261 million £, 212 million £, 187 million £, 167 million £, 159 million £, 150 million £ respectively in 2018²⁵⁵. These numbers have change into 487 million £ for Barcelona, 433 million £ for Manchester City, 411 million £ for Real Madrid, 407 million £ for Paris St-Germain, 371 million £ for Liverpool, 340 million £ for Bayern Munich, 323 million £ for Manchester United, 320 million £ for Chelsea, 285 million £ for Juventus, 268 million

²⁵³ <https://football-observatory.com/IMG/sites/b5wp/2021/wp367/en/>

²⁵⁴ <https://football-observatory.com/IMG/sites/b5wp/2021/wp367/en/>

²⁵⁵ https://www.footballbenchmark.com/documents/files/UEFA%20Club%20Licensing%20Benchmarking%20report_2020_FY%202018.pdf

£ for Arsenal, 215 million £ for Borussia Dortmund, 213 million £ for Atletico Madrid, 207 million £ for Tottenham, 202 million £ for Internazionale, 161 million £ for Milan in 2020.²⁵⁶




Figure 2. The wage spending of the elite football clubs between 2018 and 2020
 Source: Football Observatory, Net transfer spending over last ten seasons, 2020, <https://football-observatory.com/IMG/sites/b5wp/2021/wp367/en/>




Figure 3: Elite football clubs in the transfer market from post-FFP to 2021 summer,

²⁵⁶ https://editorial.uefa.com/resources/0272-145b03c04a9e-26dc16d0c545-1000/master_bm_high_res_20220203104923.pdf

Source: UEFA, Football Benchmark Reports, 2021,
https://www.footballbenchmark.com/documents/files/UEFA%20Club%20Licensing%20Benchmarking%20report_2020_FY%202018.pdf

The social, economic, legal and political developments occurred in European football inevitably shape the environment in which actors in European football pyramid operate, and a number of co-constitutive factors have combined to undermine the existing hegemonic position of UEFA. Football's transformation triggered by the commodification restricts actors' powers and influence to shape as no single actor has the capacity to control a diverse field of actions and interactions, thus leading to a new forms of governance²⁵⁷. The new power dynamics emerged in the European hegemonic order necessitate a bargaining and a compromise between hegemonic interests and hegemonic positions rather than a top-down decision-making by a single actor. Despite the coercive mechanism introduced by the FFP, European football's richest clubs can easily access and command high volumes of capital to fund their pursuit of glory attained by dominating the domestic leagues and proceed to furthest in the Champions League, at the expense of European football pyramid's integrity and future. Even though there has been continuous breaches to FFP committed by the elite football clubs, most notably Manchester City and Paris St-Germain²⁵⁸, UEFA did/could not take punitive action required by FFP, a hegemonic project of their own. The decision not to enforce regulations in case of a breach, and decision not to comply and even willingly defy and undermine the FFP regulations illustrated a new power dynamics in European football where there is a shift in favor of elite football clubs which led and will lead to hegemonic struggles in European football.

3.3 Football Clubs and Hegemonic Struggles in European Football

Clubs are situated at the bottom of the football pyramid. Clubs were originally founded as local associations to create a platform for the local community to engage in sport, thus promoting the idea of sport for all²⁵⁹. Football clubs are the embodiment

²⁵⁷ Holt(2009).*Op.cit* p.4.

²⁵⁸<https://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/sportsnews/article-10919377/Man-City-PSG-continuously-breaching-financial-fair-play-regulations-say-LaLiga.html>

²⁵⁹Ducrey, P. Et al(2003). UEFA and Football Governance: A New Model. Unpublished MA Dissertation, Centre International D'Etude du Sport, Switzerland. P.11.

of feelings and identities as they bring people together, inspire people to form a bond. Football clubs keep track of a set of rules, namely, the promotion and relegation system and ability to participate multiple competitions, while the former dictates that each team will be rewarded/punished according to position in their respective league hierarchy to promote sporting merit, the latter offers more than one venue to compete such as a domestic league, one or two domestic cup competition, and a European-wide competition.²⁶⁰ Although these fundamental principles remain intact, the fabric of the have started to change as football transformed in an accelerated phase derived from a response to domestic football crises, namely, hooliganism and crowd that has prevalent throughout the England in the 1980s.²⁶¹ English Football Association curbed the rules and pushed football clubs to be processed as profit-oriented business, hence making them commodified. The commodification have initiated a wave of penetration into the football clubs from various forms of capitals whom either want to make profit out of the game of football or engage in practices of sportwashing to emend the tarnish reputation by leading the football clubs the owned to glory and success. Football clubs generally structured in three ways, namely as stock-market companies, foreign-owned clubs and a minority supporters' trust model with scarce representation²⁶². The ownership of football clubs have become dispersed and have fallen under the control of private capital owners after the consolidation of European Economic Area.

Football clubs, especially European elite football clubs possess transnational characteristics such as global reach, corporate structures, labor market activities, and branding with transnational corporations (TNCs)²⁶³. TNCs are profit-centered businesses and can be categorized in 3 different levels as ethnocentric, polycentric, and geocentric corporations. Ethnocentric corporations “are controlled by home-based headquarters; polycentric corporations facilitate greater self-determination within centrally defined flexibility; geocentric corporations are controlled by globally mobile

²⁶⁰Peeters, T., Szymanski S., Fumagalli, C. et al.(2014). “Financial fair play in European football”, *Economy Policy*, 29(78). P.351.

²⁶¹Dubal, S.(2010). “The neoliberalization of football: Rethinking neoliberalism through the commercialization of the beautiful game”, *International Review for the Sociology of Sport*, 45, p.127.

²⁶² Franck, E. (2010). “Private Firm, Public Corporation or Member’s Association Governance Structures in European Football”, *International Journal of Sport Finance*, 5(2), pp. 108-127.

²⁶³ Giulianotti & Robertson (2009). *Op.cit* p.70.

managers”²⁶⁴. Transnational corporations, regardless of their origin based on territoriality, recruit elite employees on a global scale, have shareholders and directors, undertake worldwide research and development, and execute product development and micromarketing with acute flexibility²⁶⁵. European elite football clubs who generate massive revenues from various resources, achieved historic success at domestic and European level competitions, have a global-wide followers, valued at billions²⁶⁶, are Real Madrid, Barcelona, Manchester United, Liverpool, Bayern Munich, Manchester City, Paris St-Germain, Chelsea, Tottenham, Arsenal, Atletico Madrid, AC Milan, and Inter Milan. These clubs disperse through Europe, and located in big 5 leagues, namely, Spanish LaLiga, English Premier League, German Bundesliga, Italian Serie A, and French Ligue 1. These elite football clubs have a similar ownership structures as most of them are owned by private investors as a result of football’s commodification and internationalization, except for the Spanish clubs, Barcelona and Real Madrid who opted out to convert from member associations to limited joint-stock companies enacted by Spanish Sport Law in 1999²⁶⁷, and for the German clubs, Bayern Munich and Borussia Dortmund who operate in a football culture and structure demand and prioritize inclusiveness and a certain degree of democracy which led to formation of non-profit member associations whose control remain in the majority of members (50+1 rule)²⁶⁸. Elite football clubs can recruit player and technical staff wherever they like because of liberalization of labor market ensured by the ECJ’s Bosman ruling. These clubs tend to value the integration of their foreign recruits “within the distinctive occupational subcultures of players, and into the competitive ethics and rule interpretations that prevail at national level”²⁶⁹.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁵ Sklair, L. (2001). *The Transnational Capitalist Class*, Oxford: Blackwell. pp.2-3.

²⁶⁶ See Table 3.

²⁶⁷ Giulianotti & Robertson (2009). *Op.cit* p.75.

²⁶⁸ Bauers, B.S., Lammert, B., Faix, A. & Hovemann, G.(2020). “Club members in German Professional football and their attitude towards the 50+1 Rule- A stakeholder-oriented analysis”, *Soccer & Society*, 21(3), p.274.; Merkel, U. (2012). “Football fans and clubs in Germany: conflicts, crises, and compromises”, *Soccer & Society*, 13(3), p.360.

²⁶⁹ Giulianotti & Robertson (2009). *Op.cit* p.77.

Additionally, they do not recruit players that would not serve them in their pursuit of titles so whatever player they choose to recruit must improve their chances of winning either through its quality and talent or through tactical flexibility and precision. Finally, these clubs, just like global brands, have distinctive logos, market positions and priorities, pricing structures, distribution channels, and assumed values, hence they are developing commercial departments to exploit their full economic potential²⁷⁰. The commercial revenues that they generate originate from the “transnational tales about their histories of success, exciting playing styles, iconic players and managers, and their promise of spectacles”²⁷¹.

Table 3: The list of most valuable European football clubs: <https://soccer.nbcsports.com/2022/05/26/forbes-most-valuable-clubs-list/>

Real Madrid	\$5.1 billion
Barcelona	\$5.1 billion
Manchester United	\$4.6 billion
Liverpool	\$4.45 billion
Bayern Munich	\$4.275 billion
Manchester City	\$4.25 billion
Paris St-Germain	\$3.2 billion
Chelsea	\$3.1 billion
Juventus	\$2.45 billion
Tottenham	\$2.35 billion
Arsenal	\$2.05 billion
Borussia Dortmund	\$1.8 billion
Atletico Madrid	\$1.5 billion
AC Milan	\$1.2 billion
Inter Milan	\$1 billion

²⁷⁰ Giulianotti & Robertson (2009). *Op.cit* p.78.

²⁷¹ *Ibid.* p.77

Elite football clubs, having established their structures and operational mechanisms like TNCs, seek to more and more capital to fund their competition on the pitch which necessitates them to join their forces to advance their common political and economic interests. They aim to institutionalize their de-facto hegemonic position in European football's hegemonic order where there is an expression of broad consent for UEFA's leadership as the sovereign of European football by the stakeholders of European football pyramid, and by European Union²⁷². The social forces that make the European hegemonic order accept the ideas of solidarity, integrity, and sporting merit and support them with their material and institutional capabilities. However, the European hegemonic order in football consists of endless pursuit of further capital which leads to constant need for expansion facilitated and solidified by the process of commodification and internationalization in football which paved the way for elite football clubs' rise in European football order. Elite football clubs' interests turned into the European Champions Clubs Cup', a European competition full of commercial potential that fails to live up to expectations, these clubs strongly believed that the format of the competition that favors the uncertainty of outcome put them in a disadvantageous position as they have been deprived of exploiting full commercial potential of the tournament which attracts the attention of people in Europe, and capital because of their historic successes, fan-base, and quality of their teams. UEFA capitulated to the commercial interests of elite football clubs' and transformed the European Champions Clubs' Cup to the UEFA Champions League with a new format that increases the guaranteed number of matches²⁷³. However, UEFA have acquired the central marketing rights of all the revenues generated by the Champions League to be distributed to the competing clubs and rest of the European football pyramid as solidarity payments to sustain and promote financial resilience²⁷⁴.

²⁷² The European Commission has referred to a specific European model of Sport in which the pyramid structure, monopoly of governing organizations, principle of promotion and relegation, and the competitive structures in national and European levels are prioritized and highlighted. See European Commission, Directorate General X (1998) 'The Development and Prospects for Community Action in the Field of Sport', Brussels, 29th September 1998.

²⁷³ Holt (2009). *Op.cit* p.22.

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.* p.14.

The elite football clubs, having entered a new era in European club competitions decided to form an informal lobby group named G-14²⁷⁵ to solidify and expand their de-facto hegemonic position in European football. G-14 formulated as a European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG) that provides a legal framework for entities at national level in different countries to operate together at the European level sought to attain more active role for clubs in European football pyramid, to establish a closer link with the governing bodies at every level, to ensure the prosperity and continuity of clubs as key actors of football, to maintain the good relations between G14 and UEFA²⁷⁶. The G14 represented limited number of clubs spread across seven leagues, and lacked a defined and coherent membership criterion which pose problems such as inclusion and legitimacy.²⁷⁷ The formulation of a historic bloc which is far more than a mere political alliance between social forces represented by classes or fraction of classes²⁷⁸ requires the integration of a variety of different interests that are propagated throughout the society to consolidate and achieve not only political and economic unity in goals but also intellectual and moral unity.²⁷⁹ G-14, having formulated by the elite football clubs, failed to incorporate various football clubs' different interests, needs, and priorities which prevent G-14 to achieve a unity and consensus required for a historic bloc to possess. UEFA opted to act where elite football clubs fail with the G-14 as a hegemonic project to consolidate their position to further challenge UEFA, hence UEFA established European Club Forum²⁸⁰ (ECF) a platform to discuss "matters covering the entire spectrum of the European game, including the competition formats, marketing and rights strategies, as well as developments and marketing opportunities within the field of new

²⁷⁵ The initial members of the G-14 consists of Bayern Munich, Borussia Dortmund, Juventus, Internazionale, Ac Milan, Olympic Marseilles, Paris St Germain, Porto, Real Madrid, Barcelona, Ajax, PSV Eindhoven, Liverpool, and Manchester United.

²⁷⁶ Holt (2009). *Op.cit* p.90.

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁸ Bieler, & Morton. (2004). *Op.cit.* p.87.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.* p. 89.

²⁸⁰ The ECF consists of 102 clubs which are selected on the basis of five year on-field sporting performance, including the representatives of all 52 member associations.

communications”²⁸¹. UEFA aimed to deter and limit the effectiveness of the G14 so that the future of the European football structure remains loyal to the path charted by the UEFA.

The elite football clubs’ de-facto hegemonic position in European hegemonic order in football engender further hegemonic struggles especially against UEFA as the de-jure hegemon of European football. This hegemonic struggle ignited after European football’s transformation generated by commodification and internationalization which constituted a new power dynamics in European football. This new power dynamics created an opportunity for elite football clubs to act to institutionalize and consolidate their hegemonic position. The elite football clubs’ role in the expansion and development of football drive their pursuit to achieve their hegemonic interests which is to seek out new venues or to re-structure the existing ones to acquire further capital to attain glory. Therefore, as the pinnacle of European football because of the commercial potential, global reach full of dedicated fans, a historic fierce competition between European powerhouses, and political and cultural significance infused with tradition, emotion, and history to the people in Europe, the Champions League has been and will be the center of hegemonic struggles in European football.

²⁸¹ Holt(2009).*Op.cit.*97.

CHAPTER 4

THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OVER FOOTBALL IN EUROPE

The commodification process transformed the fabric of European football by opening the doors to injection of high volumes of capital, to initiate a wave of internationalization in the ownership structures of football clubs which resulted in a hegemonic struggle between UEFA, the sovereign organizer of the European level competitions, and elite football clubs who became a challenger to the hegemonic position of UEFA. This chapter discusses the emergence of the UEFA Champions League, and whether or not it has addressed the hegemonic projects of both UEFA and the elite football clubs. It explores the political and cultural significance of the UCL, and the formulation process undertaken by UEFA and Television Event and Media Marketing (TEAM). It moves to explain the commercial importance of the UCL by specifically focusing the generation of revenues over the years which is crucial not only for the elite football clubs but also for the UEFA. The rest of the chapter explains the hegemonic struggles between UEFA and the elite football clubs through an examination on how UEFA's hegemonic projects affected and shaped the hegemonic position and hegemonic projects of the elite football clubs, and further lead to hegemonic struggles centered on the deciding the future of the UCL.

4.1 The Emergence of the UEFA Champions League

The Champions League was launched in 1992-93 season as a hybrid competition comprised of a mini-league and knock-out stages²⁸². The Champions League has gone through a series of further changes as a result of a pressure originated from G-14 who believed that the new structure revealed only a glimpse of the

²⁸² Desbordes, M. (2007). *Marketing and Football: An International Perspective*. Taylor & Francis. P.23.

commercial potential of the Champions League²⁸³. UEFA completed the re-formulation²⁸⁴ of UCL by increasing first group stage from 6 to 8 groups and by accepting not only the national champions but also other football clubs succeed in domestic competitions based on their national associations' UEFA coefficient²⁸⁵. The commodification, spectacularization and internationalization of sport in general, and football in particular made UCL a “benchmark for sporting competitors, a key driver of television audiences, and an attractive property for global sponsors to tap into affluent consumer demographics”²⁸⁶. The transition to UCL finalized the decision to centralize marketing, branding, and commercial control of the tournament to UEFA²⁸⁷, so that UEFA can tap into political and cultural significance of UCL infuse with history and prestige by implementing marketing and branding strategies, and can utilize the commercial control and central marketing to balance the de-facto hegemonic position and hegemonic interests of elite football clubs, and to preserve the wider interests of stakeholders in European football pyramid through re-distributing revenues generated by the UCL for the continuation of its hegemonic position and hegemonic struggles kicked off by the elite football clubs.

UEFA employed a company called Television Event and Media Marketing (TEAM) to run together the decision to brand the competition in a way to forge a bond based on tradition that can link the past to present through emphasizing on the historic contests and best teams and players to stimulate a sense of familiarity and legitimacy to ensure the viability of the UCL²⁸⁸. This goal led to a publication named Champions League: Giving the Fans the Best Club Football Competition in the World that is a

²⁸³ Holt, M. (2007). “The Ownership and Control of Elite Club Competition in European Football”, *Soccer & Society*, 8(1), p.54.

²⁸⁴ To see how the current format Works check <https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2819840-uefa-champions-league-explained-how-the-tournament-works>

²⁸⁵ <https://www.uefa.com/nationalassociations/uefarankings/>

²⁸⁶ Holt(2009). *Op.cit* p.50.

²⁸⁷ Desbordes (2007). *Op.cit* p.29.

²⁸⁸ King (2004). *Op.cit* pp.331-332.

guide to the branding of the competition, aims to reach everyone who is interested in the Champions League by starting to tell the history of the competition since 1956²⁸⁹.

The UEFA Champions League has consistently set new standards since its launch, whilst always respecting the rich heritage of the European Champion Clubs' Cup. Irrespective of whether one considers the history of the competition to have started in 1955 or 1992, the competition to establish the Champion Club of Europe has always represented the very pinnacle of club football. The likes of Alfredo di Stefano, Bobby Charlton, Johan Cruyff Franz Beckenbauer and Marco van Basten are among the countless legends who have caught the imagination over the years as well as the current stars that grace the UEFA Champions League, including Zinedine Zidane, David Beckham and Oliver Kahn.²⁹⁰

The premier European club competitions in Europe, regardless of the name and format, has always been staged the best teams in Europe “made of elite international athletes, courting a pan-European and worldwide fan base”²⁹¹. UEFA believed in the necessity to combine the great players and pasts contests of the European Champion Clubs' Cup as requirements of modernization, to foster continuity²⁹². The deliberate and explicit attempt to marry the heritage namely, the former glories and rivalries available in the European collective memory, and prestige brought by the best football clubs and players can set the stage for the premier European club competition, can give the fans what they long for in football, and can enhance the brand value created on and around the Champions League. UEFA to highlight the significance of prestige for the UCL, stated that “the UEFA Champions League, like any other global brand, is complex in character. Whilst it is perceived in slightly different ways by the various audiences across Europe, prestige is at the heart of the UEFA Champions League brand image”²⁹³.

UEFA sought deliver a brand infused with prestige to pan-European and worldwide fans, and the wider European football industry through introducing the

²⁸⁹ Desbordes (2007). *Op.cit.* p.37.

²⁹⁰ UEFA (2003). UEFA Champions League: Giving the Fans the Best Competition in the World, 2003-2006. UEFA.p.2.

²⁹¹ Cox, R., Hills, L., Kennedy, E. (2015). “Myths of nation in the Champions League”, *Soccer & Society*, 16(5-6), p.674.

²⁹² Desbordes (2007). *Op.cit.* p.38.

²⁹³ UEFA (2003). *Op.cit* p.8.

UEFA Champions League anthem, the house colors, and the starball symbol²⁹⁴. First of all, the Champions league anthem, Handel's Zadok the Priest, can be heard at every stadium and television screen across Europe on Tuesday and Wednesday nights to convey exclusivity that reflects historical and prestigious connotations²⁹⁵. UEFA aimed to establish a connection with the anthem and the the Champions League, and successfully managed to build a tension and excitement, and mass appeal for the anthem as the harbinger of UEFA Champions League kick off. Second of all, the starball placed at the center of the re-branding process following the transition to Champions League, and designed to "reflect the eight star teams that remained in the two group stages following the initial reformulation of the competition, and each star within the ball represents an elite club of European football, therefore entrenching the elite clubs within the competition under UEFA control"²⁹⁶. The UCL logo is far more significant than a visual image, it is a "modern classic that captures in its starball symbol the elite world of Europe's top club competition and classic matches between top clubs. It has a subliminal aura of glamour"²⁹⁷. Furthermore, UEFA has actively utilized the process of re-branding as an opportunity to consolidate its hegemonic position in European football as the legitimate organizer of European club competitions amid the hegemonic struggles centered on UCL. Thirdly, the house colors situated in the starball logo are chosen as black, white, and silver to generate connotations of history, prestige, and preciousness²⁹⁸. King stated that "the black and white engenders memories of the old television footage of the early days of the European Cup, again specifically relating the modernized tournament and marketing concept with the old European Cup and thus legitimizing the transformed competition"²⁹⁹. The use of silver represents the current UCL and is employed by the

²⁹⁴ Desbordes (2007). *Op.cit.* p.38.

²⁹⁵ *Ibid.* P.39.

²⁹⁶ King (2004). *Op.cit* p.332.

²⁹⁷ UEFA (2003).*Op.cit* p.28.

²⁹⁸ Desbordes (2007). *Op.cit* p.41.

²⁹⁹ King (2004). *Op.cit* p.328.

deep midnight blue as a background color³⁰⁰ to bridge past and present, to marry heritage and prestige. The creation of UCL brand follows a comprehensive utilization of the brand and control of event management, both in and of the pitch, and the constant implementation of the brand identity on a European basis “both reinforces the identity of the competition and serves to entrench the competition in the consciousness of European football fans”³⁰¹. The Champions League, a European-wide event, was carefully designed to create a brand identity such as the anthem, starball, and house colors penetrate into the daily lives of people in Europe as a public ritual engaged regularly every fortnight for a season long which can also function as an engine for integration and a generator of a Europeanized mindset³⁰².

4.2 Hegemonic Struggles over the Champions League

The UCL brand and identity designed by UEFA and TEAM uncovered the commercial potential of the tournament by deliberately planning to utilize the political and cultural significance infused with heritage and prestige of European football in general, and European club competitions in particular. The hegemonic struggles in European football have transformed with the emergence of the UCL into “cash-cow for Europe’s elite clubs which have consolidated their position at the apex of the game, and has been one catalyst for re-evaluation of the wider organizational structures of European football”³⁰³. UEFA sought to centralize the commercial control and marketing by the emergence of the UCL which creates a new power dynamics in European football as UEFA has an access to re-distribute the revenues generated by the broadcasting rights negotiated by UEFA itself. The hegemonic position of the UEFA in the European football architecture has further consolidated its hegemonic positions and has enabled UEFA to preserve the wider interests of the European football pyramid and to develop football in Europe. UEFA’s revenues comprised of broadcasting rights, commercial rights, tickets sales, hospitality, and other revenues

³⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁰¹ Desbordes (2007). *Op.cit* p.48.

³⁰² Niemann, A. & Brand, A. (2020). “The UEFA Champions League: a political myth?” *Soccer & Society*, 21(3),p.329.

³⁰³Holt, M. (2007). “The Ownership and Control of Elite Club Competition in European Football”, *Soccer & Society*, 8(1), p.51.

such as disciplinary fines and asset management, these revenues generated by European club competitions and national team competitions³⁰⁴. UEFA distributes the revenues generated by European club competitions to clubs participating in men's Champions League, Europa League, and Super Cup, while reinvest the rest as solidarity payments "to non-participating clubs from all 55 member associations to be invested in youth football development projects, to clubs eliminated in the men's UCL and Europa League qualifying rounds, and to clubs contributing to the success of national team football through the participation of some of their players"³⁰⁵. The redistribution of the revenues based primarily on sporting merit in the UCL and solidarity payments designed to reduce the financial gap between the elite football clubs and the rest, and to level the playing field by constituting a new competitive balance to end the undisputed domination of the elite football clubs in UCL. However, elite football clubs who already established a domination in their domestic leagues only to be changed as a result of an intra-rivalry which does not foresee a shift in the competitive balance, continue to dominate the UCL thanks to the commodification wheel designed to empower them both on and off the pitch. The UCL since its official kick off have only staged a single champions coming from outside the 5 big leagues³⁰⁶ who are the center of the commodification and internationalization which provide them access and command over substantial financial source to attain the best players and coaches to not only dominate the other football clubs but also to transform them to internalize the cycle revolves around the search for capital to achieve success.

The UCL is the latest form of football's surrender to capitalist expansion as it not only offers the best players, coaches, and football clubs but also accumulates further capital in each passing year because of the emotional investment because of a segmentation of fans concentrated in Europe and disperse through the world. These collection of fans consist of glory hunters, iconographs, retrospectives, and stress

³⁰⁴https://editorial.uefa.com/resources/0275-151e1a55c231-ef1c32b881dc-1000/en_in_uefa_financial_report_2020-2021.pdf

³⁰⁵ *Ibid.* P.7.

³⁰⁶ <https://www.uefa.com/uefachampionsleague/history/>

seekers³⁰⁷ who gathered on television or in stadiums on Tuesdays and/or Wednesdays to support their team and maybe to see their rivals lose, to get a sense of joy and to feel proud over a victory, to experience their favorite player in action, and to long for the old days filled with historic rivalries and glories, and to feel suspense, excitement. The emotional investment of the fans both for their respective clubs and the Champions League itself have provided a constant expansion for the Champions League in terms of its popularity, quality, and revenues. The exploitation of the commercial potential of the UCL has been the center of the hegemonic struggle between elite football clubs and the UEFA in which the former seeks to acquire a much larger share of the UCL revenues to continue to fund their endeavors to dominate their domestic competitions and to compete for the European champion title in UCL, while the latter opts to re-distribute and re-invest as much as possible to re-organize the torn-competitive balance in European football so that uncertainty of outcome can be restored in a way that applies to the all competitions, and to restrict elite football clubs' financial and political power to preserve the wider interests of European football pyramid and to protect its own hegemonic position. However, despite the re-distribution and solidarity payments to help the development of European football, and the Financial Fair Play regulations (discussed in section 3.2) to ensure financial resilience by stopping the spending frenzy that took over European football, elite football clubs' access and command over substantial financial resources which forces a systemic pressure on European football clubs to accommodate their practices that lead to shift in the power dynamics in the hegemonic struggle over European football. Football clubs who caught up in the allure of elite football clubs' financial and political power especially in the decision-making process, began to act like them by copying their operational practices which put not only themselves but the European football pyramid into a jeopardy consists of a threat of systemic bankruptcy and insolvency. This pattern once internalized as a strategy would result in either heavy disposal of best prospects to maintain the cash-flow for clubs' survival or to heavy and irresponsible investment to attain domestic or European level success which can only help the sustain clubs for a short term absent a

³⁰⁷ Cox et al (2015). *Op.cit* p.675. For further conceptualization of fans check Giulianotti, R.(2002). "Supporters, Followers, Fans, and Flaneurs: A Taxonomy of Spectator Identities in Football", *Journal of Sport and Social Issues*,26:1 pp.25-46.

development of new strategy based on fiscal responsibility. The elite football clubs’ constant search for capital originated from an interest to exploit financially weaker clubs to root out any potential challenger to their domination in their domestic competitions and to gain a competitive edge in their intra-struggle to attain success and glory in the UCL.




Figure 4: Distribution and Solidarity Payments in relations to UEFA total revenues

Source: https://editorial.uefa.com/resources/01fb-0f8427c6b6d1-88b2906473d7-1000/2010_11_uefa_financial_report.pdf
https://editorial.uefa.com/resources/022a-0f842b4cdb03-aae56cb6f120-1000/2014_15_uefa_financial_report.pdf
https://editorial.uefa.com/resources/0213-0f84291f5842-9d380fbc43b1-1000/2012_13_uefa_financial_report.pdf
https://editorial.uefa.com/resources/0275-151e1a55c231-ef1c32b881dc-1000/en_In_uefa_financial_report_2020-2021.pdf.p.9




Figure 5: Revenues generated by the UEFA Champions League

Source: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/378203/rights-revenue-of-uefa/>

The hegemonic interests of the elite football clubs as a result of the domestic challengers to their domination that deprived them to participate the UCL regularly amid the explosion of revenues generated by the UCL, transformed their hegemonic interests to pursue a greater role in the decision-making process on all matters regarding the UCL. This hegemonic interests is far more comprehensive than they forced on UEFA before the establishment of the UEFA Champions League which elite football clubs only sought to fully exploit the commercial potential of the premier European club competitions, however, they now seek to replace the central marketing and commercial control of UEFA over the UCL so that they actively be part of decision-making process over matters regarding the UCL. UEFA, after the threat imposed by the G-14 to its legitimacy in the European football pyramid utilize the inclusiveness and lack of representation apparent in the G-14³⁰⁸ to formulate the European Club Forum (ECF) charged to function as a “platform for increased dialogue and consultation between UEFA and Europe’s major clubs, and to nurture the well-being of football on the European continent”.³⁰⁹ Furthermore, ECF, after the

³⁰⁸ Holt(2009). *Op.cit* p.93.

³⁰⁹ *Ibid.* p.96.

participation of G-14 clubs becomes European Club Associations (ECA), an independent organization responsible for representing football clubs at European level.³¹⁰ ECA aims to protect and promote European club football by creating “a new, more democratic governance model that reflects the key role of the clubs”³¹¹. ECA “acts to strengthen each of the clubs for the benefit of all and to ensure that club football is recognized by decision-makers as the main stakeholder in the game”³¹². The ECA, having created to positioned as the voice of football clubs in European football, practically serves the hegemonic interests of the elite football clubs some of whom already occupy a position in the leadership positions of the ECA. The ECA charged with investigating alternative possibilities on how to further exploit the marketing rights, what can be done with regards to UCL’s future in an organizational level³¹³, all of which overlaps with the hegemonic interests of the elite football clubs. In spite of the institutionalized hegemonic position within the existing European football pyramid, elite football clubs opted a complete control over the decision-making process with regards to the future of the Champions League.

The amidst the discussions for the future of the UCL a pandemic emerged called coronavirus that lays bare the society we have created, centuries of global processes and the cultivated, networked society and its interdependent infrastructural architecture”³¹⁴. The magnitude of the disease has hindered and delayed the political, economic decision-making processes, has questioned the resilience of the corporations and institutions, and have shut down mass gatherings and sporting events for an unforeseeable future³¹⁵. The pandemic has “opened up the Pandora’s Box of football’s financial fragility which has already tested once with the global economic crisis of 2007-08”, however, for the first time since WW2 European football competitions have

³¹⁰ <https://www.ecaeurope.com/about-eca/>

³¹¹ <https://www.ecaeurope.com/about-eca/>

³¹² <https://www.ecaeurope.com/about-eca/>

³¹³ <https://www.ecaeurope.com/about-eca/main-achievements/governance/>

³¹⁴ Parnell, D., Bond, A., Widdop, P. & Wilson, R. (2022). “Covid-19, networks and sport”, *Managing Sport and Leisure*, 27(1-2), p.72.

³¹⁵ *Ibid.*

cancelled³¹⁶. The delay or cancellation of the football games have further exposed the weaknesses of the European football pyramid and have forced football clubs to find new sources to generate revenues to compensate for the loss of match day income, and the renegotiated commercial and broadcasting revenues. The lingering financial distress experienced by the football clubs have caused a systemic shock as football clubs find themselves in position not to comply with their financial obligations in spite of the increased solidarity payments injected to the European football. The pandemic has worsened the financial burden rested on the football clubs, forcing especially the elite football clubs since their financial obligation and their need for a considerable amount of capital due to a series of loss arise from the delay and/or suspension of the football matches, and rebated broadcasting and commercial revenues, to accelerate the implementation of their hegemonic projects. The European Super League as elite football clubs' hegemonic project envisions the institutionalization of a league where the centralization of marketing and branding, and commercial power will be in elite football clubs' responsibility which has been their hegemonic interests since the establishment of UCL so that they can fully explore alternatives and options to exploit the commercial potential of a tournament which they believed that because their historic accomplishments, and the prestige and excellence they brought made the tournament so popular across fans, and investable for the transnational corporations. Therefore, a European-wide tournament created and controlled by elite football clubs' would yield to a commercial potential and a development for European football beyond the imagination according to the elite football clubs.

4.3 European Super League Project

The European football pyramid suffered immensely by the pandemic as it crippled the revenue streams of the clubs through suspension and postponement of the football games which led to the renegotiation of the broadcasting rights, restructuring of the sponsorship deals, and match-day losses due to the absence of fans. The pandemic has further exposed the financial weaknesses and have kicked off a new hegemonic struggle between UEFA and elite football clubs centered on the re-making

³¹⁶ Parnell, D., Bond, J.A, Widdop, P. & Cockayne, D. (2021). "Football Worlds: business and networks during Covid-19", *Soccer & Society*, 22(1-2), p.1.

the Champions League. Even though the both hegemonic projects focused on the future of the Champions League, elite football clubs' hegemonic interest was to establish a new hegemonic order by finalizing the football's surrender to capitalism. The threat of a breakaway league has been on the football clubs' agenda for more than two decades, shelved to pressure UEFA to accommodate their hegemonic interests. On the other hand, UEFA's hegemonic projects aimed to contain the hegemonic interests of the elite football clubs by limiting their financial and political through the introduction of re-distributive and coercive mechanisms, namely solidarity payments and FFP, and through the incorporation of various and diverse interests of the stakeholders in European football. This achieved to block the further expansion of the elite football clubs in the existing hegemonic order, but also led to the further empowerment of the elite football clubs. The existing hegemonic order in football recognizes and endorses the irreplaceable and indispensable position of the elite football clubs for the development of football as they command a substantial financial resources which translate to quality on the pitch that attracts the interest of a global fan-base, however, this hegemonic order also enables them to challenge UEFA's hegemonic position in an attempt to establish a new hegemonic order where they can uphold the powers, rights, and responsibilities of the UEFA.

The pandemic has reshuffled the power dynamics amongst the football clubs, hindering the relative strength and purchasing power of some of the elite football clubs, thus accelerated the process of materialization of European Super League. A dozen of the world's richest announced in 2021 that they had formed a breakaway European club competition that would “upend the structures, economics and relationships that have bound football for nearly a century”³¹⁷. AC Milan, Arsenal FC, Atletico de Madrid, Chelsea FC, FC Barcelona, FC Internazionale Milano, Juventus FC, Liverpool FC, Manchester City, Manchester United, Real Madrid CF, and Tottenham Hotspur have all joined the Super League as Founding Clubs³¹⁸. The clubs stated that “the formation of the league comes at a time when the global pandemic has accelerated the

³¹⁷<https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/18/sports/soccer/super-league-united-liverpool-juventus-madrid.html?smid=tw-share>

³¹⁸ <https://thesuperleague.com/press.html>

instability in the existing European football economic model”³¹⁹. They claimed that “the founding clubs have had the objective of improving the quality and the intensity of existing European competitions throughout each season, and of creating a format for top clubs and player to compete on a regular basis”³²⁰. Furthermore, founding clubs believe that the “pandemic has shown that a strategic vision and a sustainable commercial approach are required to enhance value and support for the benefit of the entire European football pyramid”³²¹. The Super League project came to fruition in the light of proposal for the future of the Champions League designed by the collective efforts of the UEFA and ECA which the aforementioned founding clubs think it would not solve the fundamental issues, including the need to provide higher-quality matches and additional financial resources for the overall football pyramid. The new tournament will “provide significantly greater economic growth and support for European football via a long-term commitment to uncapped solidarity payment which will grow in accordance with the league revenues”³²², the solidarity payments “will be substantially higher than those generated by the current European competition and are expected to be in excess of 10 billion £ during the course of initial commitment period of the clubs”³²³. In addition to the solidarity payments, the competition “will be built on a sustainable financial foundation with all founding clubs signing up to a spending framework, and in exchange for their commitment, founding clubs will receive an amount of 3.5 billion£ solely to support their infrastructure investment plans and to offset the impact of the Covid pandemic”³²⁴. There has been an illusion in European football with regards to the commercial potential and political power that elite football clubs have, hence elite football clubs utilize this ungrounded belief to declare that the materialization of the ESL will enable them to sustain the European football’s finances through uncapped solidarity payments distributed by the revenues generated by the

³¹⁹ <https://thesuperleague.com/press.html>

³²⁰ <https://thesuperleague.com/press.html>

³²¹ <https://thesuperleague.com/press.html>

³²² <https://thesuperleague.com/press.html>

³²³ <https://thesuperleague.com/press.html>

³²⁴ <https://thesuperleague.com/press.html>

ESL. Their hegemonic desire to replace UEFA by seizing the authority and power to organize European club competitions and by centralizing the marketing, branding, and commercial control disguised under the false pretences of the greater good of the European football.

The materialization of the ESL rested on the incorporation of diverse interests and positions to the hegemonic bloc composed ideally of a broad consensus and a unity in ideas. Elite football clubs not only failed to incorporate the interests of other social forces in play but also failed to establish a unity in their ideas as there is division in the interests and prioritizes among the infamous dozen. The penetration of the forces of capital into the football created dominant ethos in European football which is “there is always another triumph to plan, always another peak to conquer, always another player to buy”³²⁵. The systemic greed in football has taken captive every stakeholder in the football pyramid, which dictates expansion and exploitation of every available capital whether it’s cultural, social, economic or human for the sole purpose of glory. This relentless and unending pursuit of glory requires to have a solid and sustainable financial system to obtain the best players and managers in the transfer market that is “battered by the lingering effects of the coronavirus pandemic, only teams backed by the world’s super rich have been able to trade freely, fluffing up their already plump rosters with the cream of the game’s talent”³²⁶. The balance of power among the leaders of the hegemonic bloc have shifted in favor of the cash-rich elite football clubs whom can and will spend outrages amounts of money to procure sensational names such as when Chelsea, the defending champions to the Champions league owned by a Russian oligarch, Roman Abramovich, spent 135 million \$ to obtain Romelu Lukaku from Internazionale Milan, the last champions of Seria A, Manchester City owned by the ruling family of the United Arab Emirates, spent 138 million \$ to obtain Jack Grealish from another English side not because they desperately need him but simply because they can afford it, and further sought to obtain Harry Kane from Tottenham Hotspur, but failed due to the strong financial resilience and huge demands of the club

³²⁵ <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/23/sports/soccer/super-league-europe-soccer.html>

³²⁶ <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/02/sports/soccer/soccer-transfer-market-lionel-messi.html?smid=tw-share>

for Kane³²⁷. The greatest moves in the transfer market were made by Paris St-Germain owned by the rulers of Qatar, they have obtained Sergio Ramos, a prolific defender and a long-time captain of the Real Madrid, Gianluigi Donnarumma, the goalkeeper of AC Milan, Georginio Wijnaldum, captain of the Netherlands and Liverpool player whom also in contract talks with Barcelona, Achraf Hakimi, a promising wing-back from Internazionale Milan, and Lionel Messi, maybe the greatest football player of all time from Barcelona, while rejecting two huge proposals of Real Madrid for their player Kylian Mbappe, a star who can dominate the next decade. The other European giants have to mitigate between how to remain competitive with clubs who have unlimited resources in their war chest and to make sells to compensate for the financial impediments hammered on them not only by the pandemic but also by the long cycle of irresponsible spending habits fueled by their greed. FC Barcelona, Real Madrid CF, Juventus, and Inter have all lost either their best players or find themselves in a position to unable to make a move to enhance the quality of their squad especially when their rivals such as P.S.G and Manchester City, Chelsea, and Manchester United have no restrictions to spend money to obtain the best players there is.

The past few years have consolidated the emerging pattern that the once Europe giants are in retreat, and their place was captured by the cash-rich elite football clubs. The European Super league has answered the needs and demands of a diverse group, all of which are centered upon the flow of capital and how it can be used to further their interest. The European Super league is a scheme that prioritizes money, “the relentless, insatiable, metastasizing pursuit of it, cynical and grasping attempt to hoard as much of it as possible, made by those who already have far more than most, and far more than they need”³²⁸. This hegemonic bloc represents a diverse and contested interests of various clubs such as Liverpool, Manchester United, Arsenal, and Tottenham Hotspur owned by Americans have aimed not only to make more money out of football but also spend less money into football, and they want to control the expenses through salary cap and financial regulation while maintaining a stable

³²⁷<https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/02/sports/soccer/soccer-transfer-market-lionel-messi.html?smid=tw-share>

³²⁸ <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/23/sports/soccer/super-league-europe-soccer.html>

income and restricted expenditures³²⁹. The others like Chelsea and Manchester City have aimed to abolish the limitations placed on their expenditures especially in the transfer market, their interests is to use their apparently unlimited resources to gain a competitive edge which enable them to win popular acclaim that would lead to cultural and political legitimacy in the world³³⁰. The rest of the founding members are comprised of the Italian and Spanish giants whom have lost their financial supremacy over the last few years and have aimed to recover to former glorious days. They consider the existence and the power of the first two groups as a problem as the first group has an access to an immeasurable wealth due to the revenue generated by the Premier League, and the second group has limitless money to spend which not only put them in a disadvantageous position in the transfer market but also forces them to “build up mountains of debt, leaving teams that believe themselves to be in football’s front rank facing a second-class future”³³¹. The Super League as a hegemonic project has designed in a way that will materialize the interests of the founding clubs, however it has failed to incorporate the different interests of the participants of European football pyramid. The declaration of the project has sparked an outrage in every level of football society as it is a declaration of war both to the UEFA as the sovereign organizer of the European football, and to the domestic leagues, all the other football clubs, and to the fans whom all are have been abhorred by this hegemonic project which fails to command a meaningful and popular support.

The announcement of a breakaway league led to the emergence of an unlikely alliance which includes UEFA, FIFA, domestic leagues, nation-states, European Union, and fans from all over the world even of the fans of the founding clubs. UEFA has long turned a blind eye to the actions and desires of the elite football clubs so long as it maintains its position as the sovereign organizer of the European level competition and the protector of the European football pyramid. UEFA policy choices, its activeness in regulating the European football through FFP and its inaction has empowered these clubs to a level where they pass beyond the point of challenging to

³²⁹ <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/23/sports/soccer/super-league-europe-soccer.html>

³³⁰ <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/23/sports/soccer/super-league-europe-soccer.html>

³³¹ <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/23/sports/soccer/super-league-europe-soccer.html>

the UEFA but declare a complete rupture from the existing European football pyramid. The period which UEFA has acted as complicit or co-contributor to the de-facto hegemonic position of the elite football clubs have ended with the announcement of the Super League. UEFA's president, Aleksander Ceferin, "denounced the group behind the plan and vowed to take a stern action if they did not reverse course. He raised the possibility of barring players on the participating teams from events like the World Cup and other tournaments, and threatened to banish the rebel clubs from their domestic leagues"³³². In a joint statement, UEFA, English FA, Italian FA, Spanish FA have announced that "the 12 clubs that will join the European Super league will be banned from all domestic competitions"³³³. Furthermore, "all teams that join the Super League will be banned from any other competition at domestic, European, or world level, and additionally, the players in these teams may also be denied the opportunity to represent their countries on a national level"³³⁴. The new position of the UEFA and the domestic leagues quickly embraced by the FIFA³³⁵ as well, the president, Gianni Infantino "persuaded to pull out the biggest threat in the arsenal of those fighting for the status quo by stating that FIFA will ban any players who took part in an outside competition from the World Cup"³³⁶. In a speech at the congress of European football's governing body, Infantino stated "if some elect to go their own way then they must live with the consequences of their choice, they are responsible for their choice. This means, either you are in, or you are out"³³⁷. These governance bodies have threatened the players about the possible consequences of playing for the clubs who founded and

³³²<https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/24/sports/soccer/what-happened-to-super-league.html#click=https://t.co/XUrOwIOAvS>

³³³<https://barcauniversal.com/statement-uefa-and-top-leagues-set-to-ban-clubs-that-will-join-european-super-league/>

³³⁴<https://barcauniversal.com/statement-uefa-and-top-leagues-set-to-ban-clubs-that-will-join-european-super-league/>

³³⁵ Although FIFA staunchly opposed to the Super League, there are legitimate concerns that it was FIFA who gave the green light to the football clubs for the implementation of project. See. <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/20/sports/soccer/super-league-fifa-infantino.html>

³³⁶<https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/24/sports/soccer/what-happened-to-super-league.html#click=https://t.co/XUrOwIOAvS>

³³⁷<https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/24/sports/soccer/what-happened-to-super-league.html#click=https://t.co/XUrOwIOAvS>

may think to join the Super League, but the fact is that even though there is no official statement from the FIFPro on behalf of the professional players, some of the players³³⁸ and managers³³⁹ have publicly condemned the efforts for the Super League as its creation will damage the integrity of the European football pyramid. There has been European wide criticism coming from the British government and the French President, and from the European Union, all of which have staunchly opposed the formation of the Super League as it will threatened the principle of solidarity and sporting merit that are the core principles of the European model of sport³⁴⁰. Finally, fans were not only criticizing the proposal but also they protested in the streets to send a message to the founding clubs, especially the fans of the English clubs have been the most vocal about the greed, and self-serving nature of the decision-makers³⁴¹. Football Supporters Europe³⁴² (FSE) along with the overwhelming majority of fans is standing against to plans to create a breakaway super league. “This closed shop competition will be the final nail in the coffin of European football, forsaking everything that has made it so popular and successful- sporting merit, promotion and relegation, qualification to UEFA competitions via domestic success, and financial solidarity”³⁴³. The Super League is “illegitimate, irresponsible, and anti-competitive by design, and it is driven exclusively by greed. The only ones who stand to gain are hedge funds,

³³⁸<https://www.goal.com/en/news/henderson-to-lead-pl-captains-response-to-super-league/bek9q82moopy149yz48c2gtza> ; <https://www.goal.com/en/news/henderson-to-lead-pl-captains-response-to-super-league/bek9q82moopy149yz48c2gtza> ; <https://www.skysports.com/football/news/11661/12279996/gary-neville-on-european-super-league-plans-im-fuming-but-it-wont-go-through-not-a-chance>

³³⁹<https://www.skysports.com/football/news/11679/12281140/pep-guardiola-on-european-super-league-its-not-sport-when-success-is-guaranteed> ; <https://www.skysports.com/football/news/11669/12280539/jurgen-klopp-says-opinion-hasnt-changed-on-european-super-league-after-previous-opposition>

³⁴⁰<https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/frances-macron-opposes-breakaway-european-super-league-2021-04-18/> ; <https://www.voanews.com/a/arts-culture-european-super-league-plans-set-battle-future-football/6204834.html>

³⁴¹ <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/23/sports/soccer/super-league-europe-soccer.html>

³⁴² FSE is the democratic voice of European football fans: Founded in 2008 at the first European Football Fans Congress registered in Germany; and active in 55 UEFA nations. It is an independent, non-profit association of fans recognized as a representative body on fans issues by institutions such as UEFA and Council of Europe. For more information check <https://www.fanseurope.org/about-fse-2/>

³⁴³ <https://www.fanseurope.org/news/fse-condemns-european-super-league-plans/>

oligarchs, and a handful of already wealthy clubs, many of which perform poorly in their own domestic leagues despite their inbuilt advantage”³⁴⁴.

The Super League collapsed 48 hours after its announcement when the six football clubs from Premier League decided to abandon the project, their withdrawal created a domino effect in which the other clubs followed their footsteps except the Spanish giants, Barcelona and Real Madrid whom are desperately in need of further financial resources to pump up their competitive edge. The mounting pressure by fans and the threat of expulsion from the domestic leagues have incomprehensively increase the stakes against the founding clubs, especially for the Premier League clubs who are already have the best financial opportunities and a global fan base, and in their absence Super League project was doom to fail. The botched Super League project has demonstrated 3 things for the future of European football pyramid. Firstly, the dozen who orchestrated the project have witnessed the limitations on their power and will for the first time since the transition to the new of the Champions League. The days that dictate their will upon rest of the European football pyramid, have stopped with the emergence of a coalition of groups, all of whom would have been a disadvantageous position if this hegemonic project succeeded, but it was the UEFA would lose its authority and power over the European competitions, and fans would become more alienated and further kick out of the decision-making process. Secondly, even though the dissolution of the Super League has produced an alliance comprised of actors who have diverse interests and priorities, this alliance failed to become a counter-hegemonic historic bloc as it did not aim to deliver a meaningful proposal for an alternative future in which the game of football can no longer be owned by the forces of capital. The UEFA has utilized the coercive power of itself, FIFA, the nation-states, and the European Union to dismantle this hegemonic project, but fell short in considering and taking action of what fans want for the future of European football pyramid. In spite of the effectiveness of the threat of expulsion and other forms of sanctions, fans have been the glue that keeps all the actors together in this alliance against the proposed hegemonic project, they have been challenging the dominant culture and understanding that is the greed for glory as a result of the hyper-

³⁴⁴ <https://www.fanseurope.org/news/fse-condemns-european-super-league-plans/>

commodification, to foster equality, oversight, and solidarity in European football. Thirdly, not only did this alliance failed to form a counter-hegemonic historic bloc, but also fell-short in both re-organizing rules and principles that govern the European football pyramid so that what happened with the breakaway Super League will never happen, and the UEFA has opted not falter from the previous policies that served only to empower these dozen football clubs and led them to where they are, the new structure of the Champions League foresee a single league that scratches the group stage , increases both the number of teams by 4 and the guaranteed matches to 10, and of those new 4 places, 2 of them will be distributed based on the historical performances, another slot will be filled by the fifth best-performing league in Europe, and the last will be through play-off rounds³⁴⁵.

The deadliest attempt that aims a complete rupture from the European football pyramid has been weathered by threats of expulsion from the domestic and European level competitions which have not materialized, by a degree of alienation of the fans that can be surmountable with the purchase of best players and best managers whom can bring glory and success, and a 15 million £ penalty given by the UEFA which is a breadcrumb for these clubs given that they command a huge resources. The Super League project has utterly failed and exposed the vulnerabilities of some, and desperation of others, but even they stumbled and faltered, they did not actually lose anything other than their credibility in the eyes of the football world which is both recoverable and inconsequential for the maintenance of their operations, and their invincibility and might. Despite a degree of loss in their power, and their failure to commence a new hegemonic order, the previous hegemonic order that recognizes and endorses the position and significance of the elite football clubs continues to exist. The exploitation of weaker clubs, the greed in pursuit of glory and success has imprinted so deep and extensively into the European football, even in the face of existential threat to the rest of the European football pyramid, the underlying political practices of sporting authorities, the social relations between the fans, football clubs and media, the power dynamics between the stronger and the weaker not only proceed but also intensified in favor the elite football clubs.

³⁴⁵ <https://www.fanseurope.org/news/fse-condemns-european-super-league-plans/>

CHAPTER 5

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND SPORT

The main focus of the thesis thus far was to unpack the hegemonic struggles in the European football pyramid by investigating the historical development of the actors in the pyramid vis-à-vis the commodification process, and by uncovering the hegemonic projects of the actors to pursue their hegemonic interests. The hegemonic order in which the actors of European football pyramid operate has been designed and transformed by the decisions and regulations aimed to fulfill the hegemonic interests and projects of the European Union. Even though EU does not actively take sides in the hegemonic struggles that does not foresee a threat to the existing European hegemonic order, it has an immense institutional capacity and power to regulate, re-design and transform the power dynamics of the institutional governance of European football.

The establishment of European Super League project has failed against the surmounting opposition coming from a counter-hegemonic bloc composed of a various actors both within and without the football pyramid. Even though these actors have not-aligned and sometimes conflicted interests with regards to the future of the European football architecture, joined to dismantle the European Super League project in which they consider detrimental to existing hierarchical and institutional order of the football pyramid. The ESL debacle within 48 hours after its announcement, does not require EU's involvement, yet has the potential to disrupt and undermine the social and political values of football prioritized and championed by the European Union over the years. The vision for the European Super League project driven predominantly by the cynical greed for the dominant ethos persistent in the European football architecture could have fundamentally dismantle the European model of sport by rupturing the hierarchical football pyramid, undermining openness and fairness in terms of participatory conditions and competitive balance, and diverting the people,

members, and fans from the game, hence it is a threat to the heart and soul of the football in Europe. The botched ESL project has yielded to the maintenance of the existing power dynamics, structures, dominant ethos and ideas in the European football pyramid which is a system that is broken and flawed for the all stakeholders in the game. However, sport remains an area where a certain degree of autonomy exists as the current hierarchical order and institutional framework persist to govern and regulate the totality of the game, but still subject to EU laws and regulations which would have been altered if a new hegemonic order constructed as a result of the ESL project. The further alienation of people from the European football competitions, a destruction of the domestic leagues' fabric, a necessity of a complete re-organization of the European football, uncertainties regarding the sporting merit and competitive balance, and the abuse of dominant position in the market and the anti-competitive nature and structure of the European Super League which leads to cartelization and oligarchy could have undermined the European hegemonic project in sport in general, and football in particular.

5.1 European Union and the European Hegemonic Projects

The European Union project born out of a post-war conditions that tore Europe apart, the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community created a common market so that the countries that engage with each other can operate together as equal partners in the same organizational umbrella³⁴⁶. This framework has further developed and expand in the name of European Economic Community established with the 1959 Treaty of Rome, and finally to the European Union with the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. The progress of the project has built on the principles of deepening and expansion which includes a proliferation of area of competence, and the transfer of power from domestic level to European level in the face of a growth in numbers of the member states. There have been attempts at theorizing the deepening process, namely the neo-functional, intergovernmentalist, and post-functionalists. First of all, neo-functional believe in the spillover effect as policies that considered autonomous will lead to an increasing reliance on non-state to implement policies, will result in shift in

³⁴⁶ https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/history-eu_en

citizens attachment towards supranational institutions³⁴⁷. The implementation of policies will lead to gradual exploitation of benefits so that the cooperation and collaboration at the EU level only will increase and expand, even though there may be problems that delay spillover or hinder further integration, policy spill over and supranational activism will prevail in the long run³⁴⁸. Second of all, intergovernmentalist conceptualize European integration as the outcome of cooperation and competition among national governments rather than the outcome of cooperation and competition among societal actors³⁴⁹. The decision making process involves the domestic formation of national preferences, intergovernmental bargaining, and the creation of European institutions to secure agreements³⁵⁰. The national preferences are shaped by the interests of the powerful domestic actors rather than intra-party politics and pressures, hence the decisions on the European integration are predominantly economic and issue specific determined by the firms and interest groups³⁵¹. Third of all, post-functionalism postulates the mismatch between the institutional status quo and the functional pressures for multilevel governance creates an environment where the states find themselves in a difficult position to provide public services and redistribute resource to local, national, and international level³⁵². The decision making process can be subject to scrutiny from mass media, negotiations between government coalitions, contestation between political parties, hence the nature of the issue and the degree of conflict can change which can hinder or facilitate integration³⁵³. Furthermore, European integration in the form of deepening and expansion disrupts the established party systems, gives rise to new radical left and

³⁴⁷ Hooghe, L. & Marks, G. (2019). "Grand theories of European integration in the twenty first century", *Journal of European Public Policy*, 26(8), p. 1114.

³⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁵⁰ Hooghe, L. & Marks, G. (2019). "Grand theories of European integration in the twenty first century", *Journal of European Public Policy*, 26(8), p. 1114.

³⁵¹ *Ibid.*

³⁵² Marks, G. (2012). "Europe and its empires: from Rome to the European Union", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 50(1), pp.1-20.

³⁵³ Hooghe & Marks (2019). *Op.cit.* p.1117.

radical nationalists parties which they bring a new dimension of both intra-party competition and party competition, lead to formulation of new strategic choices, thus ultimately constraints supranational action³⁵⁴.

Even though aforementioned takes on the European integration covers a variety of logical explanation as to what hinders and facilitates integration, Neo-Gramscian school of thought conceptualize European integration as the outcome of contestation between rival hegemonic projects. Neo-Gramscian take on the European integration adds historical context, institutional setting, the multiple levels of the integration process, and the underlying structural conditions that enable and constrain action to the existing economic and political character of the integration³⁵⁵. The EU's institutional architecture, policy competences and the *acquis communautaire* dictate and shape the ways the actors' preferences in the decision-making process. The institutional framework characterized by the multi-level governance which gathers "the multiple scales and complex, fluid and overlapping jurisdictions of governance"³⁵⁶, and paves the way for the "de-nationalization of statehood, the de-statization of politics, and the re-articulation of territorial and functional powers"³⁵⁷. The EU's complex institutional and organizational structure draw the general framework where actors can pursue their preferences or refrain from it in order to re-position themselves. The diverse interests of the actors have been shaped by "the global economy, the financial crisis, neoliberal attempts at restructuring social relations, the geopolitical and strategic context relating to the post-Cold War order, new securitization processes, the changing role of the state, changing state-society relations, the shift to new forms of governance within civil society, and demographic

³⁵⁴Hooghe, L. & Marks, G. (2018). "Cleavage theory and Europe's crises: Lipset, Rokkan and the transnational cleavage", *Journal of European Public Policy*, 25(1). P.121.

³⁵⁵ Bulmer, S. & Joseph, J. (2016). "European integration in crisis? Of supranational integration, hegemonic projects and domestic politics", *European Journal of International Relations*, 22(4), p.732.

³⁵⁶ Hooghe L and Marks G (2004) Contrasting Visions of Multi-level Governance. In Bache, I and Flinders M (eds) Multi-level Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.15-16.

³⁵⁷ Jessop, B. (2004). Multi-level governance and multi-level metagovernance. In: Bache, I. and Flinders, M. (eds). Multi-Level Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.61.

changes”³⁵⁸. European hegemonic project consists of a contested interests and compromises between actors, and requires a certain degree of institutional fixes to overcome the complex administrative dynamics EU impose on actors³⁵⁹. European hegemonic project is a process where there is constant process of struggle, contestation, and renegotiation, the post-Maastricht incorporates different interest such as neoliberal hegemonic project, national-social hegemonic project, national-conservative hegemonic project, and pro-European social-democratic hegemonic project³⁶⁰. Neoliberal hegemonic project envisions an EU that can be “competitive in a global trading and production setting”, pushes for a “liberalization in the single market and EU external trade policy”, and seeks to limit the EU regulatory burden³⁶¹. National-social hegemonic project pursues the preservation of strong social systems at the member-state level and aims to maintain a prominent role of nation-state in redistributing resources at domestic level³⁶². National-conservative hegemonic project has gathered the political forces resisting to further integration and backed by the people who have negatively affected by the globalization, cosmopolitanism, and immigration³⁶³. Pro- European social-democratic hegemonic project aims to establish a social Europe where further integration can employed for market-correcting measures at a supranational level³⁶⁴. The post-Maastricht era initiated a new process for the EU where a compromise between the rival hegemonic projects resulted in the “changing political forms of rule and the general shift from government to governance, and the simultaneous devolution of state powers downwards and internationalization of policy upwards”³⁶⁵, and “general economic changes towards greater

³⁵⁸ Bulmer, S. & Joseph, J. (2016). *Op.cit.* p.732.

³⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁶¹ Bulmer, S. & Joseph, J. (2016). *Op.cit.* P.740.

³⁶² *Ibid.*

³⁶³ Bulmer, S. & Joseph, J. (2016). “European integration in crisis? Of supranational integration, hegemonic projects and domestic politics”, *European Journal of International Relations*, 22(4), p.774.

³⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁵ Bulmer, S. & Joseph, J. (2016). *Op.cit.*

interdependence and intensification of economic flows, increasing financialization and shifting ways of regulating markets, and a drive to market liberalization”³⁶⁶. The European hegemonic project has been to construct a European identity in order to compensate for the lack of European demos, to empower the supranational institutions such as European Court of Justice and Directorate General for Competition Policy established by the mandate of the European Commission to ensure the protection of market principles such as guaranteeing the liberalization of labor, and maintaining a competitive environment for the broadcasting.

5.2 The Construction of European Identity through Football

The “centrality of football in European cultures and societies has been established over time by its unique position as the national sport in almost any European country”³⁶⁷ which acknowledged by the popularity, participation rates, spectator turn-out, media presence, market size and marketing appeal³⁶⁸. The Amsterdam Treaty has emphasized “the social significance of sport, in particular its role in forging identity and bringing people together”³⁶⁹. The European Commission states that “sport plays a significant role in health-promotion, education, training and social inclusion and networking”, and estimates that “10 million volunteers in about 700.000 sport clubs through the EU are involved in sport at the social level”³⁷⁰. Sport provides a vast and dense social network for European citizens, hence it “represents and strengthens national and regional identity by giving people a sense of belonging to a group, it unites players and spectators and contributes to social stability and is an emblem for culture and identity”³⁷¹. The construction of a collective identity starts with the psychological link between the individuals and the social groups, where the former

³⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁷ Manzenreiter, W. & Spitaler, G. (2012). *Governance, Citizenship and the New European Football Championships*. Routledge: London.

³⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁹ https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/ams/fna_1/dcl_29/sign

³⁷⁰ European Commission (2007). *The EU and Sport: Background and Context, Accompanying document to the White Paper on Sport*. SEC (2007) 935, 11 July 2007.

³⁷¹ European Commission (1998). *The European Model of Sport: Consultation Document of DG X*. Brussels: European Commission.

attributes a certain value and emotional significance to the latter, which leads to attachment and then loyalty with a sense of obligation to that particular social group³⁷². People belong to several social groups which the expression of their identities, priorities, and goals may be contested, however, people do not tend to see their diverse identities as being in conflict and tend to invoke them in accordance with the context they are in³⁷³. Social identities link individuals to a social group in a specific substantive content consists of “the constitutive norms and rules that define the social group and its membership, its goals and social purposes, as well as the collective worldview shared by the group”³⁷⁴. Social identities convey “a sense of we-ness of imagined community usually based on collective narratives of a common fate, a common history, and a common culture”³⁷⁵.

The European continent has witnessed a rivalry between secular and religious powers, namely, between the Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire³⁷⁶, progressed throughout the age of enlightenment, gave birth to the industrial revolution, experienced the Napoleonic wars³⁷⁷. Even though the continent has went through a series of era-changing events, they have unfolded in a very diverse and intense way in terms of penetrating and influencing the different societies in the continent. Furthermore, despite the horrors of the WW2, common experience of occupation, mass suffering, and valiant resistance which led to the emergence of distinct rather than homogenic identities in Europe³⁷⁸. The burden of the war has pushed both political and intellectual prominent figures to “overcome the nadir of European history with a return to European humanist, enlightened and democratic traditions” which ultimately

³⁷² Tajfel, H. (1981). *Human Groups and Social Categories- Studies in Social Psychology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. P.255.

³⁷³ Risse, T. (2011). “A Community of Europeans?: Transnational Identities and Public Spheres”. Cornell University Press. Project Muse. P.25.

³⁷⁴ *Ibid.*.26

³⁷⁵ *Ibid.*.p.25

³⁷⁶ Mayer, C. F. & Palmlowski, J.(2004). “European Identities and the EU- The Ties that Bind the Peoples of Europe”. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 42(3), p.579.

³⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁷⁸ *Ibid.* P.579.

gained an institutional framework through the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952, and European Economic Community in 1958³⁷⁹. The creation of a European Community born out the horrors and the new realities of the war, is not an illustration of European strength and European collective identity, but an “admission of weakness, an institutional creation necessitated precisely by the lack of a positive identity that could have sustained itself between the two power blocks of the cold war”³⁸⁰. The EU cannot “refer to a popular, historic founding myth akin to the US Declaration of Independence, the Glorious Revolution with its cause of parliamentary sovereignty, or Bastille Day which marks the French revolution”³⁸¹.

The social identities are continuously negotiated, constructed, reconstructed, and reified, hence the construction of a European identity in the absence of a historical, cultural output even after the WW2 is achievable since European and national identities are not zero-sum game³⁸². The motto of “unity in diversity” not only acknowledges the diverse and distinct nature of the identities which may have overlap and to a degree contest with one another, but also paves the way for the construction of a European identity which celebrates the a vast group of identities. The complicated nature of the institutional framework of the EU, and the multi-level system of it creates an environment where a diverse number of actors compete for the power over decision-making and agenda setting. Even though the European hegemonic project in a creating both supranational institutions that oversee the proper flow of the union and a single market that ensures fair competition, freedom of movement, goods, labor, and people has been a compelling story, they both lack the symbolic and emotional foundation in creating a European identity. European Union have been “unable to challenge the emotional monopoly held by the nation-state”³⁸³ due to the lack of a European demos and a European public sphere, both of which are originated from the absence of “a common language that everybody speaks and understands, a common European-wide

³⁷⁹ Mayer, & Palmowski, (2004).*Op.cit* P.580.

³⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁸¹ *Ibid.*

³⁸² Risse(2011).*Op.cit.* p.27.

³⁸³ Pyta, W. & Nils Havemann(2015). *Football Research in Enlarged Europe: European Football and Collective Memory*. Palgrave Macmillan: UK. P.4.

media that everybody watches, listens to, or reads, and a common European perspective”³⁸⁴. European football provides an everyday forms of social exchange which enables European to interact with another to formulate a European community³⁸⁵. Football has a considerable community building capacity as it manages to transform the classical spectator sport to a form of popular culture which can penetrates the everyday practices of European people through the creation of a pan-European league, namely the Champions League, and can enhance the level of identification and belonging of the European due to the composition of the squads.

The Europeanization of football in a sense that the transformative power of the European level arrangements and ambitions on domestic level have made way football a “Europeanized everyday practice, as Europe became the gold standard for fans across the continent and potentially beyond”³⁸⁶. The creation of a pan-European league allows fans to meet across the continent either through attending the matches at the stadium or watching it on television despite the fact that the entry to the Champions League favors the most powerful teams in Europe. The Champions League has brought together different teams from different regions to the European football’s epitome to regularly play a rival from another European country, has present a media coverage before and after the matches, providing various information about the teams which fans are not aware of³⁸⁷. The matches in the Champions League are organized around a certain ceremony consists of an anthem and a logo, and played with a star ball, which all aim to utilize a strong football connection that remind the symbols of the EU, namely, the flag, shape and stars.³⁸⁸ The Europeanization of football has only solidified with the Bosman ruling under which players markets has been deregulated to ensure the freedom of movement, it has also accelerated the Europeanization of player markets³⁸⁹. The changes in the transfer market have change the composition of the top-

³⁸⁴ Risse (2004). *Op.cit.*p.108.

³⁸⁵ Manzenreiter, W. & Spitaler, G.(2012). *Op.cit.*

³⁸⁶ Weber, R. (2021). “Banal Europeanism? Europeanisation of football and the enhabitation of a Europeanised football fandom”, *Sport in Society*, 24(11), p.1894.

³⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁸⁹ Duval, A. & Rompuy, V.B. (2016). *The Legacy of Bosman*. The Hague: Asser.p.2

level football clubs in a sense that while the transfer market is international, the clubs in Europe scour the Europe for talented players which in turn increases the interests of the fans and pushed them to get information about the players in their club³⁹⁰. Fans are increasingly encounter predominantly European squads, both with their own and their rivals, the players in the squads can give interviews and address to their fans in their own language which later is translated, and they get acquainted with the local customs and practices so that they can form a bond with the fans³⁹¹.

The European identity is a complex and intertwined construct, and it is in a constant process of alteration and negotiation. Europe has “reiterated through everyday practices, symbols, and cultural praxis”³⁹² through football as it generates a European sphere where the players, clubs, and fans engage with each other on a regular basis in different competitions, and where they all are constantly exposed to the European symbols that can enhance their identifications, feelings of groupness and belonging to Europe. Football plays not only on the pitch, but also off the pitch where involved parties share common experiences and emotions, triumphs and defeats, joy and sorrow. The European hegemonic project in creating a European identity has followed a route which has been built on the single market and supranational institutions rather than to rely on historical, cultural, and emotional foundations. The market logic and institutional framework of the EU established has initiated a new center of power away from the nation-state that has the power to pressure actors, institutions, and people to conform, ultimately hoping to shift loyalty from national to European level which would eventually to construct European identity. However, what the European hegemonic project lacked is significant in constructing a European identity, hence football serves not only to forge a European space where there is a routine interaction and exposure to the European level structures, but also enrich the cultural practices and historical moments between fans, clubs, nations, and regions. Even though football enjoys a relative autonomy in its organizational and competitive structure, and every

³⁹⁰ Velema, T., Han-Yu, W., Yu-Kai, Z. (2020).” Global Value Added Chains and the Recruitment Activities of European Professional Football Teams.”, *International Review for the Sociology of Sport*, 55(2): pp.127-146.

³⁹¹ Weber(2021).*Op.cit.* p.1905.

³⁹² Ibid. P.1894.

nation's and clubs' approach in terms of their history, financial situations, goals, and operational culture to football is different from one another, the EU's decisions and provisions have helped football to advance in Europe. The establishment of a pan-European league system, namely the Champions League and Europa League, the growth and expansion of a European transfer market as a result of the Bosman ruling of the European Court of Justice, and the intervention of the European Commission in the central marketing of broadcasting rights of the European level competitions have given a fabric for the European football.

5.3 ECJ's Bosman Ruling

The European Union has gradually increased its involvement in sport through its institutional capacity and power, the European Court of Justice made a ruling on a case named Bosman which solidified EU's interference in football to ensure the freedom of movement and labor and fundamentally shifting the balance of power among the football clubs. The ECJ's ruling "abrogated a system of transfer fees to be paid for out-of-contract player as it infringed upon the freedom of movement under Article 48 of the Treaty of Rome and abolished the nationality restrictions that limited the number of foreign players in a team"³⁹³. The nationality quotas limits the maximum number of non-national players that a club can register for a given game. Nationality quotas often regarded as a means to ensure the quality of national teams and as a way to foster emotional bond and loyalty between a club and supporters³⁹⁴. Even though national quotas relatively straightforward to formulate and implement, the application of the national quotas in European football often vary as national football association designate different rules in terms of defining what constitutes a national player³⁹⁵, and deciding the upper limit that a club can field a player in a given game³⁹⁶. Nationality

³⁹³ Weber (2021).*Op.cit.* p.1900.

³⁹⁴ Roderick M. (2006). *The Politics of Agenda Setting: The Car and the Shaping of Public Policy*. Aldershot: Ashgate.p.116.

³⁹⁵ The resolution of the Bosman case paved the way for a third category which is EU Players. The players who are nationals of an EU member state can play for a club in another member state. Following the Bosman case EU players enjoy the same rights as national players; and therefore they do not occupy a place in a club's nationality quota.

³⁹⁶ Lanfranchi, P. (2001). *Moving with the Ball, the Migration of Professional Footballers*. Oxford: Berg.p.216

quotas hinders the freedom of movement for workers which is recognized by article 39 EC which entail the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the member states as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment³⁹⁷. The European Court of Justice issued a verdict on the issue of discrimination based on nationality in cases of *Dona vs Mantero* and *Walrave and Koch vs Association of Union Cycliste Internationale*³⁹⁸ which can be considered as benchmark on the availability of foreign players. European Commission tried to compel UEFA to ease the ban of foreign players.³⁹⁹ The elite clubs were less than enthusiastic as they have already curbed and benefitted by the transfer regime since the beginning of the 1970s to achieve success by signing global and star players who draw much more attention and popularity. Despite the lack of clubs' interest in the liberalization of the transfer market for European players, the European Commission has been vehemently desire to legislate the European market which happened when Jean-Marc Bosman was suspended at a third of his pay by his club, Standard Liege, which originally agreed to transfer Bosman to another club, Dunkerque, but due to difference in financial expectations Liege back down from the transfer.⁴⁰⁰ Given that the transactions was European in nature, European Commission closely monitored the dispute which eventually refereed to European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling on the compatibility between the transfer system and nationality clauses with the Articles 48 (free movement of workers), 85, and 86 (free competition) of the Treaty of Rome.⁴⁰¹ The ECJ's verdict marks the beginning of a new era where players' right to transfer freely without hindrance to another clubs has been recognized.

The football players remain at the bottom of the football pyramid. Clubs must register their players with their respective national football associations and UEFA to participate in the domestic competitions, and European competitions respectively.

³⁹⁷ <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12008E045:en:HTML>

³⁹⁸ King (2003). *Op.cit.* 75.

³⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰⁰ King (2003). *Op.cit.*p.71.

⁴⁰¹ Blainpain, R. and Inston, R. (1996). *The Bosman Case: The End of the Transfer System?* Leuven :Peeters p.9.

These governing bodies regulate and decide on the registration criterion which gives them a certain degree of power and control over the players that a club can hire.⁴⁰² Lanfranchi and Taylor state that football governing bodies have traditionally opted to implement two set of norms to regulate the employment and registration of football players, transfer systems and nationality quotas.⁴⁰³ The logic of a transfer is as follows, “if a player is to be transferred from one club to another, the competent governing bodies have to deal with the paperwork and issue a new license to allow the football player to be fielded by the new club”⁴⁰⁴. Roderick argues that transfer systems exist to protect small clubs that dedicate their resources to develop young players so that the rich and powerful clubs cannot steal their best prospects without fair compensation.⁴⁰⁵ The transfer fee enables small clubs to invest in their training camps, grass-roots educations which are significant for their survival. The football transfer system designed to favor clubs rather than players as it allowed clubs to retain a player at the end of a contract when there is no agreement over compensation for a transfer⁴⁰⁶. These provisions known as retain and transfer system because clubs are allowed to retain the player’s license even when the contractual relationship between the club and the player expired⁴⁰⁷. The post-Bosman labor market in football is a combination of “global-value added chains developed by clubs, player agents, and investment agencies to transfer talents from (semi) peripheral countries to play in the core leagues of world football”⁴⁰⁸.The Bosman ruling promulgated a new transfer regime for elite clubs to take advantage by utilizing their economic powers, and promising success and glory.⁴⁰⁹

⁴⁰² Garcia (2008). *Op.cit.* p.87.

⁴⁰³ Lanfranchi., P.(2001). *Moving with the Ball, the Migration of Professional Footballers.* Oxford: Berg.p.218.

⁴⁰⁴ Garcia (2008). *Op.cit.*p.88.

⁴⁰⁵ Roderick M.(2006). *The Politics of Agenda Setting: The Car and the Shaping of Public Policy.* Aldershot: Ashgate.p.116.

⁴⁰⁶ Garcia (2008). *Op.cit.*p .88.

⁴⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰⁸ Velema, Wen, Zhou(2020).*Op.cit.*p .129.

⁴⁰⁹ Holt(2009).*Op.cit.*p.20.

The liberalization of the transfer market and the abolition of foreign player restrictions has transformed the political economic structure of the European football which is more transnational in character and more competitive than the previous regime. The increase in the global connectivity has made clubs, leagues, nation-states, supra-national institutions, and sport-specific regulatory bodies to consider the world as a single and connected space where some must regulate and design the transfer systems while others have to compete to find, buy, and sell talents. Football clubs follow a “disaggregated recruitment strategy through which they acquire a large share of their players globally, but also scout locally and regionally”⁴¹⁰. The squad of the football clubs consist of a core of home-country players and highly talented foreign players acquired regionally or from across the globe, the former embodies the club’s core values and forming the heart of the team while the latter addresses the need to win, success, and glory both for the clubs and its fans⁴¹¹. Football clubs aim to ensure a constant flow of talented players so that they turn to countries, regions that they share a degree of historical, linguistic, and cultural similarities⁴¹². European football clubs “are more likely to hire foreign players from their former colonies and from countries that share a common language, cultural background, or tactical approach toward the game”⁴¹³. The football clubs act on a certain patterns of cultural “glocalization” in their recruitment strategies, they carefully select and employ players from countries and regions to accommodate their own country’s cultural and linguistic conditions while contributing to the club’s vision both on and off the pitch. The historical and cultural linkages between the core and (semi)peripheral countries determined the direction of the transfer of the players such that players from Francophone Africa tend to employed at France, Latin-American footballers employed at Southern European countries,

⁴¹⁰ Poli, R.(2010). “Understanding globalization through football: The new international division of labour, migratory channels and transnational trade circuits”. *International Review for the Sociology of Sport*, 45(4). Pp.491-506.

⁴¹¹ Poli (2010). *Op.cit.*.

⁴¹² Velema, Wen, Zhou (2020).*Op.cit.* p.130.

⁴¹³ *Ibid.* p.130.

Eastern European players employed at Germany⁴¹⁴, and Irish, Scottish and Scandinavia players employed at the England.⁴¹⁵ The new transfer order set up by the Bosman ruling is a lucrative business for European football clubs as they purchase cheap foreign labor and sell their best players expensively to larger teams operating in big five leagues⁴¹⁶. The new hegemonic order facilitate the flow of player de-skilling the (semi)-periphery while enriching teams operating in football's global core, which maximize their profits from importing and grooming cheap foreign talents to re-sell to bigger leagues⁴¹⁷. UEFA characterized the transformation as "the danger of concentration of power, and consequently, a loss of the desired balance among the football clubs"⁴¹⁸, and feared that the emerging structure after the Bosman ruling can undermine the dominance of UEFA by creating new centers of power.⁴¹⁹

5.4 Broadcasting in Europe

The liberalization of the transfer market in Europe through the ECJ ruling has been a significant step in establishing a hegemonic order in football, and spill over to the liberalization of the broadcasting market in Europe. The EU has always been concerned about "the relative weakness of European television industries within the global marketplace"⁴²⁰ as European television companies are too small to compete and the broadcasting in Europe was regulated on a basis of public service, control by the state as the political importance of disseminating messages was paramount.⁴²¹ The opening of the market to competition, coupled with the technological development of

⁴¹⁴ Littlewood, M. Et al. (2011). Football labour migration: "An examination of the player recruitment strategies of the "big five" European football leagues 2004-5 to 2008-9". *Soccer&Society*, 12: pp.788-805.

⁴¹⁵ Elliot, R.(2016). "Football's Irish exodus: Examining the factors influencing Irish player migration to English Professional leagues". *International Review for the Sociology of Sport*, 51: pp.147-161.

⁴¹⁶ Velema, Wen, Zhou (2020).*Op.cit.* p.130.

⁴¹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴¹⁸ King (2003).*Op.cit.* p.90.

⁴¹⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴²⁰ Wheeler, M. (2004). "Supranational Regulation: Television and European Union"., *European Journal of Communication*, 19(3), p.351.

⁴²¹ King (2003). *Op.cit.* p.96.

satellite and digital television, paved the way for the creation of new private television platforms throughout the EU that wanted a share in the lucrative market previously dominated by public broadcasters⁴²². The liberalization of broadcasting markets is significant for EU to foster free and fair competition to establish and consolidate the European Single Market. “The technological advancements, cross-sectoral convergence, economic opportunities, and the globalization of communications services have brought new entrants, strategic alliances, acquisitions and corporate media marriages and mergers”⁴²³ into the European broadcasting. The entities in the television market were faced with a tough challenge to win viewers over from the previously dominant public broadcaster. Private television companies realized that one way to secure access to the market was to offer live and exclusive coverage of sporting events, especially professional football. Football has gradually become a global business and a form of entertainment so that a new line of partnership emerged between the actors in football and the media industry in which the former provides content and audience for the media and television, and the latter offers a new and broad revenue source, and a market for the football world⁴²⁴.

The co-constitutive and co-beneficial partnership between the media industry and the football started to penetrate and change the map of European football of broadcasting which has been dominantly controlled by the five companies, Bertelsmann, News Corporation (BSkyB), Canal Plus (owned by the utilities giant Vivendi), the Kirch Group and Mediaset whom all have been involved in a complex and unstable alliances and oppositions.⁴²⁵ Prior to the beginning of the market liberalization throughout the Europe, both the public broadcasters and the private broadcasters of the football matches have enjoyed a considerable monopoly which have enabled them to pay relatively smaller fees to acquire the broadcasting rights⁴²⁶. The fees to acquire the broadcasting rights have substantially increased as a result of a

⁴²² *Ibid.*

⁴²³ Wheeler, M. (2004). *Op.cit.* p.360.

⁴²⁴ Evans, T. & Lefever, K.(2011). “Watching the Football Game: Broadcasting Rights for the European Digital Television Market”, *Journal of Sport and Social Issues*, 35(1), p.34.

⁴²⁵ King (2003). *Op.cit.* p.100.

⁴²⁶ Evans, Lefever (2011). *Op.cit.* p.38.

proliferation of commercial free-to-air and pay television channels, and even if the broadcasters would not seem to profit from broadcasting the games, they remain interested because of the promotional opportunities, branding power, and audience building effects of football⁴²⁷. France was the first major European league market in which the transformation in the broadcasting affecting, in 1985 the newly formed channel, Canal Plus, won the contract for live French first division of football.⁴²⁸ Canal Plus has remained the sole broadcaster of the league until they converted their satellite network to the digital transmission which in turn they found themselves in sharing the digital rights of First Division French football with TPS (Television par Satellite).⁴²⁹ English Premier League has been broadcasting by the partnership of BBC and ITV whom providing the service as a public good, but free-to-air television practice under their tenure stopped when BSkyB won consecutive contracts in 1992 and 1996.⁴³⁰ German First Division, Bundesliga, has also been broadcasted by the ARD and ZDF, the two public channels, from 1965 to 1988, but the right of broadcasting upheld by the UFA and RTL until 1992 which replaced the previous media outlets with SAT1 and ISPR which also been replaced by the digital subscription channel owned by BSkyB.⁴³¹ Even though collective sale was part of the deal between the broadcasters and the league, Italian and Spanish First division leagues did not negotiate based on the collective sales rather they have opted to pursue deals in individually or in a fragmented group.⁴³² In Italy, public broadcasting continue to stream highlights of the matches until 1994⁴³³, and despite the initial loss to a private network of broadcasting, state-owned RAI continue to broadcast the Serie A due the a failure in the contract obligations.⁴³⁴ The collective sale and a unity in the broadcasting ended in 1998 when

⁴²⁷ Evans, Lefever (2011). *Op.cit.* p.38.

⁴²⁸ King (2003).*Op.cit.* p.104.

⁴²⁹ *Ibid.* p.110.

⁴³⁰ *Ibid.* p.113.

⁴³¹ King (2003).*Op.cit.* p.114.

⁴³² *Ibid.*

⁴³³ James, T. and Sturges, B. (1997).” What price European football?” *Soccer Analyst*, 10, pp.2-14.

⁴³⁴ Guest, L. and Law, P. (1997). “The Revolution will be televised”, *World Soccer*, January, pp. 14-17.

a series of broadcasters emerged, namely, Telepui Digital Plus, and News Corporation and Telecom Italia.⁴³⁵ The former acquired the rights of the Italian giants, Milan, Juventus, Inter, and Napoli, while the latter acquired the rights of clubs such as Fiorentina, Lazio, Roma, and Parma.⁴³⁶ The broadcasting market was regulated under the collective bargaining and collective sale in Spain where the giants of the league, Real Madrid, and Barcelona, have wanted to switch to a more Italian model as they are the clubs with the most rating, hence a fragmented and a individually negotiated broadcasting services would further their economic prosperity.⁴³⁷ Their desire to change broadcasting services have been fulfilled when the existing contract with Audiovisual owned by the competitors Telefonica and Sogecable, replaced with the Via Digital, and Canalsatellite Digital whom broadcast the matches of Barcelona and Real Madrid respectively.⁴³⁸ The domestic markets regulated under the national laws have been the first targets of market liberalization, ushering a new era for the broadcasting in Europe.

The European Commission like the broadcasters acknowledge the significance of football as a prime-time content for television companies because it has the power to attract new customers to subscription and pay-per-view services and to ensure advertising revenue in free to air channels⁴³⁹. Competition policy has played a central role in the evolution of the EU and the construction of the Single European Market. EU competition policy has three general objectives⁴⁴⁰. It is to promote market efficiency, in the sense of maximizing consumer welfare and avoiding concentration of resources amongst a limited range of market actors⁴⁴¹, to protect the consumer and small and medium sized-enterprises from the dominance of large aggregations of

⁴³⁵ James, T. and Sturgess, B. (1997).” What price European football?” *Soccer Analyst*, 10, pp.2-14.

⁴³⁶ King (2003).*Op.cit.* p.104.

⁴³⁷ King (2003).*Op.cit.* p.104.

⁴³⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴³⁹ European Commission (1999). Principles and Guidelines for the Community’s Audiovisual Policy in the Digital Age. COM (99) 657 final, 14 December 1999.

⁴⁴⁰ Garcia (2008). *Op.cit.* p.133.

⁴⁴¹ Craig, P. and De Burca, G. (2003). EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials. 3rd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. P.936.

economic power⁴⁴², and to facilitate the creation of the single European market, thus it is central to fostering economic integration⁴⁴³. Competition policy is an essential tool to ensure that private barriers to trade do not substitute the public barriers previously removed by the governments during the construction of the single market⁴⁴⁴. The Commission's primary objectives was to ensure single market integration and exploit the commercial opportunities, it also sought to ensure pluralism in the broadcasting, cultural diversity to preserve the national identities, and to enhance the citizen's choice by offering them a wide range of content and access⁴⁴⁵.

The centrality of competition policy has permitted the Commission to establish its Directorate General for Competition Policy as one of the most active and effective centers of power within the EU institutional framework⁴⁴⁶. The Directorate General for Competition Policy acts on the Article 81 and 82 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community. Article 81 "prohibits agreements between undertakings and other concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and whose object of effect is the prevention or distortion of competition in the single market"⁴⁴⁷. The terms "undertaking" is defined as an entity engaged in economic activity, the ECJ has considered undertakings as both individual persons and state agencies that perform economic or commercial functions⁴⁴⁸. Sport organizations such as UEFA, a football governing body in Europe has defined as undertakings or associations of undertakings because it engages in an economic activity, selling the broadcasting rights of the Champions League⁴⁴⁹. Furthermore, Article 81 defines "the cartel-like activities that

⁴⁴² Cini, M. and McGowan, L. (1998). *Competition Policy in the European Union*. Basingstoke: Macmillan. P.4.

⁴⁴³ Craig and De Burca (2003). *Op.cit.* p. 937.

⁴⁴⁴ Cini, and McGowan (1998). *Op.cit* p.11.

⁴⁴⁵ Garcia (2008). *Op.cit.* p.136.

⁴⁴⁶ *Ibid.* p.133.

⁴⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴⁸ Craig and De Burca (2003). *Op.cit.* p.939.

⁴⁴⁹ Gardiner, S. Et al. (2001). *Sports Law*. 2nd edition. London: Cavendish Publishing. P.392.

are prohibited due to their distorting of competition in the single market”⁴⁵⁰, however accept their activities if they generate benefits that outweigh the restriction on competition. The exemptions can only be granted if “it contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, it allows consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit”⁴⁵¹. The exemptions can be determined by the DG Competition. In addition to the Article 81, Article 82 prohibits “the abuse of a dominant position within the market by one or more undertakings in so far as it may affect trade between member states”⁴⁵². UEFA due to its position in the European football pyramid and the sovereign organizer and supreme authority of the joint and collective selling of the European level competitions have suffered from the provisions of the Article 81 and 82.

DG Competition has a broad mandate to ensure competition and restrict monopoly in the broadcasting market. It has “supervised mergers between media companies to ensure that there was no market dominance arising from them; and has investigated the accumulation of content to be broadcast in order to ensure that no television operator obtains too much premium content, hence distorting the market through a dominant position”⁴⁵³. The Commission considers “that an excessive concentration of football broadcasting in one operator’s hands has the potential to heavily distort competition and, more importantly, reduce the opportunities and choices for the consumer”⁴⁵⁴. The Commission has identified two markets where the selling of broadcasting rights by tournament organizers might distort competitions; namely, the upstream market and the downstream market⁴⁵⁵. The upstream market is “defined as the market for acquisition of TV broadcasting rights of football events

⁴⁵⁰ Garcia (2008). *Op.cit.* p.134.

⁴⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵² Craig and De Burca (2003). *Op.cit.* p.993.

⁴⁵³ Wheeler, M. (2004). “Supranational Regulation: Television and the European Union”. *European Journal of Communication*, 19(3). P.361.

⁴⁵⁴ Garcia (2008). *Op.cit.* p.138.

⁴⁵⁵ European Commission (2003). Decision Relating to a Proceeding Pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article of 53 of the EEA Agreement (Comp/C. 2-37. 398 Joint Selling of the Commercial Rights of the UEFA Champions League). 2003/778/EC, 23 July 2003.

played regularly throughout the year”⁴⁵⁶. Competition in this upstream market can be restricted by football organizations when they sell broadcasting rights collectively on behalf of the participating clubs. The downstream market is “defined as the television market in which football events are broadcast as an important element of the competition for advertisers, viewers or subscribers among TV companies”⁴⁵⁷. In this market television companies are the suppliers and the viewers or subscribers are the customers⁴⁵⁸. The Commission is of the opinion that excessive concentration of football rights in the hands of a single television company may restrict competition because other channels would lack content to attract viewers⁴⁵⁹. DG Competition addressed the possible problems that may arise from the collective selling and exclusivity, by ensuring that competition organizers do not sell their broadcasting rights in a way that one single broadcaster can accumulate an excessive amount of them, hence reducing the options of the consumer to choose between channels to watch football⁴⁶⁰. Exclusivity is the practice of selling the broadcasting rights only to one single television operator or an exclusive basis to maximize revenue. Collective selling is the practice through which a competitor organizer sells the broadcasting rights on behalf of the clubs participating in the tournament.

The broadcasting regulations and practices of the UEFA against the mandate of the DG Competition to eliminate anti-competitive practices and regulations in the broadcasting market in Europe resulted in a clash. UEFA believes that;

It is in the interest of football that there should be firm control over the televised coverage of matches. An invasion of such transmissions can only lead to a devaluation of the game’s worth and thus to a decline in interest not only on the part of the public but also in that of the commercial circles which are currently seeking to become involved in football⁴⁶¹.

UEFA preferred a limited number of games to be broadcasted by the media as it can reduce the level of participation to football through all the levels especially at amateur

⁴⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵⁷ European Commission (2003). Commission Clears UEFA’s New Policy Regarding the Sale of the Media Rights to the Champions League, European Commission Press Release.

⁴⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶⁰ Garcia (2008). *Op.cit.* p.139.

⁴⁶¹ UEFA (1990). Report of the General Secretary for 1988 and 1989. Berne. UEFA.

and grassroots level, and can decrease the attendance at stadiums due to the fact that people can choose the comfort of their home⁴⁶². Consequently, UEFA adopted a new set of rules concerning the cross-border transmission of football matches regulated by the Article 14(2) of the UEFA Statutes⁴⁶³. This article states that “national FAs could ban the television transmission of foreign football in their territory”⁴⁶⁴. The introduction of the broadcasting regulations caused a formal complaints by television companies to the European Commission, the first of which was registered with DG Competition on 5 April 1989 by the British company Independent Television Association Limited⁴⁶⁵. The DG Commission has already red-flagged the practices and regulations of the UEFA as anti-competitive acted on the complaint, and has begun its investigation which would could carry a wider impact in football’s broadcasting throughout the Europe and especially the broadcasting rights of the Champions League⁴⁶⁶.

The Commission referred to the regulations and practices of UEFA as anti-competitive per the Article 81 as they hinder competition by unnecessarily and disproportionately restrict access to television markets⁴⁶⁷. The Commission held several meeting with UEFA officials to explain the problems persistent in their regulations and practices of broadcasting, and as a result of a preliminary assessment, DG Competition proposed three ways to comply with EU competition law⁴⁶⁸. Firstly, UEFA’s regulations should have aimed to protect the live football rather than the national football⁴⁶⁹. Secondly, the restrictions should be limited to a defined windows

⁴⁶² Parrish, R. (2003). Sports Law and Policy in the European Union. Manchester: Manchester University Press.p.127

⁴⁶³ Garcia(2008). *Op.cit.* p.141.

⁴⁶⁴ *Ibid.* p.141

⁴⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶⁷ European Comission(2001). Commission Opens Proceedings against UEFA’s Selling of TV Rights to UEFA Champions League, European Commission Press Release. 20 July 2001.

⁴⁶⁸ Garcia(2008).*Op.cit.* p.142.

⁴⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

on weekend afternoons as people record the highest attendance ratings⁴⁷⁰. Additionally, these time slots best determined by national FAs prior to the reasonable time to prevent any arbitrary application of the regulations⁴⁷¹. Thirdly, any restriction or ban should not include transnational, cable and satellite channels⁴⁷². UEFA after a careful consideration of proposal made by DG Competition, decided to amend its regulations and practices of broadcasting so that a new set of broadcasting regulation and practices emerged compatible with the demands of the DG Competition. The new standing for the broadcasting dictate that national FAs can only ban foreign football matches a limited amount of time that does exceed two and a half hours per week-end, these time periods defined as the “blocked broadcasting hours” must be notified to UEFA at least 14 days prior to the beginning of seasons and remain in effect for entirety of the season⁴⁷³. In light of the changes made in the broadcasting statutes, Commission rather than granting an exemption under Article 81, accepted the new standing as lawful and competitive⁴⁷⁴.

The clash between the DG Competition and UEFA have continued to the Champions League because of the position of the UEFA as the sovereign organizer and exclusive owner of the broadcasting rights. UEFA has the authority to market the Champions League, and to joint sell the commercial rights of the organization which it considered these attributes as a prerequisite for the existence of and continuation for the tournament⁴⁷⁵. UEFA desired to reach a compromise with the DG Competition as long as it can get the authorization of the DG Competition for its joint selling the broadcasting rights of the Champions League⁴⁷⁶. UEFA argues that the practices of

⁴⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷² *Ibid.*

⁴⁷³ UEFA(2003). Regulations Governing the Implementation of Article 48 of the UEFA Statutes (Broadcasting Regulations), Adopted by UEFA Executive Committee. 22 May 2003. <https://www.uefa.com/newsfiles/88494.pdf>

⁴⁷⁴ Garcia(2008).*Op.cit.* p.144.

⁴⁷⁵ European Commission (2003). Decision Relating to a Proceeding Pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article of 53 of the EEA Agreement (Comp/C. 2-37. 398 Joint Selling of the Commercial Rights of the UEFA Champions League). 2003/778/EC, 23 July 2003.

⁴⁷⁶ Garcia (2008).*Op.cit.* p.146.

central marketing and joint selling is significant for the preservation of the Champions League brand, for the continuation and consistency of the quality of the Champions League, and for the guarantee of financial solidarity throughout the European football pyramid which would ensure a competitive balance amongst football clubs⁴⁷⁷. However, against the arguments made by the UEFA, European Commission objected the practices and regulations embraced by the UEFA on the grounds that the joint selling system prevents clubs from marketing their own broadcasting rights which leads to a hindrance on competition both amongst clubs and between the clubs and the UEFA⁴⁷⁸, the central marketing allows a single broadcaster to acquire all the television rights of Champions League at the expense of the smaller and poorer broadcasters⁴⁷⁹, and the combination of joint selling and central marketing have blunted the UEFA to fully exploit the wide range of possibilities in broadcasting the Champions League⁴⁸⁰. The European Commission after listing the objections to the UEFA's broadcasting regulations and practices issued a following statement:

The Commission fully endorses the specificity of sport as expressed in the declaration of the European Council in Nice in December 2000, where the Council encourages a redistribution of part of the revenue from the sales of TV rights at the appropriate levels, as beneficial to the principle of solidarity between all levels and areas of sport. However, the Commission considers that the current form of joint selling of the TV rights by UEFA has a highly anti-competitive effect by foreclosing TV markets and ultimately limiting TV coverage of those events for consumers. The Commission considers that joint selling of the TV rights as practiced by UEFA is not indispensable for guaranteeing solidarity among clubs participating in a football tournament. It should be possible to achieve solidarity without incurring anti-competitive effects.⁴⁸¹

Furthermore, European Commission adopted a new position on the principle of joint selling by issuing the following statement:

While joint selling arrangements clearly fall within the scope of Article 81(1), the Commission considers that in certain circumstances, joint selling may be an efficient way to organize the

⁴⁷⁷ European Commission (2003). Decision Relating to a Proceeding Pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article of 53 of the EEA Agreement (Comp/C. 2-37. 398 Joint Selling of the Commercial Rights of the UEFA Champions League). 2003/778/EC, 23 July 2003.

⁴⁷⁸ European Commission (2003). Commission Clears UEFA's New Policy Regarding the Sale of the Media Rights to the Champions League, European Commission Press Release, 24 July 2003.

⁴⁷⁹ Garcia (2008). *Op.cit.* p.152.

⁴⁸⁰ Garcia (2008). *Op.cit.* p.152.

⁴⁸¹ European Commission (2001). Commission Opens Proceedings against UEFA's Selling of TV Rights to UEFA Champions League, European Commission Press Release. 20 July 2001 <http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/01/1043&format>

selling of TV rights for international sport events. However, the manner in which the TV rights are sold may not be so restrictive as to outweigh the benefits provided.⁴⁸²

A new system of broadcasting rights for the Champions League established as a result of a consultation between UEFA and the DG Competition by taking into consideration of the objections and new position of the European Commission. The new compromise would incorporate the principle of joint selling which allowed UEFA to enjoy exclusive rights of the Champions League on behalf of the participant clubs, but it also foresees an increase in the sold packages and in the number of broadcasters per country⁴⁸³. This led to emergence of more matches so that a new and smaller packages for broadcasters to bid and acquire can rise. The Commission respected joint selling, but forced UEFA to offer a wider variety of packages instead of the single package structure suggested by UEFA in 1999. UEFA has split its proposed commercial rights into TV broadcasting, internet, streaming through mobile phones, sponsorship and licensing into 14 smaller packages to be sold on a country by country basis for a period not exceeding three years. UEFA accommodated the demands of the European Commission by radically changing its position from the previous regulations and practices that aim to limit the number of matches available to transmission to broadcast every match in the Champions League shows that what lengths UEFA would go to maintain its hegemonic position as the sovereign organizer and supreme authority in the European football pyramid. The new position embraced by the UEFA has enabled it to retain the exclusive rights to sell the two main live rights packages for free-TV and pay-tv, but other packages are co-exploited by both UEFA and participating clubs, similarly, the rights for internet and UMTS are co-exploited by UEFA and the participating clubs.⁴⁸⁴ The Commission was happy to close the case with a formal decision in July 2003. The Commission took the view that the new joint selling of Champions League broadcasting rights, despite its anti-competitive nature merited an exemption under Article 81(3)⁴⁸⁵. The exemption was “granted on the

⁴⁸² European Commission(2001a). The UEFA Champions League- Background Note, European Commission memorandum. MEMO/01/271, 20 July 2001. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_01_271

⁴⁸³ Garcia(2008). *Op.cit.* p.154.

⁴⁸⁴ Garcia(2008). *Op.cit.* p.154.

⁴⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

grounds that the UEFA system to sell the broadcasting rights creates a single point of sale and it facilitates the protection of the Champions League as a brand product of high quality⁴⁸⁶. The new system is compromise between the total liberalization of broadcasting rights and a restrictive joint selling arrangement, favoring the latter to the former⁴⁸⁷. It is crucial for UEFA to maintain the economic means secured and granted by the European Commission to ensure its authority in the European football pyramid. UEFA's Director of Legal Services, Markus Studer, stated;

UEFA is very satisfied with the outcome of this case, which marks the first occasion where the European Commission has approved central marketing arrangements for a major sporting event. The decision gives legal security for UEFA to sell the commercial rights of the competition until at least 2009. At the same time, the decision provides a modern and balanced solution, opening up further possibilities for technological innovation and maximizing variety and choice for football fans to follow Europe's flagship competition.⁴⁸⁸

Since the beginning of the 1990s it is UEFA who pays its members, because you have no authority if you do not control also the economic part of it. The clubs would not have respect if there is no economic power behind a central body. So, by introducing central marketing of TV rights, we introduced a solidarity system in European football and we enhance also the authority of UEFA as the competent authority to control and develop football, including the professional game⁴⁸⁹.

UEFA's hegemonic position in the European football pyramid is constituted by being the organizer of the Champions League, and being able to re-distribute the revenues generated by the Champions League. The EU's hegemonic project to establish and consolidate the practices of Single Market such as freedom of movement and ensuring fair and free competition have also empowered the hegemonic position of the UEFA in the European football pyramid.

⁴⁸⁶ European Commission. (2003). Decision Relating to a Proceeding Pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article of 53 of the EEA Agreement (Comp/C. 2-37. 398 Joint Selling of the Commercial Rights of the UEFA Champions League). 2003/778/EC, 23 July 2003.

⁴⁸⁷ Garcia(2008).*Op.cit.* p.156.

⁴⁸⁸ UEFA(2004). CEO Annual Report 2003. UEFA. Nyon (Switzerland): UEFA.

⁴⁸⁹ Garcia(2008). *Op.cit* p.168.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Football has been played in various parts of the world through Britain to Egypt, and China to Japan with different formats and rules. The introduction of a league structure and a degree of professionalization have enabled its constant expansion and diffusion by the British Empire. Football has been the most popular and anticipated sport as it can easily penetrate into popular culture through evoking a wide range of emotions such as excitement, anger, pride, love, and hope over people which make them heavily invested in football. The game inside pitch offers a story, and a journey where people can associate and see the reflection of their identity in the clubs they support. However, as football diffuses to the world the fabric of the game has begun to change, both the game itself and its stakeholders, and the fans have become commodified. The process of commodification released a huge amount of capital from various sources into the football pyramid in which a wave of professionalization and internationalization began to enroot, thus football has become an activity that has a social, political, and economic significance. The multi-dimensional and multi-purposeful nature of the football have gathered the interests of various actors who have aimed to utilize sport in general, and football in particular to gain the upper hand in their hegemonic struggles and to empower a new identity just like what happened in Italy under Mussolini and Spain under Franco, to pursue their regional aspirations through hosting MSEs like South Korea and Qatar which granted an opportunity to showcase a brand image and identity to create a legacy that can either lead to augmentation of soft power or soft disempowerment, and to genuinely foster peace and development in a global scale, but unintentionally empower the existing hierarchical power structures due to a top-down approach that fails to address either the problems or appropriate solutions in spite of the institutional capacity, power, and will like the United Nations.

The authoritarian regimes' utilization of sport in general, and football in particular set the stage for hegemonic struggles between themselves and other social forces in their respective national context. The hegemonic interests, positions, and projects of a hegemonic bloc actively shape the projects, positions, and interests of their counter hegemonic bloc in a given hegemonic order. The European football also has its own hegemonic struggle which the UEFA and the elite football clubs continue to develop hegemonic projects to materialize their hegemonic interests just like a chess match, and the "king" of this hegemonic struggle is the Champions League. The European football's transformation in terms of a change in the ownership models, the injection of high volumes of capital, de-regulation and privatization of broadcasting, kicked off a hegemonic struggle between UEFA and the elite football clubs resulted in the transition to the Champions League. Both of the actors devised hegemonic projects, elite football clubs aimed to fully exploit the commercial potential of the Champions League to fund their pursuit of glory and success, while UEFA has been busy in the protection of the wider interests of the European football pyramid by centralizing the marketing and branding rights of the Champions League, and gaining a complete control over commercial activities. UEFA believed in the necessity to gain complete control over branding and marketing as they proved to be essential in staging a MSE. The South Korean and Qatari examples with the hosting MSEs shows the necessity of creating a legacy that would serve a long-lasting impact that lead to either augmentation of soft power or soft disempowerment which utilized to pursue their regional aspirations. Even though the Champions League is not considered as a Mega-Sport event, the political and cultural significance rooted in its long history and tradition coupled with the brand identity and image UEFA created based on prestige make the UCL the next best thing. The legacy surrounding the UCL fosters the development of the competition into a world-wide fan base whom make it easier to attract further revenues, interest, and attention which UEFA opts to make use of it for the wider interests of the European football pyramid, while the elite football clubs opt to increase their financial and political strength to institutionalize their de-facto hegemonic position, and to root any challengers. The revenues generated by the UCL and the centralization of marketing and commercial control enabled UEFA to re-distribute and re-invest the money to re-build the torn-competitive balance, and to

bring balance to the deplorable financial situation of the football clubs. Additionally, UEFA formulates a coercive and comprehensive hegemonic project named Financial Fair Play to restrict the spending frenzy and to reverse the systemic pressure elite football clubs impose on the rest of the football clubs which lead to either heavy investment to succeed in a short period of time results mostly in bankruptcy or financial distress or to dispose every valuable assets to maintain cashflow for their survival. The goodwill, and the comprehensive measures employed by UEFA to protect the integrity and future of the European football pyramid have not only failed but also empower the hegemonic position of elite football clubs as they both find access to higher volumes of capital, and set a wrong example for the rest of the football clubs, hence UEFA shared a similar path with the United Nations.

Football in Europe has built on the idea of a sporting merit and a competitive balance that provides a system of reward and punishment, and uncertainty of outcome, all of which contributed to development of football. Elite football clubs, in an era defined by the commodification which necessitates to have an access and command over a substantial financial resource are forced to participate in Champions League football, however, as a result of a mismanagement and spending frenzy, in spite of the financial power, elite football clubs began to deprive from making a regular appearances in the UCL as the new contenders emerge in their respective national context. This unexpected circumstances have forced elite football clubs to formulate and implement a new hegemonic project to protect their interest which is to gain further access in the decision-making process, especially with regards to the future of the UCL. However, UEFA, having already pressured once by the elite football clubs' informal lobby group, G-14, has already formulated and implemented its hegemonic project by anticipating the next move of their rival. UEFA utilized the G-14's lack of representation and inclusiveness which created a problem of legitimacy, established European Club Forum, a platform tasked to discuss all the matters relating to the competition formats, marketing and rights strategies, and future of the European football pyramid. Furthermore, UEFA to limit the influence of the elite football clubs, transformed the European Club Forum into European Club Association, an independent body charged to facilitate a dialogue and consultation to promote and protect European club football. ECA designed to represent the interests of football

clubs and to work to ensure the recognition of football clubs as the main stakeholder in European football. The elite football clubs who are position in the leadership of the ECA have a direct power and influence to actively decide the future of the UCL, however what they really want is to replace the UEFA's hegemonic position by obtaining the central marketing and branding, and commercial control over the European club competitions. The existing European hegemonic order does not allow such a transition, hence elite football clubs aim to formulate and institutionalize a league of their own to materialize their hegemonic interests.

The elite football clubs' hegemonic projects builds on the dominant sporting ethos created by the commodification that envisions a endless search for capital to attain glory which in turn necessitates a constant expansion for procurement of additional capital, and a ruthless exploitation to root out any challengers. The Champions League does not satisfy the needs of the elite football clubs due to distribution mechanism and unguaranteed participation which encouraged the implementation of elite football clubs' hegemonic project, a new league owned and controlled by them. The materialization of this hegemonic project halted because of the coronavirus, but it has further revealed the weaknesses of the European football pyramid, namely the lack of financial resilience which caused systemic repercussion. The coronavirus has halted football matches, suspend temporarily and permanently the ongoing seasons which can only resumed after closed doors, hence it fundamentally disrupts football operations. It opens the door for re-negotiations of the broadcasting rights almost in every league, the broadcaster demanded rebated considerable amount of payments, all of which resulted in the worsening of the cycle of debt, and the increase the need for the search of more capital. The emerging landscape in the European football architecture necessitates the elite football clubs to establish a new hegemonic order, one that is designed to further concentrate the cultural, economic, and human capital. The Super League as the new hegemonic project have been the continuation of the threat of breakaway league that has changed the format of the Champions League.

The elite football clubs in this new hegemonic bloc have different interests and priorities to join the Super League, some want to control the expenses through salary cap and financial regulation while maintaining a stable income and restricted

expenditures, a few pursue to abolish the restrictions on their ability to act in the transfer market, so that they can use their resources to gain a competitive edge which can lead to cultural and political legitimacy in the world, and the others want to re-gain their lost financial supremacy to re-live their glorious days. The Super League project has emerged as the answer to all their needs and interests, however, it also gave way to the emergence of a counter-hegemonic bloc led by the UEFA whom believes that only way forward is to facilitate solidarity, foster further competitive balance, and to maintain the sporting merit which are the backbone of the football in Europe. This counter-hegemonic bloc has re-organized themselves against the declaration of Super League, and consists of a diverse group of actors whom generally have a conflictual interests and ideas about the future of the football. The counter-historic bloc comprise of FIFA, UEFA, European Union, national associations and the domestic leagues of the signatory football clubs, and the fans. The mounting pressure, threat of expulsion from the domestic, European, world tournaments, and the discredit from the fans have made the materialization of the Super League practically impossible. Despite the failure on the part of the dozen football clubs, this counter-historic bloc have failed to establish a counter-hegemonic order because most of them have been satisfied with the positions before the declaration of the Super League. The pursuit of glory driven by the chronical greed have been the fuel of the European football pyramid, the actors in the counter-historic bloc have aimed to maintain their authority and power other than the fans whom have long desired and protested for a change in the European football pyramid where the principles of financial solidarity, sporting merit, and the qualification to the European competitions based on the domestic success become the main pillars. The greatest threat thus far to the existing European football pyramid have been evaded with the alienation of the fans, an insignificant fine to be paid by the revolting football clubs, and ultimately a decrease in the credibility, and the loss of power and prestige of the signatory football clubs. However, even if they have failed to materialize their hegemonic project, the previous hegemonic order remains in place since the dominant sporting ethos can help them recover the hearts of the fans, the homogenized practices in the football pyramid continue to empower the elite football clubs. Furthermore, the accepted proposal for the new format of the Champions League is a rip-off of the proposed hegemonic project that is the Super League, the

approved version in the UEFA bodies foresee an increase in the number of participants and the number of guaranteed matches, both of which are in the lists of the interests that elite football clubs have wanted to secure. The battle for control over the European football has resulted in the emergence of a lesser-evil for the future of European football, elite football clubs have aim to establish an order where they can fully exploit the interests of the fans, and can totally break-off from the existing European football pyramid in which they are the de-facto hegemon, hence even if there seems to be a retreat by the elite football clubs, they still operate in an hegemonic order created by them and favored them the most.

Football has been organized in a hierarchical pyramid order where each governing body have different obligations and responsibilities, and power and authority determined by the geographical space in which they operate. FIFA is reside at the top of the pyramid, followed by regional associations such as UEFA, then national associations, football clubs, and players. The struggle for hegemony, and the construction of a hegemonic order driven by the cynical greed, hyper-commodification, and the constant pursuit of glory amongst the stakeholders in the European football architecture have been design, set in motion, accelerated by the decisions and regulations taken by the European Union. Even though EU does not get involved in the hegemonic struggle between the UEFA and the elite football clubs, but when an attempted rupture reoccurs to threaten the European football architecture which aims to re-shuffle the existing power dynamics, processes so that a new hegemonic order can be established EU weighed in to ensure the maintenance of the current hegemonic order that is crafted and developed by the EU itself. The EU's increasing willingness to operate in sport have materialized as a result of a combination of efforts that begin with the Amsterdam Treaty, and continue with the Helsinki Report on Sport, Nice Declaration, White Paper on Sport, and acquired a treaty based status and coherence with the Lisbon Treaty. EU's hegemonic projects in sport is an extension and application of the European hegemonic project constructed in spite of the complex and multi-faceted institutional framework in which various actors whom have diverse and conflictual interests on the transfer of power from domestic to supranational level, and the integration processes manage to formulate common principles and policies as a result of the contestation, negotiations, compromise. This

struggle has led to the emergence of a European hegemonic project sought a gradual increase and expansion in policy areas to facilitate competition, to ensure the freedom of movement, to construct a European identity, and to empower the supranational institutions. Football not only provides a constant exposure and becomes a routine for the people which EU have tried to utilize in the construction of a European identity, but also is a domain where the principles of common market and free and fair competition must be applied in accordance with the EU regulations. The institutional venues of the EU such as ECJ and European Commission have taken steps to facilitate the freedom of movement in the transfer market, and to ensure a competitive environment for the broadcasting.

REFERENCES:

- Andrews, D. & Silk, M. (2012). *Sport and Neoliberalism: Politics, Consumption, and Culture*. Temple University Press.
- Amara, M. (2005). "2006 Qatar Asian Games: A Modernization Project from Above?" *Sport in Society, Culture, Commerce, Media, Politics*, 8(3), pp.493-514.
- Armstrong, G. & Giulianotti, R. (2001). *Fear and Loathing in World Football (Global Sport Cultures)*. Oxford: Berg.
- Armstrong, G. (2004). "The Lords of Misrule: football and the rights of the child in Liberia, West Africa", *Sport in Society*, 7(3), pp.473-502.
- Arnaut, L., J. (2006). *Independent European Sports Review*.
- Appadurai, A. (2015). "Playing with Modernity: The decolonization of Indian Cricket", *Altre Modernita*, 14, pp.1-24.
- Balcells, A. (1996). *Catalan nationalism: Past and present*, trans. J.Hall. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Bale, J. (2001). *Sport, space and the city*. Caldwell, NJ. Blackburn Press.
- Bar-On, T. & Escobedo, L. (2019). "FIFA seen from a postcolonial perspective", *Soccer & Society*, 20(1), pp.39-60.
- Baddies, D. (2021). "The ESL would destroy football as we know it- it's almost as if they don't care", <https://www.theguardian.com/football/2021/apr/19/the-esl-would-destroy-football-as-we-know-it-its-almost-as-if-they-dont-care> accessed 21 June 2022.
- Barlett, C.A. & S. Ghoshal. (1989). *Managing Across Borders: The Transnational Solution*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
- Bauers, B.S., Lammert, B., Faix, A. & Hovemann, G.(2020). "Club members in German Professional football and their attitude towards the 50+1 Rule- A stakeholder-oriented analysis", *Soccer & Society*, 21(3), pp.274-288.
- BBC, "Manchester City: Timeline of a transformation since 2008 Sheikh Mansour takeover", <https://www.bbc.com/sport/football/45372362?rand=23189> accessed 21 June 2022.

- Ben-Porat, A. (2009). "Six decades of sport, from a game to commodity: football as a parable", *Sport in Society*, 12(8), pp.999-1012.
- Benoit, M. (2008). "The politicization of football: the European game and the approach to the Second World War", *Soccer & Society*, 9:4, pp.532-550.
- Beutler, I. (2008). "Sport serving development and peace: Achieving the goals of the United Nations through sport", *Sport in Society*, 11(4), pp. 359-369.
- Biancalana, E. (2015). "Volkswagen's Heavy Investment in the Soccer World", <http://www.soccer365.com/volkswagens-heavy-investment-in-the-soccer-world/> accessed 21 June 2022.
- Bieler, A. & Morton, D. A. (2004). "A critical theory route to hegemony, World order and historical change: neo-Gramscian perspectives in International Relations", *Class & Capital*, pp.85-113.
- Birkhauser, S., Kaserer, C., Urban, D. (2019). "Did UEFA's financial fair play harm competition in European football leagues?", *Review of Managerial Science*, 13(1), pp. 113-145.
- Black, D. (2008). "Dreaming big: The pursuit of second order games as a strategic response to globalization", *Sport in Society*, 11(4), pp.467-480.
- Blainpain, R. and Inston, R. (1996). *The Bosman Case: The End of the Transfer System?* Leuven: Peeters.
- Borba, L. (2020). "How Red Bull is Building a Profitable Football Empire", <https://medium.com/illumination/how-red-bull-is-building-a-profitable-football-empire-1b59fe4f71fb> accessed 21 June 2022.
- Brannagan, P. & Giulianotti, R. (2015). "Soft power and soft disempowerment: Qatar, global sport and football's 2022 World Cup finals", *Leisure Studies*, 34(6), pp. 703-719.
- Brannagan, P. & Rookwood, J. (2016). "Sports mega-events, soft power and soft disempowerment: international supporters' perspectives on Qatar's acquisition of the 2022 FIFA World Cup finals", *International Journal of Sport Policy*, 8(2), pp.173-188.
- Broudehoux, A.M. (2015). "Mega-events, Urban Image Construction, and the Politics of Exclusion" in *Mega-events and Globalization: Capital and Spectacle in a Changing World Order*. Edited by R. Gruneau and J. Horne. London: Routledge.
- Bulmer, S. & Joseph, J. (2016). "European integration in crisis? Of supranational integration, hegemonic projects and domestic politics", *European Journal of International Relations*, 22(4), pp.725-748.
- Burlamaqui, L. (2019). "The "invention" of FIFA history: Joao Havelange's election to FIFA presidency as a historic event", *Soccer & Society*, 20(7-8), pp. 1056-1070.

Bysouth, A. (2020). "RB Leipzig: How did Red Bull build a Champions League side from scratch?", <https://www.bbc.com/sport/football/51475532> accessed 21 June 2022.

Carr, J., Millar, S., Parnell, D., Power, M. and Widdop, P. (2020). "Football and politics: the politics of football", *Managing Sport and Leisure*, 25, 1-2, pp.1-5.

Chalip, L. (2005). "Towards social leverage of sport events". *Journal of Sport and Tourism*, 11, pp. 109-127.

Cini, M. and McGowan, L. (1998). *Competition Policy in the European Union*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Coalter, F. (2010). "The politics of sport for development: Limited focus programmes and broad gauge problems?" *International Review for the Sociology of Sport*, 45(3), pp. 295-314.

Cohen, P. (2013). *On the Wrong Side of the Track? East London and the Post Olympics*. London: Lawrence & Wishart.

CNN, "Kroenke closes on Arsenal takeover", <https://edition.cnn.com/2009/SPORT/football/11/03/arsenal.koenke.takeover.clichy/> accessed 21 June 2022.

Conversi, D. (1997). *The Basques, the Catalans and Spain: Alternative routes to nationalist mobilisation*. Reno, NV: University of Nevada Press.

Cornelissen, S. (2010). "The geopolitics of global aspiration: Sport mega-events and emerging powers", *International Journal of the History of Sport*, 27(16-18), pp.3008-3025.

Cox, R.W. (1981). "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 10(2):126-155.

Cox, R., Hills, L., Kennedy, E. (2015). "Myths of nation in the Champions League", *Soccer & Society*, 16(5-6), pp. 674-692.

Craig, P. and De Burca, G. (2003). *EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials*. 3rd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cremer, A. (2017). "VW's football sponsorship in limbo as Wolfsburg face relegation", https://sg.news.yahoo.com/vws-football-sponsorship-limbo-wolfsburg-face-relegation-122104731--sector.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAE8SKQW7nu7G5Ax91X9Wcseb6WFe4S0IDdNTZ4OSa-X_P4VNM2jS94zWqYR8FZEshwfv5q8fvvasrUC7fe526hmaEcrftmq_eoEuX4OLGQKvj9TweisDuN4QsG1mj5KoFfqG97K1nfcfMtQ9OfuscEqMahr1D9l-kMPbbly1Uc5v accessed 21 June 2022.

- Dalton, R.J. (2018). *Political Realignment: Economics, Culture and Electoral Change*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Darby, P. (2011). "Out of Africa: The exodus of elite African football talent to Europe". In: Maguire, J. A. & Faloutsos, M. (eds). *Sport and Migration: Borders, Boundaries and Crossings*. London: Routledge.
- Darnell, C.S. (2010). "Power, politics and "Sport for Development and Peace": Investigating the Utility of Sport for International Development". *Sociology of Sport Journal*, 27. Pp.54-75.
- Darnell, C.S. (2010a). "Sport, race, and bio-politics: Encounters with difference in 'Sport for Development and Peace' internships", *Journal of Sport and Social Issues*, 34(4), pp. 396-417.
- Delanty, G.(1995). *Inventing Europe. Idea, Identity, Reality*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Deloitte, "Deloitte Football Money League 2021", <https://www2.deloitte.com/bg/en/pages/finance/articles/football-money-league-2021.html> accessed 21 June 2022.
- Desbordes, M. (2007). *Marketing and Football: An International Perspective*. Taylor & Francis.
- Ding, S. (2012). "Is Human Rights the Achilles' heel of Chinese Soft Power? A new Perspective on Its Appeal". *Asian Perspective*, 36, pp.641-665.
- Dimitropoulos, P. & Scarfarto, V. (2021). "The impact of UEFA financial fair play on player expenditures, sporting success and financial performance: evidence from the Italian top league", *European Sport Management Quarterly*, 21(1), pp.20-38.
- Dong, Q. & Duysters, G.(2015). "Research on the Co-Branding and Match-Up of Mega-Sports Event and Host City". *The International Journal of History of Sports*, 32(8), pp.1098-1108.
- Dubal, S. (2010). "The neo-liberalization of football: Rethinking neoliberalism through the commercialization of the beautiful game", *International Review for the Sociology of Sport*, 45(2), pp.123-146.
- Ducrey, P. Et al. (2003). *UEFA and Football Governance: A New Model*. Unpublished MA Dissertation, Centre International D'Etude du Sport, Switzerland.
- Duggal, S. (2021). "Statement: UEFA and top leagues set to ban clubs that will join European Super League", <https://www.goal.com/en/news/henderson-to-lead-pl-captains-response-to-super-league/bek9q82moopy149yz48c2gtza> accessed 21 June 2022.
- Duke, V., Crolley, L. (1996). *Football, nationality and the state*. London: Longman.
- Duval, A. & Rompuy, V.B.(2016). *The Legacy of Bosman*. The Hague: Asser.

- Dogliani, P. (2000). "Sport and Fascism", *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*,5:3, pp.326-348.
- Dorsey, J. (2015). "How Qatar is its own worst enemy", *International Journal of the History of Sport*, 32(3), pp.422-439.
- European Club Association, "About ECA", <https://www.ecaeurope.com/about-eca/> accessed 21 June 2022.
- European Club Association, "ECA Representation at UEFA", <https://www.ecaeurope.com/about-eca/eca-representation/eca-representation-at-uefa/> accessed 21 June 2022.
- European Club Association, "EU Matters",<https://www.ecaeurope.com/about-eca/main-achievements/eu-matters/> accessed 21 June 2022.
- European Club Association, "Financial Fair Play", <https://www.ecaeurope.com/about-eca/main-achievements/financial-fair-play/> accessed 21 June 2022.
- European Club Association, "Governance", <https://www.ecaeurope.com/about-eca/main-achievements/governance/> accessed 21 June 2022.
- European Club Association, "Main Achievements", <https://www.ecaeurope.com/about-eca/main-achievements/> accessed 21 June 2022.
- Edelman, R. (1993). *Serious Fun: A History of Spectator Sports in the USSR*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Eick, V.(2010). "A neoliberal sports event? FIFA from the *Estadio Nacional* to the fan mile", *City*,14:3, pp.278-294.
- Elliot, R. (2016). "Football's Irish exodus: Examining the factors influencing Irish player migration to English Professional leagues". *International Review for the Sociology of Sport*, 51: pp.147-161.
- European Commission (1998). *The European Model of Sport: Consultation Document of DG X*. Brussels: European Commission.
- European Commission (1999). *Principles and Guidelines for the Community's Audiovisual Policy in the Digital Age*. COM (99) 657 final, 14 December 1999.
- European Commission (2001). *Commission Opens Proceedings against UEFA's Selling of TV Rights to UEFA Champions League*, European Commission Press Release. 20 July 2001 <http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/01/1043&format> accessed 20 June 2022.
- European Commission (2001a). *The UEFA Champions League- Background Note*, European Commission memorandum. MEMO/01/271, 20 July 2001.

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_01_271 accessed 20 June 2022.

European Commission (2003). Decision Relating to a Proceeding Pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article of 53 of the EEA Agreement (Comp/C. 2-37. 398 Joint Selling of the Commercial Rights of the UEFA Champions League). 2003/778/EC, 23 July 2003.

European Commission (2003a). Commission Clears UEFA's New Policy Regarding the Sale of the Media Rights to the Champions League, European Commission Press Release, 24 July 2003.

European Commission (2007). The EU and Sport: Background and Context, Accompanying document tot the White Paper on Sport. SEC (2007) 935, 11 July 2007.

European Parliament, "The Treaty of Nice and the Convention on the Future of Europe", <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/4/the-treaty-of-nice-and-the-convention-on-the-future-of-europe> accessed 20 June 2022.

European Union, "History of the EU", https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/history-eu_en accessed 20 June 2022.

Evans, T. & Lefever, K.(2011). "Watching the Football Game: Broadcasting Rights for the European Digital Television Market", *Journal of Sport and Social Issues*, pp.33-49.

Football Supporters Europe, "FSE CONDEMNS EUROPEAN SUPER LEAGUE PLANS", <https://www.fanseurope.org/news/fse-condemns-european-super-league-plans/> accessed 21 June 2022.

Football Supporters Europe, "Our Game. Our Voice", <https://www.fanseurope.org/about-fse-2/> accessed 21 June 2022.

FIFA, "Congress", <https://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/congress> accessed 21 June 2022.

FIFA, "FIFA Council", <https://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/organisation/fifa-council> accessed 21 June 2022.

FIFA, "Committees", <https://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/organisation/committees> accessed 21 June 2022.

FIFA (2007) *FIFA Statutes*, Edition 2007.

FIFA. (2010). 2022 FIFA World Cup Bid evaluation report: Qatar. Zurich: Fédération. Internationale de Football Association.General Secretariat for Development and Planning. (2008). Qatar national vision 2030.

France, S. (2021). "Who owns Manchester United & who are the Glazer family?", <https://www.goal.com/en-us/news/who-owns-manchester-united-who-are-the-glazer-family/18j8f1yu1tliv1hrp93zefh7n> accessed 20 June 2022.

Foot, J. (2007). *Calcio: A History of Italian Football*. Harper Collins Publishing. London: UK.

Franck, E. (2010). "Private Firm, Public Corporation or Member's Association Governance Structures in European Football", *International Journal of Sport Finance*, 5(2), pp. 108-127.

Franck, E. (2014). "Financial Fair Play in European Club Football- What is it all about?" UZH Business Working Paper Series. University of Zurich.

Franck, E. (2018). "European club football after 'five treatments' with financial fair play- time for an assessment", *International Journal of Financial Studies*, 6(4), pp.1-19.

Garcia, B., (2007). "From regulation to governance and representation: agenda-setting and the EU's involvement in sport", *Entertainment and Sports Law Journal* 5(1), pp.1-15.

Garcia, B. (2008). *The European Union and the Governance of Football: A Game of Levels and Agendas*. Doctoral Thesis. Loughborough University.

Garcia, B. (2009). "Sport governance after the White Paper: the demise of the European model?" *International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics*, 1(3), pp.267-284.

Garcia, B., & Weatherill, S. (2012). "Engaging with the EU in order to minimize its impact: sport and the negotiation of the Treaty of Lisbon", *Journal of European Public Policy*, 19(2), pp.238-256.

Garcia, B. & Meier, H. (2017). "Global Sport Power Europe? The Efficacy of the European Union in Global Sport Regulation", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 55(4), pp.850-870.

Gardiner, S. Et al.(2001). *Sports Law*. 2nd edition. London: Cavendish Publishing.

Gasser, P. and Levinsen, A. (2004). "Breaking post-war ice: Open Fun Football Schools in Bosnia and Herzegovina", *Sport in Society*, 7(3), pp.457-472.

Gil-Nam, H. & Mangan, A.J. (2002). "Ideology, Politics, Power: Korean Sport-Transformation, 1945-92", *The International Journal of History of Sport*, 19:2-3, pp.213-242.

Giulianotti, R. (1999). *Football: A Sociology of the Global Game*. Polity Press.

Giulianotti, R. (2002). "Supporters, followers, fans, and flaneurs: A Taxonomy of Spectator Identities in Football", *Journal of Sport & Social Issues*, 26(1), pp. 25-46.

- Giulianotti, R. (2004). "Human Rights, Globalization and Sentimental Education: The Case of Sport", *Sport in Society*, 7(3), pp. 355-369.
- Giulianotti, R. & Robertson, R. (2004). "The globalization of football: A study in the globalization of the serious life", *British Journal of Sociology*, 55(4), pp. 545-568.
- Giulianotti, R. and Robertson, R. (2009). *Globalization and Football*. London: Sage Publications.
- Giulianotti, R. (2011). "Sport, peacemaking and conflict resolution: A contextual analysis and modelling of the sport, development and peace sector", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 34(2), pp.207-228.
- Giulianotti, R. (2012). "Mapping the global football field: A sociological model of transnational forces within the world game", *British Journal of Sociology*, 63(2), pp.216-240.
- Giulianotti, R. (2015). *Sport. A Critical Sociology*. Polity Press.
- Giulianotti, R. (2019). "Football events, memories and globalization", *Soccer & Society*, 20(7-8), pp.903-911.
- Goldblatt, D. (2006). *The Ball is Round: A Global History of Football*, London: Viking.
- Gramsci, A. (1971). *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, ed. And trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Novell-Smith. London: Lawrance and Wishart.
- Grix, J. & Lee, D. (2013). "Soft power, sports mega-events and emerging states: The Lure of the politics of attraction", *Global Society*, 27(4), pp.521-536.
- Grix, J. , Brannagan, P., Houlihan, B. (2015). "Interrogating States' Soft Power Strategies: A Case Study of Sports Mega-Events in Brazil and the UK", *Global Society*, 29(3), pp.463-479.
- Grix, J. & Brannagan, P. (2016). "Of Mechanisms and Myths: Conceptualizing States' Soft Power Strategies through Sports Mega-Events", *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 27(2), pp.251-272.
- Grix, J. & Kramareva, N. (2017). "The Sochi Winter Olympics and Russia's unique soft power strategy", *Sport in Society*, 20(4), pp.461-475.
- Grix, J., Jeong, J., Kim, H. (2021). "Understanding South Korea's use of sports mega-events for domestic, regional and international soft power", *Societies*, 11(4), pp.1-17.
- Goig, R. (2008). "Identity, nation-state and football in Spain. The evolution of nationalist feelings in Spanish football", *Soccer & Society*, 9(1), pp.56-63.
- Guest, L. and Law, P. (1997). "The Revolution will be televised", *World Soccer*, January, pp. 14-17.

- Hare, G. (1999). "Towards the demassification of French Television in the 21st Century", *Modern and Contemporary France*, 7(3), pp. 307-317.
- Hartmann, D. & Kwauk C. (2011). "Sport and Development: An Overview, Critique, and Reconstruction", *Journal of Sport and Social Issues*, 35:3, pp.284-305
- Henderson, R.W. (2001). *Ball, Bat and Bishop: The origin of Ball Games*, Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press.
- Hindley, D. (2002). "An examination of the utility of the concept of governance in relation to the sports of swimming, football and cricket", (unpublished thesis), Institute of Sport and Leisure Policy, Loughborough University.
- Holt, M. (2007). "The Ownership and Control of Elite Club Competition in European Football", *Soccer & Society*, 8(1), pp.50-67.
- Holt, M. (2009). "UEFA, Governance, and the Control of Club Competition in European Football", *Birkbeck Sport Business Centre*, 2(1), pp.1-197.
- Hooghe L and Marks G (2004) *Contrasting Visions of Multi-level Governance*. In Bache I and Flinders M (eds) *Multi-level Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hooghe, L. & Marks, G. (2018). "Clevage theory and Europe's crises: Lipset, Rokkan and the transnational cleavage", *Journal of European Public Policy*, 25(1). Pp.109-135.
- Hooghe, L. & Marks, G. (2019). "Grand theories of European integration in the twenty-first century", *Journal of European Public Policy*, 26(8), pp.1113-1133.
- Horne, J.(2006). *Sport in consumer culture*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Horne, J. & Manzenreiter, W. (2006). "An introduction to the sociology of sports mega-events", *The Sociological Review*, 54(s2): pp.1-24.
- Horne, J. (2007). "The four knowns of sports mega-events", *Leisure Studies*, 26(1), pp. 81-96.
- Horne, J. And Whannel, G.(2010)." The caged torch procession: celebrities, protesters and the 2008 Olympic torch rally in London, Paris and San Francisco." *Sport in Society* 13(5), pp.760-770.
- Horne, J. (2017). "Sports mega-events- three sites of contemporary political contestation", *Sport in Society*, 20(3), pp. 328-340.
- Ifversen, J. (1997). "The Meaning of European Civilization: A Historical-Conceptual Approach". Working Paper No. 51-97, Centre for Cultural Research, University of Aarhus.

International Centre for Sports Studies, “Net transfer spending over last 10 seasons”, <https://football-observatory.com/IMG/sites/b5wp/2021/wp367/en/> accessed 21 June 2022

Jackson, S. (2013). “The contested terrain of sport diplomacy in a globalizing world”, *International Area Studies Review*, 16(3), pp.274-284.

Jackson, S.J. & Scherer, J. (2013). “Rugby World Cup 2011: Sport mega-events and the contested terrain of space, bodies and commodities”, *Sport in Society*, 16(7), pp.37-53.

James, T. and Sturgess, B. (1997). “What price European football?” *Soccer Analyst*, 10, pp.2-14.

Jennings, A. (2006). *Foulé- The Secret World of FIFA: bribes, Vote rigging and Ticket Scandals*. London, UK: HarperCollins.

Jeong, J. (2021). *How Nations Use Sport Mega-Events to Leverage Soft Power: A New Rise in East Asia*. PHD Thesis, Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester, UK.

Jessop, B. (2004). “Multi-level governance and multi-level metagovernance”. In: Bache, I. and Flinders, M. (eds). *Multi-Level Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 49-74.

Bache, I. And Flinders, M. (2004). *Multi-Level Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jones, N. (2021). “Henderson to lead Premier League captains’ response to Super League” <https://www.goal.com/en/news/henderson-to-lead-pl-captains-response-to-super-league/bek9q82moopy149yz48c2gtza> accessed 20 June 2022.

Junghagen, S. & Aurvandil, M. (2020). “Structural Susceptibility to Corruption in FIFA: A Social Network Analysis”, *International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics*, 12(4), pp.655-677.

Kamrava, M. (2009). “Mediation and Qatari foreign policy”. *The Middle East Journal*, 65, pp.539-555.

Kang, Y. & Houlihan, B. (2021). “Sport as a diplomatic resource: the case of South Korea”, *International Journal of Sport Policy*, 13:1, pp.45-63.

Kanji, L. (2016). “Illustrations and Influence: Soft Diplomacy and Nation Branding through Popular Culture”. *Harvard International Review*, 37(2), pp.40-45.

Kassimeris, C. (2011). “Fascism, separatism and the ultras: discrimination in Italian football”, *Soccer & Society*, 12(5), pp.677-688.

Kassimeris, C. (2012). “Franco, the popular game and ethnocentric conduct in modern Spanish football”, *Soccer & Society*, 13(4), pp.555-569.

- Keohane, R. And Nye, J. (1998). "Power and interdependence in the information age". *Foreign Affairs*, 77(5), pp.81-95.
- Kentrotis, K. (2018). "European governance: 'Football or Champions League?'" , *Soccer & Society*, 19(4), pp. 483-497.
- Kidd, B. (2008). "A new social movement: Sport for development and peace", *Sport in Society*, 11(4), pp.370-380.
- Kim, J. (2007). "Why Does Hallyu Matter? The Significance of the Korean Wave in South Korea". *Critical Studies in Television: The International Journal of Television Studies*, 2(2), pp.47-59.
- King, A. (1997). "New directors, customers and fans: The transformation of English football in the 1990s", *Sociology of Sport Journal*, 14(3), pp.224-240.
- King, A. (2003). *The European Ritual: Football in the New Europe*. Ashgate Publishing.
- King, A. (2004). "The new symbols of European football", *International Review for the Sociology of Sport*, 39(3), pp. 323-336.
- Kuhn, G. (2011). *Soccer vs the state: tackling football and radical politics*. Oakland: PM Press.
- Kuhn, T. (2019). "Grand theories of European integration revisited: does identity politics shape the course of European integration?", *Journal of European Public Policy*, 26(8), pp.1213-1230.
- Kruskic, H. (2019). "UEFA Champions League Explained: How the Tournament Works", <https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2819840-uefa-champions-league-explained-how-the-tournament-works> accessed 21 June 2022.
- Lanfranchi, P. (2001). *Moving with the Ball, the Migration of Professional Footballers*. Oxford: Berg.
- Lang, M., Grossmann, M. & Theiler, P. (2011). "The sugar daddy's game: how wealthy investors change competition in professional team sports", *International Associations of Sports Economists*, 11(7), pp.1-23.
- Littlewood, M. Et al. (2011). *Football labour migration: "An examination of the player recruitment strategies of the "big five" European football leagues 2004-5 to 2008-9"*. *Soccer & Society*, 12: pp.788-808.
- Llobera, J. R. (1989). "Catalan national identity: The dialectics of past and present. In E. Tonkin, M. McDonald & M. Champman. (Eds), *History and ethnicity*, pp.247-261, New York: Routledge.
- MacClancy, J. (1996). *Sport, identity and ethnicity*. Oxford: Berg.

- MacGovern, P. (2002). "Globalization or internationalization? Foreign footballers in the English League, 1946-1995". *Sociology*, pp.23-42.
- Madden, P. (2015). "Welfare economics of financial fair play in a sports league with benefactor owners", *Journal of Sports Economics*, 16(2), pp. 159-184.
- Maguire, J.A. and Stead, D. (1998). "Border crossings: Soccer labour migration and the European Union". *International Review for the Sociology of Sport*. 33, pp.59-73.
- Mangan, J.A. (2011). "The new Asia: Global transformation, regional ascendancy, and meta-phorical modernity." *The International Journal of the History of Sport*, pp.2229-2239.
- Marks, G., Hooghe, L. And Blank, K. (1996). "European integration from the 1980s: State centric v. Multi-level governance. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 34(3). Pp.341-378.
- Marks, G. (2012)." Europe and its empires: from Rome to the European Union", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 50(1), pp.1-20.
- Martin, S. (2004). *Football and Fascism: The National Game under Mussolini*. Oxford Press.
- Manzenreiter, W. & Spitaler, G. (2012). *Governance, Citizenship and the New European Football Championships*. Routledge: London.
- Mayer, C. F. & Palmowski, J. (2004). "European Identities and the EU- The Ties that Bind the Peoples of Europe". *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 42(3), pp.573-98.
- McLaughin, A. (2001). Korea/Japan or Japan/Korea? The Saga of Co-Hosting 2002 Soccer World Cup. *Journal of Historical Sociology*, 14, pp.481-507.
- Merkel, U. (2012). "Football fans and clubs in Germany: Conflicts, crises and compromises", *Soccer & Society*, 13(3), pp.359-376.
- Millward, P. (2013). "New football directors in the twenty-first century: profit and revenue in the English Premier League's transnational age", *Leisure Studies*, 32(4), pp.399-414.
- Mitra, A. (2015). "An Ethical Analysis of the 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil". *Law&Bus Review*.21 (3) pp. 1-21.
- Mittag, J. & Legrand, B. (2010). "Towards a European of football? Historical phases in the evolution of the UEFA European Football Championship", *Soccer & Society*, 11(6), pp. 709-722.
- Moenig, U., and Kim, Y.I. (2021). "The Early Globalization Process of Taekwondo, from the 1950s to 1971. *International Journal of Sport*, 37, pp.1-20.

Molnar, G. (2011). "From the Soviet bloc to the European community: Migrating Professional footballers in and out of Hungary". In: Maguire, J.A. and Falcous M.(eds). *Sport and Migration: Borders, Boundaries and Crossings*. London: Routledge.

Moravcsik, A. (1998). *The Choice for Europe*, Ithaca: Cornell.

Morrow, S. (1999). *The New Business of Football*. London: Macmillan.

Morton, D. A. (2003). "Social Forces in the Struggle over Hegemony: Neo-Gramscian Perspectives in International Political Economy", *Rethinking Marxism*, 15:2, pp.153-179.

Murray, B. (1994). *Football, a History of the World Game*. Aldershot: Scholar Press.

Murray, S. & Pigman, G. (2014). "Mapping the relationship between international sport and diplomacy", *Sport in Society*, 17(9), pp.1098-1118.

Müller, M. (2015). "What makes an event a mega-event? Definitions and sizes", *Leisure Studies*, 34(6), pp. 627-642.

Nauright, J. & Ramfjord, J.(2010)." Who owns England's game? American Professional sporting influences and foreign ownership in the Premier League", *Soccer & Society*, 11(4), pp.428-441.

Niemann, A., Borja, G. And Wyn, G. (2011). *Transformation of European Football*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Niemann, A. & Brand, A. (2020). "The UEFA Champions League: a political myth?", *Soccer & Society*, 21(3), pp.329-343.

Neville, G. (2021). "Gary Neville on European Super League plans: 'I am fuming but it won't go through, not a chance'."., <https://www.skysports.com/football/news/11661/12279996/gary-neville-on-european-super-league-plans-im-fuming-but-it-wont-go-through-not-a-chance> accessed 21 June 2022.

Nye, J. (2002)."The information revolution and American soft power". *Asia-Pacific Review*, 9(1), pp.60-76.

Nye, J. (2004)." Soft power and American foreign policy". *Political Science Quarterly*, 119(2), pp.255-270.

Nye, J. (2004). *Soft power: The means to success in World politics*. New York, NY: Public Affairs.

Nygaard, H.M., & Gates, S. (2013). "Soft power at home and abroad: sport diplomacy, politics and peace-building", *International Area Studies Review*, 16:3, pp.235-243.

Ramesh, S. (2021). "Neo-Gramscian interpretations on ideas, institutions, and hegemony", *Berlin Journal of Critical Theory*, 5:2, pp. 99-139.

Reiche, D. (2015). "Investing in sporting success as a domestic and foreign policy tool: the case of Qatar", *International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics*, 7(4), pp. 489-504.

Reuters, "France's Macron opposes breakaway European Super League", <https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/frances-macron-opposes-breakaway-european-super-league-2021-04-18/> accessed 21 June 2022.

Rigauer, B. (1978). *Sport and Work*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Rigwell, H. (2021). "European Super League Plans Set Off Battle for Future of Football", <https://www.voanews.com/a/arts-culture-european-super-league-plans-set-battle-future-football/6204834.html> accessed 21 June 2022.

Risse, T. (2011). *A Community of Europeans?: Transnational Identities and Public Spheres*. Cornell University Press. Project Muse.

Roberts, K. (2004). *The Leisure Industries* London: Palgrave.

Roche, M. (2000). *Mega-events and modernity* London: Routledge.

Rohde, M. & Breuer, C. (2016). "Europe's elite football: Financial growth, sporting success, transfer investment, and private majority investors", *International Journal of Financial Studies*, 4(2), pp. 1-20.

Rohde, M. & Breuer, C. (2017). "The market for football club investors: a review of theory and empirical evidence from professional European football", *European Sport Management Quarterly*, 17(3), pp.265-289.

Rose, A.K. and Spiegel, M.M. (2011). "The Olympic effect", *The Economic Journal*, 121, pp.652-677.

Parnell, D., Bond, J.A, Widdop, P. & Cockayne, D.(2021)." Football Worlds: business and networks during Covid-19", *Soccer & Society*, 22(1-2), pp.19-26.

Parnell, D., Bond, A., Widdop, P. & Wilson, R.(2022)." Covid-19, networks and sport", *Managing Sport and Leisure*, 27(1-2), pp.72-78.

Parrish, R. (2001). *Sports regulation in the European Union: a new approach?* *Managing Leisure*, 6:4, pp. 187-200.

Parrish, R. (2003). "The politics of sports regulation in the European Union", *Journal of European Public Policy*, 10(2), pp.246-262.

Parrish, R. (2003). *Sports Law and Policy in the European Union*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Pattison, P. (2013). *Revealed: Qatar's World Cup Slaves*. The Guardian. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/25/revealed-qatars-world-cup-slaves> accessed 20 June 2022.

Peeters, T., Szymanski S., Fumagalli, C. et al.(2014). “Financial fair play in European football”, *Economy Policy*, 29(78). Pp. 345-390.

Plumley, D. & Flint, S. (2015). “The UEFA Champions League: Maintaining the status quo?”, *Team Performance Management*, 21(5-6), pp.247-258.

Plumley, D., Ramchandani, G., Wilson, R. (2019). “The unintended consequence of Financial Fair Play: An examination of competitive balance across five European football leagues”, *Sport, Business and Management: An International Journal*, 9(2), pp.118-133.

Pouliopoulos, T. & Georgiadis, K.(2021).”FIFA and UEFA, a critical review of the two organizations through the lens of institutional theory and MacIntyre’s philosophical schema”, *Soccer & Society*, 22(7), pp.778-790.

Poli, R. (2010). “Understanding globalization through football: The new international division of labor, migratory channels and transnational trade circuits”, *International Review for the Sociology of Sport*, 45(4), pp.491-506.

Preuss, H. (2007).” The conceptualization and measurement of mega sport event legacies”. *Journal of Sport and Tourism*, 12, pp.207-227.

Preuss, H. (2015). “A framework for identifying the legacies of a mega sport event”, *Leisure Studies*, 34(6), pp.643-664.

Pyta, W. & Nils Havemann(2015). *Football Research in Enlarged Europe: European Football and Collective Memory*. Palgrave Macmillan: UK.

Quiroga, A. (2015). “Spanish Fury: Football and National Identities under Franco”. *European History Quarterly*, 45(3), pp.506-529.

Quiroga, A. (2020). “Football and nation. F.C. Barcelona and Athletic de Bilbao during the Franco dictatorship (1937-1977).”, *Journal of Iberian and Latin American Studies*, 26:1, pp.65-82.

Richardson, J. & Powell, D. (2021). “FSG ‘reject £3 bn takeover bid’ for Liverpool”, <https://www.liverpoolecho.co.uk/sport/football/football-news/fsg-liverpool-takeover-3bn-breaking-20458914> accessed 21 June 2022.

Risse, T. (2003). “The Euro between national and European identity”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 10(4), pp.487-505.

Roderick M.(2006). *The Politics of Agenda Setting: The Car and the Shaping of Public Policy*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Rose, A.K. and Spiegel, M.M.(2011).” The Olympic effect”, *The Economic Journal*, 121, pp.652-677.

Rowe, D. (1996). “The global love-match: Sport and television”, *Media, Culture and Society*, 18(4), pp. 565-582.

- Ryan, E. (2016). "The Connectivity of Culture: Innovating in Cultural Diplomacy". *Harvard International Review*, 37(2), pp.28-34.
- Sajedi, A. (2009). "Geopolitics of the Persian Gulf security: Iran and the United States", *Islamabad Policy Research Institute Journal*, 9, pp.77-89.
- Sampson, S. (2002). "Weak states, uncivil societies and thousands of NGOs: Western democracy export as benevolent colonialism in the Balkans." In S. Recic(ed.), *Cultural boundaries of the Balkans*, pp.27-44. Lund, Sweden: Lund University Press.
- Sbetti, N. & Serapiglia. (2020). "Was football fascist? The 1934 World Cup in the postwar memory", *Soccer & Society*, 21:8, pp.889-903.
- Schrijver, F. (2006). *Regionalsim after Regionalisation: Spain, France and the United Kingdom*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Schubert, M, Könecke, T., Pitthan H. (2016). "The guardians of European football: UEFA Financial Fair Play and the career of social problems", *European Journal for Sport and Society*, 13(4), pp.296-324.
- Sekulic, D, Massey, G., and Hodson, G. (2006)." Ethnic intolerance and ethnic conflict in the dissolution of Yugoslavia", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 29(5), pp.797-827.
- Serra, E. (1989). *The Relaunching of Europe and the Treaties of Rome*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Shim, D. (2006). "Hybridity and the rise of Korean popular culture in Asia". *Media, Culture, and Society*, 28(1), pp.25-44.
- Shobe, H. (2008)." Place, identity and football: Catalonia, Catalanisme and Football Club Barcelona, 1899-1975", *National Identities*, 10(3), pp.329-343.
- Sklair, L. (2001). *The Transnational Capitalist Class*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sklair, L. (2002). "The Transnational Capitalist Class and Global Politics: Deconstructing the Corporate-State Connection", *International Political Science Review*, 23(2), pp.159-174.
- Sky Sports, "Jurgen Klopp says opinion hasn't changed on European Super League after previous opposition", <https://www.skysports.com/football/news/11669/12280539/jurgen-klopp-says-opinion-hasnt-changed-on-european-super-league-after-previous-opposition> accessed 21 June 2022.
- Smith, P. (1997). *Millennial Dreams: Contemporary Culture and Capital in the North*, London: Verso.
- Smith, R. (2021). "The Super League is Gone. What now?", <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/23/sports/soccer/super-league-europe-soccer.html> accessed 21 June 2022.

Sonntag, A. (2011). "False Expectations. The counterproductive side effects of the EU's use of political symbols". In *Debating Political Identity and Legitimacy in the European Union*, ed. S. Lucarelli, F. Cerutti and V. A. Schmidt, pp.115-130. London: Routledge.

Spaaij, R. (2007). "Football hooliganism as a transnational phenomenon: Past and present analysis: A critique- More specificity and less generality", *Journal of History of Sport*, 24(4), pp.411-431.

Sugden, J. & Tomlinson, A. (1997). "Global power struggles in world football: FIFA and UEFA, 1954-74, and their legacy", *The International Journal of the History of Sport*, 14(2), pp.1-25.

Sudgen, J. & Tomlinson, A. (1998). *Fifa and the contest for World football: who rules the people's game?* Oxford: Polity.

Sugden, J. And Tomlinson, A. (2002). "Theory and method for a critical sociology of sport". In *Power games: A critical sociology of sport*. pp.3-21. New York: Routledge.

Tajfel, H. (1981). *Human Groups and Social Categories- Studies in Social Psychology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Taylor, I. (1995). "It's a whole new ball game: Sports television, the cultural industries and the condition of football in England." *Salford Papers in, Sociology*, 17, pp.1-31.

Thani, S. & Heenan, T. (2017). "The ball may be round but football is becoming increasingly Arabic: oil money and the rise of the new football order", *Soccer & Society*, 18(7), pp. 1012-1026.

The New York Times, "The Short, Unhappy Life of Europe's Super League", <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/24/sports/soccer/what-happened-to-super-league.html#click=https://t.co/XUrOwIOAvS> accessed 21 June 2022.

The New York Times, "The Super League Thought It had a Silent Partner: FIFA", <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/20/sports/soccer/super-league-fifa-infantino.html> accessed 21 June 2022.

The New York Times, "Soccer's New Rich Leave the Old Guard Looking Beleagured", <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/02/sports/soccer/soccer-transfer-market-lionel-messi.html?smid=tw-share> accessed 21 June 2022.

The New York Times, "Top European Soccer Teams Form Breakaway League", <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/18/sports/soccer/super-league-united-liverpool-juventus-madrid.html?smid=tw-share> accessed 21 June 2022.

The Super League, "Leading European Football Clubs Announcing New Super League Competition", <https://thesuperleague.com/press.html> accessed 21 June 2022.

Tomlinson, A. (2014). "The supreme leader sails on: leadership ethics and governance in FIFA", *Soccer & Society*, 17(9), pp.1155-1169.

Tunon, J. & Brey, E. (2012). "Sports and Politics in Spain" Football and Nationalist Attitudes within the Basque Country and Catalonia", *European Journal for Sport and Society*, 9(1), pp.7-32.

UEFA (1990). Report of the General Secretary for 1988 and 1989. Berne. UEFA.

UEFA (2003). Regulations Governing the Implementation of Article 48 of the UEFA Statutes (Broadcasting Regulations), Adopted by UEFA Executive Committee. 22 May 2003.

UEFA (2004). UEFA Statutes: Edition 2004. Nyon: UEFA.

UEFA (2004). CEO Annual Report 2003. UEFA. Nyon (Switzerland): UEFA.
<https://www.uefa.com/newsfiles/88494.pdf>

UEFA (2005), *UEFA Strategy: the direction and development of European football over the next decade*. UEFA, Nyon.

UEFA (2005). UEFA Vision Paper. Nyon: UEFA.

UEFA (2007) *UEFA Statutes: Edition June 2007*. Nyon (Switzerland): UEFA.

UEFA, "UEFA Champions League History",
<https://www.uefa.com/uefachampionsleague/history/> accessed 21 June 2022.

UEFA, "Protecting the Game, Financial Sustainability",
<https://www.uefa.com/insideuefa/protecting-the-game/financial-fair-play/> accessed 21 June 2022.

UEFA, "Platini plea for values",
<https://www.uefa.com/insideuefa/stakeholders/news/01c9-0f8eac9bba6d-94dbfeaa784c-1000--platini-plea-%20for-values/?referrer=%2Fuefa%2Faboutuefa%2Forganisation%2Fpresident%2Fnews%2Fnewsid%3D649269> accessed 21 June 2022.

UEFA, "Keeping competitive balance- Aleksander Ceferin",
<https://www.uefa.com/insideuefa/about-uefa/news/023d-0f8e574139c6-afb62841fa98-1000--keeping-competitive-balance-aleksander-ceferin/> accessed 21 June 2022.

UEFA, "How the club coefficients are calculated",
<https://www.uefa.com/nationalassociations/uefarankings/club/about/> accessed 21 June 2022.

Ungerer, H. (2002). "Media in Europe: Media and EU Competition", paper presented at Conference on Media in Poland by the Poland Confederation of Private Employers, Warsaw, 13 February.

Van der Burg, T. (2020). "EU competition law, football and national markets", *Managing Sport and Leisure*, pp. 1-15.

Velema, T. (2018). "A game of snakes and ladders: Player migratory trajectories in the global football labor market", *International Review for the Sociology of Sport*, 53(6), pp.706-725.

Velema, T., Wen, H., Zhou, Y. (2020). "Global value added chains and the recruitment activities of European professional football teams", *International Review for the Sociology of Sport*, 55(2), pp.127-146.

Velema, T. (2021). "Globalization and player recruitment: How teams from European top leagues broker migration flows of footballers in the global transfer network", *International Review for the Sociology of Sport*, 56(4), pp.493-513.

Walsh, A. & Giulianotti, R. (2001). "This sporting mammon: A normative critique of the commodification of sport", *Journal of the Philosophy of Sport*, 28(1), pp. 53-77.

Wilks, S. (2005). "Competition Policy: Challenging Reform", in H. Wallace, W. Wallace and M.A. Pollack (eds) *Policy-Making in the European Union*. 5th edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.113-140.

Worden, M. (2015). "Raising the Bar: Mega-sporting Events and Human Rights." Human Rights Watch World Report 2015.

Weber, K., Foley, M., McGillivray, D., Mcpherson, G. (2012). "Policy pragmatism: Qatar and the global events circuit", *International journal of Event and Festival Management*, 3(1), pp. 101-115.

Weber, R. (2021). "Banal Europeanism? Europeanisation of football and the enhabitation of a Europeanised football fandom", *Sport in Society*, 24(11), pp.1893-1909.

Welton, B. (2021). "Pep Guardiola: European Super League owners should explain decision", <https://www.skysports.com/football/news/11679/12281140/pep-guardiola-on-european-super-league-its-not-sport-when-success-is-guaranteed> accessed 21 June 2022.

Wilson, J. (2021). "ESL plotters overlooked paradox that 'global fans' like football as it is", <https://www.theguardian.com/football/blog/2021/apr/24/esl-plotters-overlooked-paradox-that-global-fans-like-football-as-it-is> accessed 21 June 2022

Whannel, G. (2002). *Media Sport Stars: Masculinities and Moralities*. London: Routledge.

Wheeler, M. (2004). "Supranational Regulation: Television and European Union", *European Journal of Communication*, 19(3), pp.346-369.

Xu, Y. (2021). "The formation mechanism of the player transfer network among football clubs", *Soccer & Society*, 22(7), pp. 704-715.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: TURKISH SUMMARY/TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Bu tez Avrupa hegemonik düzeninin inşasını ve bu hegemonik düzenin Avrupa piramidine nasıl uygulandığını incelemektedir. Avrupa hegemonik düzeninin nasıl bir süreç sonucunda oluştuğu ve neleri içerdiğini, bu hegemonik düzenin neden spora ve özellikle Avrupa futbol piramidine genişletilmesi gerektiğini açıklamayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu doğrultuda, sporun insanlar üzerindeki etkisi ve özellikle futbolun popülerliğinin nasıl ve ne derecede arttığının ortaya çıkarılması, bu popülerliğin çeşitli aktörler tarafından hangi değişik amaçlarla kullanıldığının belirlenmesi, futbolun, başka aktörler tarafından sadece bir araç olarak kullanılmasının dışında, futbol piramidi içerisindeki siyaseti, ekonomiyi, güç dengelerini ve piramit içerisindeki aktörlerin nihai hedefleri ve amaçları açıklanacaktır. Avrupa futbol piramidine hüküm süren ve metalaşma(*commodification*) ve bitmek bilmeyen açgözlülük temelinde oluşan hegemonik düzenin korunması ve daha aşırı uçlarda tekrar kurulumu için UEFA ve seçkin futbol kulüpleri arasındaki mücadeleden bahsedilecektir. Bu mücadelenin doğal ve tekrarlanan sonucu olarak, Avrupa futbol piramidi bünyesindeki düzen seçkin futbol kulüpleri tarafından parçalanmak ve Avrupa kıtası üzerinde Şampiyonlar Ligi'nin yerine geçecek, kapalı lig usulü bir turnuva düzenlemesi tehdidiyle, seçkin futbol kulüpleri var olan hegemonik düzen içerisinde kendi pozisyonları kurdukları hegemonik blok içerisine yeni aktörler katarak güçlendirmeyi hedeflemektedirler. Uzunca bir süre bu hegemonik düzen içerisinde aslan payını alan ve bu düzen içerisinde yer alan diğer futbol kulüplerini de kendi operasyonel pratikleri ve tercihleri doğrultusunda hareket etmek zorunda bırakan seçkin futbol kulüpleri, koronavirüsün(Covid-19) futbol piramidinin özellikle de futbol ekonomisi üzerinde yarattığı tahribatı fırsat bilip yeni bir hegemonik düzen yaratmak amacıyla Avrupa Süper Liginin kurmak istemişlerdir. Yeni, ayrılıkçı ve kapalı bir lig olarak tasarlanan bu organizasyon hem Avrupa futbol piramidini hem Avrupa futbolunun geleceğini

tehdit etmekte olduğundan, Avrupa Birliği'nin kendi hegemonik düzenini hem de bu düzeninin Avrupa futboluna genişletilmesini, uygulanmasını ve sürdürülmesini de tehdit etmektedir. Avrupa hegemonik düzeninin oluşması, bu hegemonik düzenin neleri kapsadığı ve Avrupa futboluna hangi kurumlar aracılığıyla genişletildiği ve uygulandığı anlatılacaktır.

Spor, amatör ruhla insanlar tarafından yapılabileceği, profesyonel olarak oynanabileceği veya seyirci ve taraftar olarak deneyimlenip zevk alınan, zaman ve mekân sınırlarını aşan, duygu yüklü çok boyutlu ve çok amaçlı bir aktivitedir. Spor, insan dramını en iyi şekilde temsil ettiği, insan duygularının ifadesi için bir platform sağladığı için tarih boyunca merkezi bir sosyal uygulama olup; bir insan kapasitesinin sınırları üzerine inşa edilmiş, kahramanların ve kötülerin hikâyesini anlatarak, büyük bir tutkuyla spora bağlı olan kitlelere hitap etmektedir. Spor yoluyla kalkınma programını benimseyen ve uygulayan çeşitli uluslararası kuruluşlar arasında, Birleşmiş Milletler sporu bir kalkınma aracı olarak harekete geçirme konusunda kurumsal ve idari kapasitesi nedeniyle öne çıkmaktadır. Kalkınma, kavramsallaştırılması ve neleri kapsamı gerektiğini saptaması zor olan geniş bir kavram olsa da, spor aracılığıyla insani yardım, kalkınma ve barış için spor olmak üzere sınıflandırılabilir. Uluslararası kuruluşlar, özellikle de Birleşmiş Milletler, sporu çatışma çözümü ve kültürler arası anlayış; fiziksel, sosyal ve toplumsal altyapının oluşturulması; eğitim yoluyla farkındalık yaratmak; yetkilendirme; fiziksel ve psikolojik sağlık ve genel refah üzerinde doğrudan etki; ekonomik kalkınma ve yoksulluğun azaltılması amacıyla kullanmayı planlamaktadır. Bu yeni aşama uyarınca, sporu yaymak ve geliştirmek için bir teşvik programı kurgulayan Birleşmiş Milletler, öncelikleri doğrultusunda sporun kalkınma programlarına dâhil edilmesini sağlamak; barış, sosyal ve cinsiyet eşitliği anlayışını teşvik etmek, diyalog ve uyumu savunmak için spor temelli dayanışma ve işbirliği ağlarını kurmak ya da kurulmasını teşvik etmek; beden eğitiminin ekonomik ve sosyal kalkınmaya getirebileceği olumlu etkilerin tanınmasına teşvik etmek; spor altyapılarının inşasını ve restorasyonunu teşvik etmek; spor ve beden eğitiminin eğitim, sağlık, barış, sosyal ve kültürel kalkınmayı teşvik etme aracı olarak yerel ihtiyaçları göz önünde bulundurarak teşvik etmek; uluslararası organizasyonları ve Birleşmiş Milletleri sporu kalkınma için kullanmak isteyen bütün paydaşlar arasındaki koordinasyonu ve işbirliği sağlamak ve

uyum ve ortaklığı kolaylaştırmak için kurgulanmıştır. Birleşmiş Milletler, spor organizasyonlarının ve ikili kalkınma kurumlarının sürdürülebilir kalkınma ilkelerine, politikalarına, programlarına ve projelerine entegre edilmelerini ve bu uygulamaları benimsemeleri için politikalar üretmeyi ve uygulamayı hedeflemektedir. Ayrıca, BM sisteminin stratejik ve küresel düzeylerde politika diyalogunda öncü bir rol üstlendiğini; uluslararası aktörler ve diğer ortakların küresel ölçekte farkındalık yaratmak için çalışmalarını sürdürmelerini; mevcut ağları güçlendirmek ve aktörler arasındaki koordinasyonu geliştirmek, en nihayetinde proje ve programların yürütülmesini ve denetlenmesini, değerlendirilmesini sağlamayı amaçlamaktadır.

BM'nin kalkınma ve barış projelerini ve programlarını ilerletmek ve geliştirmek için sporu araçsallaştırması ve sporu milenyum kalkınma hedeflerine ulaşmak için kullanmayı amaçlaması, dünyanın çeşitli yerlerinde hem yerel yönetimler seviyesinde hem de ulusal seviyede kalkınma ve barış için sporu araçsallaştırma çabalarını genişletti ve hızlandırdı. Bu doğrultuda, Aids'in parçaladığı Doğu Afrika'da savunmasız gençlere kişisel sağlık ve cinsel sorumluluk öğretmek için; eski Yugoslavya'da çocuklara ve gençlere kara mayınlarının tehlikeleri hakkında bilgilendirmek için; İsrail, Kuzey İrlanda ve Güney Afrika'da farklı etnik ve dini kökenlerden gelen çocuklar ve gençler arasındaki iletişimi ve işbirliğini teşvik etmek için spor çeşitli şekillerde kullanılmıştır. Dünyanın çeşitli yerlerinde sporun kalkınma ve barış için kullanılmasına yönelik çabalar farklı amaçları olan kurumlar ve kuruluşlar tarafından benimsenmiş olmasına rağmen, proje ve programların oluşturulması ve uygulanması sırasında belli başlı eksiklikler bulunmaktadır. Bu doğrultuda, BM, kalkınma ve barış için sporu kullanma çabalarını benimseyen aktörlerin, uluslararası koordinasyon sağlayarak ve bilgi transferini kolaylaştırarak, denetleme, sürdürülebilirlik konusundaki eksikliklerini gidermeye çalışmıştır. Bu gereksinim, projeleri uygulayan kuruluşlar ile hedef gruplar arasındaki uyumsuzluklardan ve kopukluklardan ortaya çıkmıştır. Hedefler ve projelerin kurulum ve uygulanması aşamasındaki tutarsızlıklar, yerel halkların yeterince anlaşılabilmesi, ihtiyaçlarının belirlenememesi, yetersiz ve zayıf diyalog gibi sebeplerden ötürü BM'nin yol göstericiliğine ve liderliğine ihtiyaç olmasına yol açmıştır. BM'nin kalkınma ve barış için sporu adeta kendi bünyesinde toplaması ve her türlü çabayı tek elden koordine etmeye, planlamaya ve yönetmeye çalışması, yukarıdan aşağıya ve herkese uyacak tek

beden yaklaşımı, sporun gelişmesinde ve yayılmasında ısrarcı olan emperyal, neo-kolonyal ve neo-liberal tahakküm ve sömürü biçiminin bir uzantısı olarak gözükmektedir. Sporun, katılımcıları, sosyalleşme, eğitim ve müdahaleye dayalı bir gelişim modeline bağlı olarak egemen sınıf tarafında sosyal açıdan faydalı ve kültürel olarak normatif bir karakter oluşturucu olarak kullanılmıştır. Güç ilişkilerini, hiyerarşik ve hegemonik düzeni korumak, kültürel hegemonyayı sürdürmek ve yoksulluk ve ayrıcalığın kurumsallaşmasının devamını sağlamak için belirli bir şekilde tasarlanmış ve sürdürülmesi için kalkınma ve barış için spor programlarından faydalanılmıştır.

Mega-spor olayları, genellikle süreksiz, olağan dışı, uluslararası ve büyük oluşumlardır, ancak bu tanım mega-spor olaylarının özünü tam olarak yansıtmamaktadır. Mega-spor olaylarının en doğru şekildeki tanımı şöyle yapılabilir; dramatik bir karaktere sahip, kitlesel popülerliğe ve uluslararası öneme nazır olan büyük ölçekli kültürel, ticari ve sportif etkinliklerdir. Mega-spor etkinlikleri, sermaye, insan ve cazibe için sürekli bir rekabet döngüsünün olduğu gösteriler sunar. Ayrıca mega-spor etkinlikleri, ulusların rekabeti ile birleşen tekelci konum, münhasır yayın hakları, ticarileştirme ve spor medya iş dünyası arasındaki ittifak yoluyla büyütülen uluslararası bir önemi garanti eder. Spor diplomasisi, aktörlerin hem ulusal hem de uluslararası siyasette yeni bir alan sunmaktadır. Devletler, insanların ilgisinden ve dikkatinden yararlanmak istedikleri için mega-spor etkinliklerine ev sahipliği yapmak isterler ve bunun için hem sermaye hem de insan kaynaklarını seferber ederler. Devletler, uluslararası prestijlerini arttırmak veya bozulmuş ve azalan imajlarını iyileştirmek, bölgesel ve uluslararası dış politika hedeflerine ulaşmak için, ülkelerinin özenle hazırlanmış yeni bir imajını veya mesajını dünyaya sunarlar. Mega-spor etkinliklerine ev sahipliği yapmak, ev sahibi ülkeye, insanların zihinlerini ve kalplerini fetheden kültürlerine, tarihlerine dayalı bir hedefi yansıtmaya imkanı sunar. Spor, kültür, bilgi, dil, sanat ve müziğin sürekli etkileşim içerisinde olduğu başka bir düzeyde işler. Bu unsurlardan elde edilen çekim birikimi, değerler ve ideolojilerden, güvenilir ve önde gelen kurum ve politikalardan ve kültürden öykünen yumuşak gücün artırılmasını kolaylaştırabilir. Yumuşak güç, zorlamanın aksine cazibe yoluyla hedefler ulaşmayı amaçlar ve sadece ikna etmeyi değil aynı zamanda da baştan çıkartma ve cezbetme yeteneğidir.

Mega-spor olaylarına ev sahipliği yapmak ulusların yumuşak güçlerinin artması ve dış politika hedeflerine ulaşabilmeleri için büyük bir fırsat sunmaktadır. Doğu Asya bölgesi ülkeleri bu tür spor olaylarına ev sahipliği konusunda büyük bir tecrübeye sahiptir. Güney Kore ise çeşitli yıllarda hem kış olimpiyatlarına hem de dünya kupasına ev sahipliği yapmıştır. Güney Kore'nin ev sahipliği yapmasının arkasındaki motivasyon her bir organizasyon için farklı olup, hem ulusal ölçekte hem de bölgesel ve uluslararası ölçekte siyasi hedeflerine ve önceliklerine hizmet etmektedir. Güney Kore sırasıyla 1988 yaz Olimpiyatlarına, 2002'de Dünya Kupası'na ve son olarak 2018 Kış Olimpiyatlarına ev sahipliği yapmıştır. Öncelikli olarak, iç siyasette zorlu geçen yılların umutsuzluğunun ve zorluğunun halk üzerindeki olumsuz etkisini azaltmak ve kötü günlerin geride kaldığını kanıtlamak için yaz olimpiyatlarına ev sahipliği kararını almıştır. Güney Kore, sahipliği kararını alırken daha önce ev sahipliği yapmış ülkelerin nasıl bir hazırlık sürecinden geçtiğini, neler yaptığını, neleri hedeflediklerini ve başarılı olup olmadıklarını incelemiştir. Bu incelemelerinin odağında ise Japonya yer almaktadır. Mazileri sıkıntılı olan bu iki ülkenin, bölge üzerindeki hedefleri ve tahayyülleri örtüşmekte olup, birbirlerinin doğal rakibi konumundadırlar. Güney Kore, teraziyi kendi lehine çevirmek için ise sporun hapsedici ve kapsayıcı gücünden yararlanmayı amaçlamakta olup, ulusal, bölgesel ve küresel siyasi hedefleri için planlamalara ve uygulamaları başlamışlardır. Bu planların en önemli ayağını ise *Hallyu*(Kore Dalgası) oluşturmaktadır. Kore Dalgası, Güney Kore'nin kültürel birikimlerinin bir parçası olup, Güney Kore'nin yaptığı ev sahiplikleri sonucunda dünyaya tanıtılmıştır. 2002 Dünya Kupasından sonra, Güney Kore özellikle yarattığı ve dünyaya sunduğu Kore Dalgası hem kendi bölgesinde hem de dünyada birçok kişiyi, topluluğu ve milleti etkilemeyi başarmış, dolayısıyla ülkenin yumuşak gücüne büyük bir katkı sunmuştur.

Güney Kore tecrübesinin ve başarısının aksine, mega-spor etkinliklerine ev sahipliği yapan her devletin yumuşak gücünde ve uluslararası imajında bir gelişme ve ilerleme kaydedememektedir. Katar, daha önce bölgesel ölçekte birçok kez spor organizasyonlarına ev sahipliği tecrübesine sahip olmasına rağmen, küresel ölçekteki ilk ev sahipliği hakkını 2022 dünya kupası için kazanmıştır. Hem bu hakkı kazanırken Katar aleyhinde ortaya atılan yolsuzluk iddaları, işçi ve insan haklarının tamamen görmezden gelinmesi ve delinmesi, Katar'ın ulusal, bölgesel ve küresel hedeflerinin

gerçekleşmesindeki en büyük problemlerdendir. Katar kendisini dünyaya profesyonel ve aldığı sorumlulukları yerine getirebilen bir ülke olduğu imajını çizmek isterken, ulusal ölçekte ülke halkını obeziteye ve sağlıksız yaşam karşısında bilgilendirmek ve onları spor aracılığıyla sağlıklı bir yaşama alıştırmak, kendi bölgesinde de barış ve istikrarı özendirme hedeflemektedirken, daha ev sahipliği görevini yerine getirmeden yumuşak güç ve itibar kaybına uğramıştır.

Futbolun dünyanın çeşitli bölgelerine yayılması, popüleritesinin kademeli ve istikrarlı bir şekilde artması, futbolun sahadaki etkisini aştı. Futbol, 20. yüzyıl boyunca totaliter rejimleri meşrulaştırma aracından dayanışmayı ve halk arasındaki bütünlüğü sağlamaya kadar birçok işlevi yerine getirmek için kullanılmıştır. Totaliter rejimler, üstünlük göstererek, toplumsal aktörleri kontrol altında tutarak, uluslararası itibar kazanarak, halk nezdinde morali yükselterek ve toplumu bir arada tutarak, kendi güçlerini pekiştirmeyi ve genişletmeyi amaçlamaktadırlar. Hükümetler ve rejimler, kitlelerin heyecanını belli bir seviyede tutmak, bir mesaj etrafında birleştirmek için mega-spor olaylarını kullanmayı tercih etseler dahi, bu etkinliklerin belirli bir sürede tamamlanmasına karşın spora her gün veya her hafta maruz kalmak kitleleri kontrol altında tutmak için daha etkili bir yöntem olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Totaliter rejimler, uyum ve dayanışma sağlayabildiği, entegrasyonu ve disiplini teşvik edebileceği ve kitlelerle duygusal bir bağ kurabileceği, coşku uyandırabileceği için sporun yarı dini doğasından yararlanmayı tercih ederler. Sporun kitlelerin tutum ve tercihlerini kontrol etme, yönlendirme ve şekillendirme işlevi, hegemonik sınıfın veya zümrenin hegemonyasını sürdürmek için büyük bir öneme sahiptir. Belli bir toplumsal düzeni korumak, arzu edilen bir kimliği inşa etmek ve desteklemek, farklı muhalefet biçimlerini ortadan kaldırmak, uluslararası prestij ve destek aramak için politikaların oluşturulması ve uygulanması sporu araçsallaştırmanın merkezinde yer almaktadır. Totaliter rejimler politikalarını yukarıdan aşağı bir şekilde uyguladılar dahi, bazıları hegemonik konumlarını sürdürmek için tam bir tahakküm tercih ederken, bazıları hegemonik bir düzen yaratmak için rıza üretmeyi tercih etmektedir.

Mussolini'nin İtalyasında, futbol (*calcio*), faşist rejimin popüleritesini arttırmak, gücünü ulusal ölçekte pekiştirmek, uluslararası arenadaki prestijini arttırmak ve rejimin gücünü dünyaya kanıtlamak ve göstermek amacıyla kurumsallaştırılmış ve merkezileştirilmiştir. Faşist yönetimin ilk yıllarında, rejim için

sağlam bir zemin oluşturmak, hegemonik bir düzen yaratmak ve yaratılan bu düzendeki hegemonik konumunu güvence altına almak için başvurulan yöntemler genellikle kontrol, zor ve baskıyla ilgiliyken, daha sonrasında rejim temel amacının rıza üretmek olduğu bir normalleşme sürecine yönelmiştir. Rejim, organiz, vatansever ve milliyetçi bir kimlik inşa etmeyi; yeni siyasi düzeni ve toplumu temsil edebilecek sporcular yetiştirmeyi; ve milli ve ulusal yenilenme sürecini başlatmayı amaçlamıştır. Rejim tarafından belirlenen hedeflerin bütünlüğü ve yoğunluğu, sporun orgnaizasyonel yapısında yerel, bölgesel ve ulusal düzeyde bir reform sürecini gerekli kıлып, spor üzerinde Faşist rejimin tamamen hâkimiyete sahip olmasını amaçlamaktadır. Rejimin spora olan ilgisi, siyasetteki ve toplumdaki hegemonik yapının ve hiyerarşik düzenin hem spor içinde hem de spor sayesinde üretilebileceği fikrinden ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu doğrultuda, İşten Sonra (*Opera Nazionale Dopolavora*), Faşist Gençlik Kolordosu (*Opera Nazionale balilla*) gib çeşitli örgütler kurularak rejimin spor üzerindeki etkisinin artırılması ve genişletilmesi hedeflenmiştir. Bu örgütler, rejimin yeni bir beden eğitimi kültürü geliştirilmesinde ve Faşist bir kimliğin oluşturulmasına odaklanmış olup, rejimin ulusal ölçekteki politikalarının yerel düzeyde uygulanmasından ve denetlenmesinden sorumlulardır.

Faşist rejimin sporun merkezileştirilmesindeki bir sonraki adımı, futbolun yeni dönemin taleplerine ve gerçeklerine göre yeniden yapılandırmasıdır. Faşist dönemde ve öncesinde de İtalyan futbolu belli başlı kriz dönemlerinden geçmiş olup, kronikleşmiş mali sorunlar, sorumsuzluk, büyük küçük kulüpler arasındaki güç dengesizliği, oyunun kalitesizliğinden kaynaklanan taraftar sayısındaki yetersizlik gibi problemlere aşınadır. Bu sorunların çözümü, rejimin futbol üzerindeki hâkimiyetinin artması ve genişletilmesi için uygun bir ortam yaratmıştır. Rejim, kontrol altına alınmaz ise futbolun hükümetin ve partinin baskıcı ve dönüştürücü tedbirlerine karşı başkaldıracağını düşündüğünden, kulüpler arasındaki çatışmacı ortamı yumuşatmayı, amatör sporcuların profesyonelliğe geçişinin kolaylaştırılmasını ve vergi işlemlerini düzenleyerek yeni ve kendisinin kontrolünde olan hiyerarşik düzen yaratarak, rıza üretimi futbol aracılığı ile gerçekleştirmeyi hedeflemiştir.

Futbol, hayali bir topluluk kavramını en iyi şekilde yakalamaktadır çünkü oyuncular hem saha içinde hem de saha dışında bir kimliği temsil eder ve onun için mücadele eder. Futbol, insanlara bir yerle özdeşleşmek, bağlanmak için güçlü bir

ortam sunmaktadır. Futbol kulüpleri bir bölge, şehir, kasaba veya mahalle gibi yerlerle bağlantı kurmayı kolaylaştırdığı için ulusal bölgesel veya yerel kimliklerin ifade edilmesi için aracı olurlar. Franco yönetimindeki yeni İspanyol rejimi, futbolun İspanya için önemini farkında olup, toplumda itaat etme, boyun eğme ve askeri disiplin gibi aşırı milletçi özellikleri aşılama için futboldan yararlanmaya çalışmıştır. Rejim, futbolu, iç istikrarsızlığı ve huzursuzluğu hafifletmek, ülkedeki farklı etnik gruplar arasında mevcut olan bölgesel, kültürel ve dilsel farklılıkları ortadan kaldırmak veya en azından sınırlamak, İspanyol milliyetçiliğini teşvik etmek için kullanmıştır. Franco'nun İspanya'nın gelecek tasarısına gelen muhalif görüşler ve sesler, kültürel ve sembolik ayrılıkçı hareketler futbol kulüpleri bünyesinde temsil edilmeye başlanmıştır. Hegemonik bir yapıdaki güç konfigürasyonları, aktörlerin ve kurumların kültürlerini ve alışkanlıklarını onaylamak, uyarlamak, müzakere etmek, yeniden şekillendirmek için refleksif ve üretken kapasitelerini belirten ve gösteren bir etkileşim bütününe işaret etmektedir. Franco rejimi, İspanyol toplumunun ve siyasetinin her unsurunun merkezileşmesinin ve herhangi bir bölgesel hırsın veya kimliğin, bununla birlikte her türlü ayrılıkçı kültürel sembolün ve kurumsal iradenin itibarsızlaştırılmasına ve pasifize edilmesine yönelik politikalar izlemiş ve uygulamıştır. Franco rejiminin tasarladığı örgütsel yapı, güç konfigürasyonları ve kimlik temelli hegemonik yapı, demokrasinin gelişimiyle birlikte derin ve kapsamlı bir dönüşüm gerçekleştirmiştir. Güç ve otoritenin merkezileşmesi, kontrol ve baskı, Franco'nun egemenliğinin mührü olmuştur, fakat bunların tümü demokrasiye geçiş sağlanınca restore edilmesi planlanmıştır. 1978 İspanyol Anayasası, merkezîyetçiler ve ayrılıkçılar arasında müzakere edilen ve temelinde entegrasyonu, birliği, uzlaşmayı ve bölgeci baskıları sonlandırmayı amaçlamıştır. İspanya içerisinde bulunan farklı bölgelerin ve milliyetlerin bir arada hoşgörülüyle yaşamasının garanti altına amaçlanmış olup, bu anayasa aynı şekilde futbola da tezahür etmiştir. Franco yönetiminin ilk yıllarından sonra, futbol giderek kültürel, dilsel ve etnik farklılıkları yansıtmak ve temsil etmek için kullanılmış olup, bu farklılıklar kendisini futbolun popüleritesi sayesinde garanti altına almıştır.

FIFA 1904 yılında kurulmuştur. Birleşmiş Milletler' den daha fazla üyeye sahip ve İsviçre Medeni Kanunu'nun 60. Maddesine göre kurulmuş kar amacı gütmeyen bir kuruluştur. FIFA organizasyonu içerisinde bir kongre, genel sekreterlik,

FIFA konseyi ve komiteleri bulunmaktadır. FIFA tüzüğü, stratejik denetleme ile yürütme, operasyonel ve idare işlevler arasında bir ayrım öngörmektedir. Fransa, Belçika, Danimarka, Hollanda, İspanya, İsveç ve İsviçre gibi Avrupa ülkelerinin önderliğinde kurulan FIFA'nın otoritesi ve meşruiyeti İngiltere ve Güney Amerika ülkeleri tarafından sürekli tehdit edilmiştir. FIFA üyeleri, sportif başarıları, siyasi sistemleri ve ekonomik güçlerindeki farklılıklara rağmen eşit statüyü paylaştıkları için, FIFA'da karar alma sürecini sekteye uğratan, çekişmeli ve uyumsuz spor kültürleri ile siyasi ve kültürel farklılıkların olduğu bir ortamda faaliyet göstermek zorunda kalmışlardır. FIFA, meşruiyet ve dünya çapındaki statü eksikliğinin problemlerini yaşamaya devam edip, küresel ölçekleri oyunları düzenleyebilecek ne otoriteye ne yetkiye ne de paraya sahipti ve dolayısıyla küçük bir aktör olarak kabul gördü. FIFA'nın erişiminin gerçek anlamda genişleten, FIFA'nın kuruluşu, FIFA'nın kurucu üyeleri arasında bulunan sömürgeci güçlerin daha fazla bölge ve nüfusu kontrol etme konusundaki daimi isteklerine karşın 1950'ler ve 1970'ler arasındaki dekolonizasyon dalgası olmuştur. Dekolonizasyon sürecinin bir sonucu olarak yeni ulus devletlerin ortaya çıkması, FIFA üyeliğini bir meşruiyet aracına dönüştürürken, Avrupa dışındaki ülkeler daha fazla saygı ve temsiliyet için FIFA'ya yönelmesi, FIFA'nın genişlemesini hızlandırmış ve FIFA'nın siyasi gücünü ve uluslararası paydaş olarak statüsünü pekiştirmiştir. FIFA'ya, Avrupa ve Güney Amerika ülkelerinin organizasyon içerisindeki ve dolayısıyla da futbol piramidindeki hegemonik konumuna tehdit olabilecek üyeler Afrika, Asya ve Karayipler'den katılmıştır. Avrupa ülkelerinin FIFA içerisindeki çıkarlarının giderek zayıflaması, Avrupalıları kendi egemenliklerine yönelik tehditleri püskürtmek için organizasyonel reformları hayata geçirmeye itmiştir, fakat dekolonizasyon süreciyle beraber ortaya çıkan yeni ulus devletler FIFA için fethedilmesi gereken bölgeler ve yeni pazarlar olarak değer kazanmıştır. Bunu başarmanın yolu ise bu ulus devletleri, FIFA içerisindeki seçimlerde kullanacakları oylar karşılığında küresel futbol ağına dahil edilmelerinden geçmektedir. Joao Havalenga bu süreçten yararlanarak ve FIFA'ya yeni katılan ülkelerin de desteğini alarak, bir manifesto yayınlamıştır. Bu manifestoda, Dünya Kupası'na katılımın arttırılacağına, sporun gelişimi için ihtiyacı ülkelere altyapı desteğinin verileceğinin, Avrupa ve Güney Amerika ülkelerinin FIFA üzerindeki hakimiyetinin ve tekelinin

ortadan kaldırılacağını garanti ederek FIFA'nın Avrupalı olmayan ilk başkanı seçilmiştir.

Havelange liderliğindeki FIFA, Adidas ve Coca-Cola gibi şirketlerle anlaşmalar yapmak için futbolun artan popülaritesine başvurdu ve böylece futbolda yeni bir ticarileşme ve profesyonelleşme çağı başlattı. Bu yeni çağ kamudan özele, misyondan pazara, sivil toplumdaki ticarete bir kaymayı öngördüğünden, Havelange yeni pazarlar içerecek, küresel sponsorlar çekecek olan erkekler Dünya Kupası'nı kazandı bir mega-spor etkinliğine çevirecek düzenlemeleri yapmak için kolları sıvadı. Havelange'ın halefi, Joseph Blatter, sponsorlar ve yayıncılarla çeşitli anlaşmalar yaparak, futbolun dünya çapında popülaritesini arttırmak için yeni düzenlemeleri hayata geçirdi. Bu doğrultuda, dünya genelinde altyapı yatırımları, kadın futbolunun geliştirilmesi ve yaygınlaştırılması, futsal ve plaj futbolu gibi yeni oyunların tanıtılması ve Dünya Kupası için katılım sayısının artırılmasını sağlayarak FIFA'nın gücünü ve statüsünü sağlamlaştırmayı başardı. Ayrıca, FIFA'nın operasyonlarında, yönetiminde ve finansal kaynaklarında devrim niteliğinde değişimler yapmak için hem Havelange hem de Blatter, FIFA'yı mutlak gücün başkanın elinde olduğu merkezi bir organizasyona dönüştürdüler. Bu liderler çağında FIFA başkanları, futbolun popülaritesini, FIFA'nın genişlemesini, sporun ticarileşmesini ve profesyonelleşmesini, televizyon ağlarının ve internetin yükselişini kendi güçlerini sağlamlaştırmak için kullandılar. Gücün tek bir elde toplanması ve giderek merkezileşmesi, FIFA'nın içerisinde uzun süredir devam eden yozlaşma ve kişisel kazanç kültürünün oluşmasına yol açmıştır. Bu liderler çağında misyonerlerin yerini pazarlamacılar, diplomatların yerini girişimciler almış olup, FIFA bireyler ve gruplar tarafından gelecek müdahaleler ve sömürü araçları karşısında giderek daha savunmasız hale gelmiştir. Havelange önderliğinde başlayan ve Blatter döneminde pekiştirilmiş gücün merkezileşmesi, liderlerin kendini FIFA'nın önünde görme, hesap vermeme ve yolsuzluğa dayalı yeni kurumsal bir kültür ortaya çıkmasına sebep olmuştur. FIFA'nın bünyesindeki en önemli organizasyon olan Dünya Kupası'na ev sahipliğinin belirlenmesi FIFA kongresinden FIFA başkanına ve onun yakın çevresine aktarılmıştır, dolayısıyla hesap verilebilirlik ve sorumluluktan yoksun bir kurumun içerisine kurumsallaşmış bir yozlaşma hakim olmuştur. Bu kültür, siyasi ve finansal ağların kendi çıkarları için nüfuz edebildiği bir kayırmacılık pratiği ortaya çıkarmış,

FIFA içerisindeki gücün kişisel çıkarlar ve hegemonik konumların yeniden üretilmesi gibi güç savaşlarına yol açmıştır.

Avrupa futbolu, futbolun daha fazla profesyonelleşmeyi, oyuncuların küresel göçünü, Avrupa futbol pazarındaki yayın haklarının özgürleştirilmesi ve özelleştirilmesini, metalaşmasını içeren büyük bir dönüşüm geçirmiştir. Bu dönüşümden bütün futbol piramidi etkilenmiş olsa da en büyük etkisi seçkin futbol kulüpleri ve UEFA arasında yaşanacak hegemonik bir mücadeleye yol açmış olmasıdır. Avrupa futbolunun en önemli organizasyonu olan Şampiyonlar Ligi üzerinde yaşanan bu mücadele, organizasyona katılımı, organizasyonun formatını, gelirin nasıl paylaşılması ile ilgili konularla detaylandırılmaktadır. Seçkin futbol kulüplerinin, Avrupa futbolundaki güç dinamiklerini değiştirme, karar alma sürecine daha fazla dahil olma, ve Avrupa futbol piramidindeki hakimiyetlerini genişletme istekleri, UEFA'nın Avrupa futbolu üzerindeki egemenliğini ve Avrupa futbol piramidinin bütünlüğünü koruyacak önlemler almaya ve politikalar üretmeye zorlamıştır. UEFA tarafından kabul edilen ve ortaya konan vizyon belgesi doğrultusunda, UEFA'nın çekişmeli bir ortamda faaliyetlerini nasıl yürütmesi konusunda bir çerçeve oluşturulmuş olup, UEFA'nın oyuna olan bağlılığı tekrar teyit edilmiş, zorluklar karşısında yeni bir tutum benimsenmiş ve Avrupa futbolunun geleceği için yeni bir rota benimsenmiştir. Belge, UEFA'nın Avrupa futbol piramidi içindeki hegemonik statüsünü, Avrupa futbol mirasının koruyucusu ve Avrupa düzeyindeki müsabakaların tek organizatörü olmasından kaynaklandığını belirtmektedir. UEFA'nın Avrupa futbol piramidi için hedef ve vizyonu, tüm seviyelerde dayanışmayı sağlamak, en güçlü ve en zayıf arasında bir denge oluşturmak, hem kulüpler hem de UEFA düzeyinde temsiliyeti sağlamak, temiz ve şeffaf yapılar oluşturmak, taraftarların futbola katılımını kolaylaştırmaktır. UEFA'nın vizyon belgesi, UEFA'nın Avrupa piramidindeki rolünün ve hegemonik statüsünün korunacağı daha iyi, sürdürülebilir ve kapsayıcı bir gelecek için çeşitli ilke ve hedefleri tanımlayıp bunları uygulamayı amaçlamaktadır.

Seçkin futbol kulüplerinin daha büyük finanslar fırsatlardan yararlanmaya yönelik baskıları, UEFA Şampiyonlar liginin Avrupanın seçkin kulüpleri için oyunun zirvesindeki konumlarını sağlamlaştıran bir gelir kaynağına gelmesine yol açıp, Şampiyonlar Liginin seçkin futbol kulüplerinin çıkarlarına göre yeniden gözden

geçirilmesine sebep olmuştur. Seçkin futbol kulüpleri, Avrupa futbolundaki hegemonik konumlarını genişletmek ve sağlamlaştırmak için lobi faaliyetleri yürütmek amacıyla G-14'ü kurmuşlardır. G-14 kulüpleri için aktif bir rol üstlenmek ve her düzeydeki yönetim organları ile yakın ilişkiler kurmak, futbolun kilit aktörleri olarak kulüplerin refah ve devamlılığını sağlamak, harcamaları kontrol altına almak için çözümler bulmak, UEFA ve FIFA ile işbirliği yapıp kulüpler ile bu otoriteler arasındaki iyi ilişkileri sürdürmek amacıyla örgütlenmiştir. UEFA, futbolun metalaşmasının bir avuç zengin futbol kulübünün gücünü arttırmakla kalmayıp, aynı zamanda Avrupa futbolunu düzenleye kuralları kullanma yeteneklerini ve etkilerini de arttırdıklarından, futbol piramidinin tüm seviyelerinde göreceli bir rekabet dengesi ve finansal dayanışma sağlamak için mücadele etmek zorunda kalmıştır.

UEFA, seçkin futbol kulüplerinin diğer futbol kulüplerinin genel stratejilerini şekillendirme ve dikte etme çabalarıyla mücadele etmeyi ve Avrupa genelinde finansal dayanışma ve rekabet dengesini koruyabilmek için yerel ve Avrupa düzeyindeki müsabakalardaki tek egemen olma amacını korumaktadır. Bu nedenle, yaygın bir iflas ve metalaşma tehdidi karşısında, UEFA, kulüpleri gelirleri ve giderleri arasında sürdürülebilir bir denge sağlamak amacıyla harcama stratejilerini daha iyi oluşturmayı hedefleyen kapsayıcı politikalar geliştirmeye başlamıştır. Finansal Fair Play kuralları, kulüplerin ekonomik ve finansal kapasitelerini geliştirmek, şeffaflık ve güvenilirliklerini arttırmak; alacaklarının korunmasına gereken önemi vermek ve kulüplerin çalışanlara, sosyal/vergi kurumları ve diğer kulüplere karşı yükümlülüklerini zamanında yerine getirmelerini sağlamak; kulüpleri gelirleri ölçüsünde faaliyet göstermeye teşvik etmek; Avrupa kulüp futbolunun uzun vadeli sürdürülebilirliğini korumak; Avrupa futbol kulüplerinin artan borçluluğuna ve kronik zarar döngüsüne karşı koymak amacıyla tasarlanmıştır. Avrupa futbolundaki finansal sorunlar, artan oyuncu giderleri nedeniyle yükselen borçlanma; özel veya kamusal hayırseverlere artan güven; mali kaynaklara erişimdeki eşitsizlikten kaynaklanmaktadır. Avrupa futbolu bir mücadele döngüsü içine girmiş olup, seçkin futbol kulüpleri mevcut piramit yapısına savaş açmıştır.

Avrupa futbol piramidi, yayın haklarının yeniden müzakere edilmesine, sponsorluk anlaşmalarının yeniden yapılandırılmasına ve maç günü gelir kayıplarına yol açan futbol müsabakalarının askıya alınması yüzünden finansal açıdan bir krize

girmiştir. Gelir kaybı, zaten borç döngüsüne girmiş olan futbol kulüplerinin finansal dayanaklılığını sarsmış, futbol kulüpleri, özellikle de seçkin futbol kulüpleri ayakta kalabilmek, rekabet edebilmek ve hakimiyet kurabilmek için yeni gelir kaynakları bulma arayışına girmiştir. Pandemi, futbol piramidinin içerisinde yaşanan finansal zayıflıkların daha görünür olmasına yol açarken, seçkin futbol kulüpleri ile UEFA arasında yaşanan hegemonik savaşı başka bir seviyeye taşıdı. Seçkin futbol kulüpleri, futbolun kapitalizme teslimiyetinin sürekli bir genişlemeyi gerektirdiği anlayışını benimseyerek, Şampiyonlar Ligi'ni Avrupa Süper Ligi'ne dönüştürmeyi amaçlayarak UEFA tarafından kontrol edilen Avrupa futbol piramidinin hiyerarşik düzenine karşı savaş ilan edip, yeni bir hegemonik düzen kurmayı amaçladılar. Bu ayrılıkçı lig, yirmi yılın aşkın süredir futbol kulüplerinin gündeminde olmasına rağmen, hiçbir zaman gerçekleşmemiştir, fakat seçkin futbol kulüpleri bu tehdidi kullanarak hem diğer futbol kulüplerine karşı ciddi bir üstünlük kazanmış hem de Avrupa futbol endüstrisinde yer alan çeşitli paydaşların farklı çıkarlarını ve önceliklerini bir araya getirmeyi başarmışlardır. UEFA ve seçkin futbol kulüpleri karşıt taraflarda yer alsalar da, UEFA bu kulüplerin mevcut hiyerarşik yapı içerisinde kalmalarını sağlamak için onlara giderek daha fazla güç kazandıracak taleplerine boyun eğmiştir. Mevcut hegemonik düzen, seçkin futbol kulüplerinin Avrupa futbol piramidindeki yeri dolduramaz ve vazgeçilmez rolünün UEFA tarafından kabul edilmiş ve onaylanmış hali olup, UEFA'nın her kararı seçkin futbol kulüplerinin piramit içerisindeki konumu hem pekiştirmiş hem de bu kulüplere piramit içerisinde saltanat sürme imkanı tanımıştır.

Bu fiili hegemonik düzen, en üst düzeydeki rekabeti birkaç futbol kulübüyle sınırlandırmış, bu imtiyazlı düzene meydan okuyabilecek birkaç tane daha futbol kulübü üretmiş, rekabeti genişletmek, temsili arttırmak ve seçkin futbol kulüplerinin ihtiyaçlarını karşılamak için diğer futbol kulüplerini bünyesine katmıştır. Salgın, futbol kulüpleri arasındaki güç dinamiklerini yeniden düzenleyerek, bazı seçkin futbol kulüplerinin göreceli gücünü ve satın alma gücüne zarar vermiş ve Avrupa Süper Ligi'nin gerçekleştirme sürecini hızlandırmıştır. Dünyanın en zengin kulüpleri, 2021'de futbolu yaklaşık bir asırdır birbirine bağlayan yapıları, ekonomiyi ve ilişkileri alt üst edecek yeni bir Avrupa kulüpleri şampiyonası kuracaklarını açıkladılar. Bu kulüpler içerisinde AC Milan, Arsenal FC, Atletico de Madrid, Chelsea FC, FC Barcelona, FC Internazionale Milano, Juventus FC, Liverpool FC, Manchester City, Manchester

United, Real Madrid CF ve Tottenham Hotspur yer almaktadır. Sermaye güçlerinin futbola sızması, Avrupa futbolunda her zaman planlanacak başka bir zafer, her zaman fethedilecek başka bir zirve, her zaman satın alacak başka bir oyuncu vardır şeklindeki egemen düşünceyi yaratmıştır. Futboldaki sistemik açgözlülük, futbol piramidi içerisinde yer alan her paydaşı esir alıp, bu düzenin sürdürülmesi için kültürel, sosyal veya insani mevcut her türlü sermayenin genişletilmesini ve sömürülmesini dikte etmiştir.

Geçtiğimiz yıllarda, Avrupa devlerinin eski güçlerini kaybettiği ve yerlerini nakit zengini seçkin futbol kulüplerinin kaptığı düzen ortaya çıkmıştır. Avrupa Süper Ligi, ligin içerisinde yer alan bütün futbol kulüplerinin çıkarlarına cevap verecek şekilde kurgulanmıştır. Avrupa Süper Ligi, paraya öncelik veren, zaten çoğu kulüpten daha fazlasına sahip olanlar tarafından kurgulanan, amansız, doyumsuz bir hırs peşinde olan ve parayı önceleyen bir girişimdir. Bu ligin kurucuları parayı her şeyin önüne koysalar dahi, amaçları değişkenlik göstermektedir. Örneğin Amerikan sermayesinin sahip olduğu Liverpool, Manchester United, Arsenal ve Tottenham Hotspur gibi kulüpler harcama sınırı, maaş tavanı ve çeşitli mali düzenlemelerle giderleri kontrol etmeyi amaçlarken; Chelsea ve Manchester City transfer pazarında harcamalara getirilen sınırlamaların kaldırılmasını ve gelir kaynaklarını kültürel ve siyasi meşruiyet kazanmak için kullanmayı amaçlamaktadırlar. Bu iki grubun yanı sıra, son yıllarda eski finansal üstünlüklerini kaybeden ve eski ihtişamlı günlerine dönmeyi hedefleyen İtalyan ve İspanyol kulüpleri bulunmaktadır. Bu grup, birinci grubun İngiltere Premier Ligi'nden elde ettiği gelir nedeniyle ölçülemez bir servete sahip olduğunu, ikinci grubun ise harcayacak sınırsız parası olduğundan, iki grubun varlığını da kendi güçleri için bir sorun olarak görmektedirler.

Avrupa Süper Ligi'nin kurulacağına açıklanması, UEFA, FIFA, yerel ligler, ulus devletler, Avrupa Birliği ve dünyanın her yerinden futbola gönül vermiş taraftarları ve hatta kurucu üyelerin taraftarlarını içeren beklenmedik bir ittifakın ortaya çıkmasına sebep olmuştur. UEFA, Avrupa düzeyindeki rekabetin egemen organizatörü ve Avrupa futbol piramidinin koruyucusu konumu koruduğu sürece, seçkin futbol kulüplerinin eylemlerini ve arzularını görmezden gelmiştir. UEFA'nın politika tercihleri, Avrupa futbolunu FFP ve Kulüp Lisanslama yoluyla düzenleme isteği ve bunun dışındaki eylemsizliği, seçkin futbol kulüplerinin UEFA'ya meydan

okumasının önüne geçip, mevcut Avrupa futbol piramidinden tam bir kopuş ilan edecekleri düzeye kadar güçlendirmiştir. UEFA'nın seçkin futbol kulüpleri tarafından kurulan hegemonik düzene suç ortağı veya ortak olarak katkı sağladı dönem, Avrupa Süper Lig'in ilanı ile sona ermiştir.

Premier Lig'den altı kulübün projeden çekilme kararı almasıyla Avrupa Süper Lig'i açıklanmasından 48 saat sonra dağılmış olup, İngiliz kulüplerinin çekilmesi bir domino etkisi yaratmış İspanyol Devletleri Barcelona ve Real Madrid, ve İtalyan temsilcisi Juventus dışındaki kulüplerin hepsi projeden çekilmiştir. Taraftarların artan baskısı ve yerel liglerden ihraç edilme tehdidi, özellikle finansal durumları iyi olan ve küresel bir hayran kitlesine sahip olan Premier Lig kulüplerinin ayrılığına sebep olmuştur. Başarısız Avrupa Süper Lig projesi, Avrupa futbol piramidinin geleceği için 3 şeyi net bir şekilde göstermiştir. İlk başta, projeyi yöneten kulüpler, Şampiyonlar Ligi'ne geçişin sağlandığı günden beri kendi güçlerinin ve iradelerinin sınırlarına tanık olmuştur. Avrupa futbol piramidinin tümüne kendi iradeleri dikte ettikleri günler, bu hegemonik projenin başarı olması durumunda ortaya çıkacak yeni hegemonik düzen dezavantajlı konuma düşecek olan aktörler tarafından karşıt hegemonik blokun ortaya çıkmasıyla durdurulmuştur. İkinci olarak, Süper Lig'in dağılması, farklı çıkar ve önceliklere sahip aktörlerden oluşan bir ittifak oluşturmuş olsa da, bu ittifak alternatif bir gelecek ve düzen için anlamlı bir öneri sunmayı amaçlamadığı için karşıt hegemonik tarihi blok haline gelememiştir. UEFA, bu hegemonik projeyi ortadan kaldırmak için kendisinin, FIFA'nın, ulus devletlerin ve Avrupa Birliği'nin zorlayıcı gücünü kullanmış, anca Avrupa futbol piramidinin geleceği için taraftarların ne istediğini belirlemekte ve harekete geçmekte yetersiz kalmıştır. İhraç tehdidinin ve diğer yaptırım biçimlerinin etkinliğine rağmen, taraftarlar, önerilen hegemonik projeye karşı bu ittifaktaki tüm aktörleri bir arada tutan yapıştırıcı görevini üstlenmiş, hırs, zafer ve metalaşmanın oluşturduğu baskın kültüre ve anlayışı meydan okumuştur. Üçüncüsü, bu ittifak sadece karşı hegemonik tarihi blok oluşturma konusunda başarısız olmakla kalmayıp, aynı zamanda Avrupa futbol piramidini yöneten kuralları ve ilkeleri yeniden organize etme konusunda da yetersiz kalmıştır. UEFA, sadece bu futbol kulüplerini güçlendirmeye hizmet eden ve onları buldukları noktaya ve konuma getiren politikalarından vazgeçmemeyi tercih etmiş, Şampiyonlar Ligi'nin yeni yapısını, grup

aşamasını tamamen kaldırarak, lig formatında ilerleyecek, takım sayısını ve garanti maç sayısını arttıracak şekilde yeniden düzenlemiştir.

Avrupa Süper ligi projesinin hayata geçmesi, hem futbol piramidi içinde hem de dışında çeşitli aktörlerden oluşan karşı hegemonik bir bloktan gelen baskın muhalefet karşısında başarısızlık ile sonuçlanmıştır. Bu aktörler, Avrupa futbol mimarisi ve geleceği açısından birbirleriyle uyuşmayan ve bazen çatışan çıkarlara sahip olsalar da, futbol piramidinin mevcut hiyerarşik ve kurumsal düzenine zarar verdiğini düşündükleri Avrupa Süper Ligi projesini dağıtmak için bir araya gelmişlerdir. Avrupa Süper Ligi'nin duyurulmasının yaşanan fiyasko, AB tarafından bir önlem alınmasını gereksiz kılmış olsa da, Avrupa Süper Ligi, Avrupa Birliği'nin yıllardır öncelik verdiği ve savunduğu futbolun sosyal ve politik değerlerini bozma ve baltalama potansiyeline sahip olduğu net bir şekilde görülmüştür. Başarısızlıkla sonuçlanan Avrupa Süper Ligi projesi, futbolun içerisinde yer alan tüm paydaşlar için bozuk ve kusurlu bir sistem olan Avrupa futbol piramidindeki mevcut güç dinamiklerinin, yapılarının, baskın ahlakın ve fikirlerin sürdürülmesine sebep olmuştur. Bununla birlikte, mevcut hiyerarşik düzen ve kurumsal çerçeve, oyunun bütününe yönetmeye ve düzenlemeye devam etmiştir. Avrupa Süper Ligi projesi, insanları futboldan daha da uzaklaşmasına ve yabancılaşmasına, yerel liglerinin dokusunun ve öneminin yok edilmesine, Avrupa futbolunun tamamen yeniden düzenlenmesi gerekliliğine, sportif liyakat ve rekabet dengesine ilişkin belirsizliklere ve pazardaki hakim konumun suiistimal edilmesine sebep olmakla beraber, kartelleşmeye ve oligarşiye yol açacak olup AB'nin futbol üzerindeki hegemonik projesini baltalamaya yol açabilirdi. AB'nin sporu düzenleme ve kullanma konusundaki kararlığı uzun zamandır kurumsal gündeminde yer almış olup, temelleri Amsterdam Anlaşması ile başlamış, Helsinki Raporu ve Nice Deklarasyonu ile devam etmiş, Avrupa Komisyon'un raporu ile bir çerçeve kazanmış ve Lizbon Anlaşması ile anlaşma bazlı hareket alanına sahip olmuştur. AB'nin spor ve futbol üzerindeki hegemonik projesinin amacı bir Avrupa kimliği inşa etmek, Avrupa Adalet Divanı ve Avrupa Komisyonu gibi ulusütü mercileri kullanarak emeğin serbestleştirilmesini garanti altına almak ve yayın haklarının satılması için gerekli rekabet ortamının sağlanmasını ve piyasa ilkelerinin korunmasını hedeflemek olmuştur.

APPENDIX B: THESIS PERMISSION FORM/ TEZ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ / INSTITUTE

- Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Natural and Applied Sciences**
- Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Social Sciences**
- Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Applied Mathematics**
- Enformatik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Informatics**
- Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Marine Sciences**

YAZARIN / AUTHOR

Soyadı / Surname : IRGALI
Adı / Name : CAN
Bölümü / Department : Uluslararası İlişkiler / International Relations

TEZİN ADI / TITLE OF THE THESIS (İngilizce / English): THE MAKING OF EUROPEAN HEGEMONIC ORDER: HEGEMONIC STRUGGLES THROUGH FOOTBALL

TEZİN TÜRÜ / DEGREE: **Yüksek Lisans / Master** **Doktora / PhD**

- 1. Tezin tamamı dünya çapında erişime açılacaktır. / Release the entire work immediately for access worldwide.**
- 2. Tez iki yıl süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır. / Secure the entire work for patent and/or proprietary purposes for a period of two years. ***
- 3. Tez altı ay süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır. / Secure the entire work for period of six months. ***

** Enstitü Yönetim Kurulu kararının basılı kopyası tezle birlikte kütüphaneye teslim edilecektir. / A copy of the decision of the Institute Administrative Committee will be delivered to the library together with the printed thesis.*

Yazarın imzası / Signature

Tarih / Date

*(Kütüphaneye teslim ettiğiniz tarih. Elle doldurulacaktır.)
(Library submission date. Please fill out by hand.)*

Tezin son sayfasıdır. / This is the last page of the thesis/dissertation.